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2 Summary 
This dissertation explores how financial reporting enforcement differs in Europe and how these differences 
influence the materiality assessment and disclosure decisions made by the preparers of the financial 
statement. Furthermore, it analyses how financial reporting enforcement influences the auditors’ auditing 
efforts, which are made in conjunction with the impact of the enforcement of auditors and limitations on 
the auditors’ liability. However, research indicates that strict enforcement is a prerequisite for ensuring 
compliance with accounting regulations (Hail and Leuz 2006, Daske et al. 2008, 2013, Ernstberger et al. 
2012, Christensen et al. 2013, Leuz and Wysocki 2016). Nevertheless, enforcement remains at the 
discretion of the individual member states, which has led to heterogeneous enforcement despite recent 
attempts to strengthen and harmonise it (Hirtz et al. 2012, Christensen et al. 2013, Brown et al. 2014). This 
heterogeneous enforcement has created a particular need to understand how enforcement influences 
financial reporting if the primary users must be able to use it as a reliable source of information. This issue 
is investigated in the following three papers that compose this dissertation.  
The first paper of the dissertation analyses how the strictness in financial reporting enforcement varies 
across 17 European countries and the extent to which enforcement proxies in the existing accounting 
literature reflects the actual performed financial reporting enforcement. Based on survey responses from 
European enforcement bodies and regulatory specialists, the study observes extensive variations in the 
strictness of financial reporting enforcement across the European countries, despite ESMA’s efforts to 
achieve more homogeneous enforcement in Europe. Furthermore, existing enforcement indices used in the 
accounting literature do not generally correlate with the enforcement index developed in this study, which 
begs the question of what the existing enforcement indices of financial reporting are measuring. 
The second paper discusses how the strictness of financial reporting enforcement, the applied enforcement 
strategy, and the materiality assessment impact firms’ mandatory disclosure decisions. Based on a sample 
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covering 285 firms in 12 European countries, this study finds that immaterial items exhibit a significantly 
lower level of compliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements of IAS 36, than material items. This 
indicates that preparers conduct a materiality assessment when deciding on the level of mandatory 
disclosures, and that the materiality assessment considers both the absolute and relative size of the item 
being disclosed. The strictness of enforcement is a significant determinant of the level of compliance. 
However, this holds true only if the enforcement is based on either the deterrence enforcement strategy or 
a combination of the deterrence and persuasion enforcement strategies, as the persuasion enforcement 
strategy does not appear to influence the level of compliance. Furthermore, the study finds that the 
strictness of financial reporting enforcement does not significantly influence materiality assessment. Thus, 
the findings of this study do not support the argument that a strict enforcement forces preparers to 
disclose immaterial information.  
The third paper examines how the enforcement of financial reporting, the enforcement of auditors and the 
limitations to the auditors’ liability impact the auditors’ auditing efforts of the statutory financial report. 
Previous research suggests that strict enforcement makes auditors increase their audit efforts and that a 
limitation to the auditors’ liability makes auditors reduce their audit efforts. However, unlike prior research, 
this study distinguishes between different kinds of enforcement and applies an enforcement measure 
designed to capture this particular kind of enforcement as opposed to applying a general measurement of 
enforcement. Understanding how different kinds of enforcement affect the audit efforts may help 
regulators and enforcers to be better able to achieve the desired enforcement outcomes. Based on a 
sample of six countries, this study finds that a strict financial reporting enforcement and limitations to the 
auditors’ liability have a significant and negative influence on the audit efforts. Further, the strict 
enforcement of auditors has a positive and significant influence on the audit efforts. The study contributes 
to the literature by exploring how different kinds of enforcement impact the auditors’ auditing behaviour.   
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3 Resumé (Summary in Danish) 
Afhandlingen undersøger hvordan regnskabskontrollen i Europa varierer, og hvordan denne variation 
influerer på regnskabsaflæggernes vurderinger af væsentlighed og afgivne oplysninger. Yderligere 
undersøges det, hvorledes regnskabskontrollen influere på revisors’ revisionsindsats, når der tages behørigt 
hensyn til effekterne fra revisorkontrollen og begrænsninger i revisors’ erstatningsansvar. Forskningen 
viser, at en streng kontrol er nødvendig, for at sikre efterlevelsen af regnskabsreguleringen (Hail and Leuz 
2006, Daske et al. 2008, 2013, Ernstberger et al. 2012, Christensen et al. 2013, Leuz and Wysocki 2016). På 
trods af nylige tiltag for at styrke og harmonisere regnskabskontrollen, er den forblevet et nationalt 
anliggende, hvilket har medført en uensartet tilgang til regnskabskontrollen (Hirtz et al. 2008, Christensen 
et al. 2013, Brown et al. 2014). Den uensartede regnskabskontrol har medført et særligt behov for at forstå, 
hvordan regnskabskontrollen påvirker årsregnskabet, såfremt de primære brugere af årsrapporten fortsat 
skal kunne anvende det som en pålidelig informationskilde. Afhandlingen udgøres af tre artikler, der 
undersøger disse forhold nærmere.  
Afhandlingens første artikel undersøger, hvordan regnskabskontrollen i 17 Europæiske lande varierer og 
hvordan indeks over regnskabskontrol fra den eksisterende litteratur, afspejler den faktisk foretagne 
regnskabskontrol. Undersøgelsen finder, på baggrund af et spørgeskema udsendt til tilsynsmyndighederne i 
Europa og regulatoriske specialister fra et Big 4-netværk at der, på trods af ESMAs ambition om en mere 
ensartet tilgang til regnskabskontrollen i Europa, er en omfattende variation i styrken af den udførte 
regnskabskontrol. Hertil kommer, at det i artiklen udviklede indeks over regnskabskontrol ikke korrelerer 
med eksisterende indeks, som har været anvendt af regnskabslitteraturen, hvilket befordrer spørgsmålet, 
hvad disse anvendte indeks egentlig måler.  
Afhandlingens anden artikel undersøger, hvorledes regnskabskontrollens styrke, den anvendte 
kontrolstrategi og væsentlighedsvurderinger påvirker beslutningerne om afgivelse af påkrævet oplysninger 
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(mandatory disclosures). Undersøgelsen finder, på baggrund af en stikprøve bestående af 285 
virksomheder fra 12 Europæiske lande, at der afgives væsentligt færre oplysninger, påkrævet efter IAS 36, 
når det underliggende forhold er uvæsentligt, end når det er væsentligt. Dette indikerer, at 
regnskabsaflæggerne foretager en væsentlighedsvurdering, når de beslutter hvilke oplysningskrav de skal 
afgive, og at væsentlighedsvurderingen tager hensyn til både den absolutte, og relative størrelse, på det 
underliggende forhold. Regnskabskontrollens styrke er en væsentlig determinant for graden af efterlevelse 
af påkrævet oplysningskrav, såfremt at regnskabskontrollen er baseret på en afskrækkelses (deterrence) 
kontrolstrategi, eller en blanding af afskrækkelses (deterrence) og overtalelses (persuasion) 
kontrolstrategierne, idet en overtalelses (persuasion) kontrolstrategi ikke fremstår til, at influere på graden 
af efterlevelse. Undersøgelse finder yderligere, at regnskabskontrollens styrke ikke i væsentlig udstrækning 
påvirker væsentlighedsvurderingen. Argumenterne for, at en stærk regnskabskontrol tvinger 
regnskabsaflæggerne til at afgive uvæsentlige oplysninger finder således ikke støtte i nærværende 
undersøgelse.  
Den tredje artikel undersøger hvordan regnskabskontrollen, revisorkontrollen og begrænsninger i revisors 
erstatningsansvar påvirker revisors revisionsindsats ved revisionen af årsrapporten. Tidligere forskning 
indikerer, at en stærk kontrol får revisorerne til at øge deres revisionsindsats, og at begrænsninger i 
revisors erstatningsansvar får revisorerne til at reducere deres revisionsindsats. Til forskel fra tidligere 
undersøgelser differentieres der i nærværende undersøgelse mellem forskellige kontroltype, og der 
anvendes kontrol indeks som er designet til at måle disse specifikke kontroltyper, og ikke blot det generelle 
kontrol niveau. Undersøgelse finder, på baggrund af en stikprøve fra seks lande, at både en stærk 
regnskabskontrol og begrænsninger af revisors erstatningsansvar har væsentlig og negativ indflydelse på 
revisionsindsatsen. Yderligere, har en stærk revisorkontrol en væsentlig og positive indflydelse på 
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revisionsindsatsen. Undersøgelsen bidrager til den eksisterende litteratur ved at undersøge hvordan 
forskellige typer af kontrol influerer på revisionsindsatsen.   
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5 Objective, motivation and background 
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate how the enforcement of financial reporting in Europe 
differs and how these differences influence not only firms’ decisions on materiality and disclosure but also 
auditors’ auditing efforts.  
The intention of the general-purpose financial statement is to supply existing and potential capital 
providers with financial information (Healy and Palepu 2001, IASB 2010). Existing capital providers use the 
information to monitor how invested resources are managed (the stewardship perspective), which enables 
them to hold the management team accountable. Potential capital providers use the information to 
evaluate the return on possible investment opportunities (the valuation perspective). To achieve these 
objectives, the capital providers need information that is both transparent and comparable. However, 
despite several decades of financial reporting harmonisation1 among European countries, financial reports 
continue to exhibit national characteristics, reducing the comparability and transparency of financial 
information between different countries (Nobes 1998, 2006, Pope and McLeay 2011).  
The European Commission (EC) attempted in 2002 to increase cross-border transparency and the 
comparability of financial information by adopting regulation 1606/2002 (EP 2002). Regulation 1606/2002 
(known as the IAS regulation) requires listed firms in the European Union (EU) to prepare their consolidated 
financial statements in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) beginning in 
financial year 2005 (EP 2002). The EC expected that a higher degree of transparency and comparability 
would improve the efficiency of its capital markets (Ernstberger et al. 2012, Brüggemann et al. 2013). 
                                                          
1
 The Treaty of Rome (1957) stated that the objective of the European Economic Community (EEC) was to establish 
the free movement of capital (along with the free movement of persons, goods and services). This led to attempts to 
harmonise company laws by using Directives. Attempts were made at harmonising financial reporting through the 
Fourth (1978) and Seventh (1983) Directives. Both of these directives were repealed with the adoption of the new 
accounting directive in 2013 (Directive 2013/34/EU). 
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However, it is uncertain whether these expected benefits have materialised and if they have, whether they 
are caused by the adoption of IFRS or other changes in the institutional setting. 
Research indicates that the adoption of a set of high-quality accounting standards alone is insufficient to 
generate the expected benefits (Holthausen 2009, Barth et al. 2012, Ernstberger et al. 2012, Horton et al. 
2013, Humphery-Jenner 2013, Cascino and Gassen 2015, Leuz and Wysocki 2016). Therefore, the adoption 
of regulation 1606/2002 is unlikely to yield the expected benefits. However, research also indicates that the 
benefits of adopting a set of high-quality accounting standards are more likely to be realised if the adoption 
is coupled with changes in the institutional setting, i.e., the enforcement of financial reporting (Hail and 
Leuz 2006, Daske et al. 2008, 2013, Jackson and Roe 2009, Florou and Pope 2012, Ernstberger et al. 2012, 
Christensen et al. 2013). Consequently, it is likely that the expected benefits may have been realised not 
only by adopting a set of high-quality accounting standards but also through institutional changes, 
particularly in the financial reporting enforcement environment.  
The EC knew that enforcement of financial reporting would be important for achieving the benefits, writing 
in the IAS-regulation ‘…that a proper and rigorous enforcement regime is key…’ (EP 2002). The enforcement 
of financial reporting was left to the discretion of the individual member states. However, the EC did 
require that the member states should ‘...take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with IAS.’ (EP 
2002). Consequently, financial reporting enforcement in the EU remains largely heterogeneous despite 
recent attempts to strengthen and harmonise it (Hitz et al. 2012, Christensen et al. 2013, Brown et al. 
2014). Ongoing differences in financial reporting enforcement across the European countries have raised 
the question upon which this dissertation rests. This question is as follows: 
‘How does enforcement differ across European countries, and what are the consequences of these 
differences for financial reporting?’ 
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The answer to this question is important for several reasons. First, each year, the European countries 
devote a large amount of resources—both directly and indirectly—to enforcement without knowing what 
they will receive in return (Holthausen 2009, Humphery-Jenner 2013). A better understanding of financial 
reporting enforcement and its effects will enable decision makers to make more enlightened decisions 
about the future allocation of these resources. Second, an inadequate understanding of the effects of 
enforcement may cause countries to implement enforcement activities that directly harm the transparency 
and comparability of the financial reports and/or the effectiveness and efficiency of the capital markets. 
This will cause both current and potential capital providers to devote additional resources to their decision-
making process, thereby increasing transaction costs (Leuz and Wysocki 2016). Third, failing to fully 
understand the effects of financial reporting enforcement makes it difficult for countries to optimise the 
level of enforcement and the applied enforcement strategy relative to the resources applied and thus 
realising the beneficial effects of a set of high-quality accounting standards. Consequently, there is a need 
for a better understanding of how enforcement affects financial reporting.  
The rest of this introduction is organised as follows: section seven includes a general discussion of 
regulation and enforcement, materiality and the auditors’ liability and auditing efforts and the problems 
associated with measuring these items. Section eight describes the research method, and section nine 
presents the findings of the thesis. Section ten summarises the contributions and implications.  
6 Key concepts in the three articles 
6.1 Regulation and enforcement 
Governments pass regulations—for example, the IAS regulation—in an attempt to realise political 
objectives that are seen as beneficial for their citizens, communities and economy. Whereas regulations 
may set the goals, the accompanying enforcement ensures that the goals of the regulation are met because 
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a lack of enforcement will make it virtually impossible to achieve those goals (Leuz 2010, Humpher-Jenner 
2013, OECD 2014b). Therefore, there is a clear link between the regulation and its enforcement. The 
regulation establishes the objectives, frame and tools for enforcement, whereas the actual enforcement 
ensures both that the objectives of the regulation are achieved and that the regulation is generally obeyed 
(Coffee 2007, Jackson and Roe 2009, Humphery-Jenner 2013, OECD 2014a).  
Regulations and their enforcement differ between countries, but are rooted in their historical development 
and the general institutional setting of the individual countries (Shleifer 2005, Jackson and Roe 2009). The 
goals of regulation and enforcement are different. The general objective of regulation is to deter 
misconduct. For example, the objective of the regulation on financial reporting is to protect creditors 
(Brown and Tarca 2007, Leuz 2010, Ernstberger et al. 2012, Humpher-Jenner 2013, OECD 2014a, 2014b).  
In recent decades, governments have attempted to enhance regulatory quality by passing regulations that 
ensure regulatory transparency and accountability (Baldwin et al. 2010, 2012, OECD 2014a). This is done by 
applying the principles of ‘Better Regulation’, which aims to ensure that regulation and its enforcement are 
proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted (Baldwin et al. 2010, 2012, OECD 2014a).  
The success of regulation depends on more than well-designed rules; it also requires consistent and 
effective enforcement (Jackson and Roe 2009, Humphery-Jenner 2013, OECD 2014a, 2014b). Enforcement 
is an elusive concept without a clear definition, as discussed in Article 1. Based on this discussion, 
enforcement may generally be considered to include rules, procedures and activities of a preventive and 
detective nature that ensure compliance with a given regulation, such as accounting standards or security 
laws. According to Shleifer (2005), enforcement may be conducted through public institutions that enact 
rules and procedures and perform the activities necessary to ensure compliance with the regulation. This 
approach is known as public enforcement and is performed by national enforcement bodies such as the 
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SEC in the US, Erhvervsstyrelsen in Denmark, and FREP/BaFin in Germany. Conversely, rules, procedures 
and activities may also be enacted by private actors. This is known as private enforcement. One example of 
private enforcement is that of a class-action law suit against the preparers and auditors of financial reports 
(Höltken and Ebner 2015).  
A pure application of either public or private enforcement incurs social losses. In a purely public 
enforcement environment, these social losses are caused by governments or their officials attempting to 
exploit market participants. In a purely private enforcement environment, social losses are incurred as 
individuals attempt to exploit market participants by abusing their political, economic or social resources to 
damage or steal from their rivals. Social losses are minimised when the two enforcement approaches are 
mixed (Shleifer 2005). Consequently, the optimal institutional design for enforcement involves a trade-off 
between imperfect alternatives, which minimises the incurred social losses (Shleifer 2005, Armour et al. 
2009). As a practical matter, common law tends to be biased towards private enforcement, which is 
especially clear in the US, whereas European countries appear to favour civil law, which is biased towards 
public enforcement (Shleifer 2005, La Porta et al. 2006, Coffee 2007). This dissertation focuses on the 
effects of public enforcement, which is the predominant type of enforcement in Europe.  
Enforcement must be applied with due consideration to the institutional setting in which it operates. This 
means that enforcement activities that are highly effective in one country may be ineffective in another 
country (Leuz 2010). Consequently, numerous enforcement strategies have been developed. The 
dominant, most widely used enforcement strategies are the deterrence strategy, the persuasion strategy 
and a combination of the two (Baldwin et al. 2012).  
The deterrence enforcement strategy embraces the use of penalties and prosecution as the means of 
securing compliance. The penalties applied by this strategy are usually severe and include, inter alia, 
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criminal sanctions, licence suspension and license revocation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Baldwin et al. 
2012). The persuasion enforcement strategy works in the opposite manner to the deterrence strategy, 
attempting to secure compliance through dialogue, encouragement and education (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992). The deterrence and persuasion enforcement strategies may also be mixed, and in these instances, 
enforcement is based on a ‘tit-for-tat’ approach. This means that the enforcement process is initiated by 
attempting to convince and persuade (using dialogue, encouragement and education) the enforced entity 
into compliance. If the persuasion strategy is unsuccessful, the enforcer will begin to apply more punitive 
measures, following the steps in an enforcement pyramid2. These measures begin with non-penal actions 
and escalate to more punitive measures when prior efforts have failed to produce the desired results. The 
switch to punitive measures is essentially a switch from the persuasion enforcement strategy to the 
deterrence strategy. Enforcement by mixing deterrence and persuasion appears to be the most successful 
of the enforcement strategies and has been adopted by a host of governments and regulators worldwide 
(Scholz 1984, Baldwin and Black 2008, Baldwin et al. 2012, Choi et al. 2016).  
The chosen enforcement strategy must complement the regulation because otherwise, it may be 
impossible to implement the strategy. For instance, a deterrence strategy will be ineffective if the 
regulation loses its ability to impose sanctions. Similarly, the persuasion strategy will be ineffective if the 
regulation forbids enforcers from engaging in an open dialogue with the enforced entities. Furthermore, 
the enforcement strategy must consider the environment in which it must operate. Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992) finds that industries subject to many quick changes are best enforced through application of the 
persuasion strategy, as regulations may struggle to keep pace with the rapid changes of such industries. 
                                                          
2 
The enforcement pyramid is a hierarchical collection of enforcement tools that escalate from persuasion at the base 
to warning letters and civil penalties in the middle layers to criminal sanctions and licence suspension and revocation 
at the tip (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). The pyramid can also be applied to industries in which the base of the 
pyramid is self-regulation and enforced self-regulation and command regulation, with discretionary punishment in the 
middle layers and command regulation with non-discretionary punishment at the tip (Baldwin et al. 2012). 
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This also means that the full benefits of the persuasion enforcement strategy are only achieved if enforcers 
are authorised to perform ex ante enforcement, i.e., to engage in discussions with the enforced entity 
about how compliance may be reached on specific issues (Coffee 2007, Armour et al. 2009). 
6.2 Measuring the enforcement 
The number of studies investigating how enforcement impacts financial reporting has increased 
significantly during the last decade. However, as discussed in the first article, many of the enforcement 
indices used in these studies are noisy at best. This means that better measurements of enforcement might 
very well show that enforcement has an even stronger impact on financial reporting outcomes than 
identified by the prior literature (Holthause 2009). Furthermore, the existing studies all suffer from a 
common flaw, as none of those studies consider the effects of the applied enforcement strategy. 
Consequently, an appropriate first step in obtaining a better understanding of how the enforcement of 
financial reporting affects disclosure decisions, materiality assessments and the auditors’ auditing efforts is 
to obtain a more accurate measure of enforcement. Naturally, this raises the question of how enforcement 
should be measured.  
An accurate measurement of enforcement is difficult, if not impossible, as the measurement must consider 
not only the ‘rule of the book’ but also the actual applied enforcement activities and their effect 
(Holthausen 2009, Jackson and Roe 2009, Humphery-Jenner 2013). Mahoney (2009) claims that it is the 
rule, rather than the exception, that enforcement indices miss regulatory design features, with enormous 
practical consequences. However, these design features are likely to be captured by measuring the actual 
performed enforcement. Consequently, enforcement measures must measure more than just the ‘rule of 
the book’, as a strong regulation is inefficient if the enforcement environment is weak, i.e., if the regulation 
is not enforced as intended (Holthausen, 2009; Jackson and Roe, 2009; Humphery-Jenner, 2013). This point 
can be illustrated with an example of the enforcement sanctions (imposed by enforcers) that may be 
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measured in a ‘rule of the book’ enforcement index (for example, La Porta et al. 2006) versus an actual 
applied enforcement index (that of Johansen et al. 2018) index. La Porta et al. (2006) measure sanctions as 
the possible sanctions available. The Johansen et al. (2018) enforcement index measures the available 
action and whether these actions have been utilised by the enforcers. Consequently, the index measuring 
actual applied enforcement provides a more accurate and nuanced measurement of enforcement.  
6.2.1 Differences between the ‘rule of the book’ and actual applied enforcement indices 
The importance of applying an appropriate measure of enforcement has been discussed and exemplified by 
Jackson and Roe (2009). Jackson and Roe (2009) create three resource-based public enforcement measures 
and compare them to the ‘rule of the book’ public enforcement measure created by La Porta et al. (2006). 
La Porta et al. (2006) investigate how securities laws affect the development of the stock markets and find 
that laws mandating disclosures and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules strongly benefit 
the development of the stock markets. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2006) find that public enforcement 
plays only a modest role in the development of stock markets. In a comparative analysis, Jackson and Roe 
(2009) show both that public enforcement, based on the three resource-based enforcement indices, is 
associated with deeper securities markets and that private enforcement and liability rules do not 
significantly help develop the stock markets, which is the opposite of what La Porta et al. (2006) finds.  
The challenges of enforcement indices based on the ‘rule of the book’ and the practical application of that 
rule is also examined by Armour et al. (2009), who perform a comparative quantitative analysis of the 
enforcement of corporate law between the UK and the US, both of which are common-law countries with 
strong securities markets. Armour et al. (2009) find that directors in the UK are significantly less likely to be 
sued than in the US and that private enforcement of corporate law may not be crucial for strong stock 
markets. Furthermore, they observe that in some important ways, the formal UK rules provide a more 
potent protection for the shareholders than the US rules, but that the UK rules emphasise ex ante 
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enforcement rather than ex post litigation. This means that the UK appears to apply a persuasion 
enforcement strategy, whereas the US appears to apply a deterrence strategy.  
On a similar note, Mahoney (2009) documents the importance of measuring the actual enforcement of the 
rules rather than the ‘rule of the book’. He does this by illustrating how an amendment in an interpretation 
of Rule 23 (regulating class-action law suits in the US) in 1966 changed the premise of class-action lawsuits. 
This changed interpretation made it possible, without changing the formal rules, to reach a settlement and 
thus avoid an actual trial. Consequently, the nominal plaintiffs faded into the background and class actions 
evolved into a negotiation between plaintiffs’ counsel and the defendant in which the primary issue was 
the price the defendant is willing to pay to prevent future lawsuits. This and similar minor changes probably 
would not have been captured by enforcement measurements based on the ‘rule of the book’ (Mahoney, 
2009). These studies clearly show that the measurement of enforcement influences the end results of the 
performed analysis.  
However, these studies only capture one aspect of the problem, as existing enforcement indices also fail to 
consider the effects of different enforcement strategies. Different enforcement strategies have a 
perceivable impact on how enforcers act, behave and use the available enforcement options when 
performing enforcement activities, as indicated by Armour et al. (2009). Therefore, an accurate 
measurement of financial reporting enforcement must also consider enforcement strategy. This is 
attempted the enforcement index in article 1, as it not only captures relevant aspects of the formal rules 
and their practical application but also considers the applied enforcement strategy.  
6.3 Materiality 
Materiality assessments are made throughout the preparation of the financial report and concern decisions 
about recognition, measurement, disclosures and presentation. Consequently, the use of materiality 
assessments is pervasive and has a substantial impact on the information made available to the users of the 
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financial report. For this reason, materiality assessments must be made with due consideration to how 
information reasonably could be expected to influence the decisions of current and potential capital 
providers (primary users) (IASB 2010, 2017, FASB 2015). Even so, the impact of materiality assessments on 
the financial report has received little attention in the academic literature. This is strange because studies 
indicate that users are struggling with the concept (ESMA 2012). Preparers, auditors and regulators are also 
criticised for not applying the materiality assessment correctly, which causes the financial reports to 
become complex and opaque, especially in regard to disclosures (FRC 2009, 2011, ESMA 2011, 2012, IAASB 
2012, IASB 2013, 2015a, 2015b).  
The second paper investigates whether preparers apply a materiality assessment and how that assessment 
influences their disclosure decisions with respect to mandatory disclosures. This is done by estimating the 
quantitative materiality threshold for the individual firms in the sample and comparing it with the firm’s 
level of compliance with the mandatory disclosures of IAS 36. I acknowledge that this method introduces 
several problems, especially for the materiality assessment of disclosures, which are less suited for 
assessment based on a predetermined threshold (IASB 2010, 2017). The reason for this is that disclosures 
may be purely descriptive and/or explanatory in nature and have a book value of zero, which all are 
assessed poorly against a predetermined threshold. Even so, the existing literature indicates that preparers, 
auditors and regulators often assess materiality based on different quantitative thresholds (Iskandar and 
Iselin 1999, Iselin and Iskandar 2000, Gleason and Mills 2002, Eilifsen and Messier 2014, FASB 2015, 
Christensen and Ryttersgaard 2016). Iselin and Iskandar (2000) find that auditors apply higher thresholds 
for disclosed items than for recognised items. Christensen and Ryttergaard (2016) find that the preparers 
primarily focus on quantitative measures, including the absolute amount, when making their disclosure 
decisions. Gleason and Mills (2002) observe that the level of disclosures for contingent tax liabilities 
increases with the amount of the tax claim, which indicates that the absolute amount is used to assess the 
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materiality of the tax claim. Consequently, the applied measurement of the materiality assessment utilised 
in the second article is in line with how preparers, auditors and regulators have been found to apply the 
materiality concept in practice.  
Although the applied measurement is in line with the prior literature, it does deviate from the ideal 
materiality assessment measure for disclosure. This measurement would focus significantly more on the 
qualitative considerations of the assessment than on the quantitative thresholds. A more qualitative-
focused measure is not applied because that would require access to privileged information to assess 
whether undisclosed information is immaterial or should have been disclosed. However, it is believed that 
the quantitative threshold applied by preparers, auditors and regulators is a fair proxy for the materiality of 
an item. This is considered to be especially true when measuring the disclosure materiality of impairment 
tests. The reason for this is that several of the disclosure requirements of IAS 36 relate to the premises of 
performing the impairment test, i.e., information about the discount rate, growth rate, etc., rather than the 
actual impairment charges. Consequently, the absolute and relative size of the line items should have a 
direct impact on the number of disclosures provided by firms. In this regard, goodwill is particularly 
important, as impairment charges must be offset against goodwill before other assets in the cash 
generating unit (CGU) (IAS 36.104a) and because goodwill must be tested for impairments at least once a 
year. 
6.4 Auditors’ auditing efforts and limitations on auditors’ liability 
Auditors provide independent assurance of the credibility of the financial information in financial reports, 
thereby improving resource allocation and contracting efficiency, which means that auditors have a 
significant influence on the value users attach to the financial report (DeFond and Zhang 2014). However, 
these users only attach value to the auditors’ work if they expect the audit to be performed in accordance 
with the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and the auditors can compensate for potential 
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losses caused by a poorly performed audit. However, auditors will only accept an audit engagement if the 
engagement risk is assessed as acceptable (Knechel et al. 2007). The engagement risk originates from three 
sources: reputational risk, regulation risk and litigation risk.  
Reputational risk represents the risk that an auditor’s reputational capital is impaired, which will reduce his 
ability to attract new clients and retain existing clients. Building reputational capital is time consuming and 
costly, as the auditor’s reputation can only be built slowly over time (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Therefore, 
large reputational capital provides the auditors with an incentive to deliver high-quality audits, which may 
not only increase the auditor’s reputational capital but also reduce the risk of impairing it. Regulation risk is 
the risk of regulatory intervention that subjects auditors to sanctions, including fines and criminal penalties. 
The auditor may counter this risk by lobbying against such regulatory changes. Litigation risk exposes the 
auditor to financial penalties from damage claims and has the potential to ruin both the audit firm and the 
auditor. Prior studies suggest that auditors may reduce their exposure to these three types of risk by 1) 
increasing the audit quality by making additional audit efforts, 2) bearing the risk by charging a risk 
premium (which is used to cover potential fines and lost future earnings from an impaired reputation), 3) 
avoiding the risk through client retention and acceptance, and/or 4) reducing the risk through lobbying for 
reduced legal liability. The three types of risks are not independent of each other, as financial penalties are 
likely to result in some impairment to reputational capital (DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
It has previously been debated whether limitations on the auditor’s liability will affect the value of the audit 
(London Economics 2006, EC 2007). Whereas the majority of auditors believe that limitations on the 
auditor’s liability will not affect how the audit is performed, users appear to have a different opinion, as 
45% of institutional investors believe that financial reports audited under a regime with limited auditor 
liability will provide a less true and fair view (London Economic 2006). This view is especially strong in 
countries with limitations on the auditor’s liability, as 51% of the preparers in these countries believe that 
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financial reports provide a less true and fair view. Prior studies suggest that auditors charge a risk premium 
in countries without limitations on the auditor’s liability (Taylor and Simon 1999, Fargher et al. 2001, Choi 
et al. 2008, DeFond and Zhang 2014). However, none of these studies consider the effect of financial 
reporting enforcement or the enforcement of auditors.  
Article three investigates how audit efforts are affected by enforcement of and limitations on the auditor’s 
liability. Audit efforts are proxied by the size of the audit fee. This is not the ideal measurement of the audit 
efforts but is the best available proxy. The ideal measurement of audit efforts would be the number of 
hours used by the auditor on the individual firms, but this information is not available.  
7 Research methods and data  
Methodology refers to the techniques and tools used to conduct research. A significant part of the 
dissertation is based on primary data, as existing data are inadequate to perform the necessary analysis. 
The primary data are collected by using document analysis and surveys and are supplemented with data 
from large public databases such as DataStream and Worldscope.  
7.1 Survey 
A survey methodology was used in the first article to analyse variations in financial reporting enforcement 
across the European countries. The survey responses are also used to create three enforcement indices, 
which are used to analyse how well the enforcement indices applied in the accounting literature capture 
the different characteristics of financial reporting enforcement. Existing enforcement indices are largely 
based on formal rules rather than the actual application of these rules (Coffee 2009, Holthausen 2009, 
Jackson and Roe 2009, Mahoney 2009, Humphery-Jenner 2013). The data needed for this analysis require 
insights into how actual financial reporting enforcement is conducted; these data are not readily available 
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from existing papers or databases. The most obvious way to obtain these data is by surveying the people 
who are involved in the actual enforcement process.  
Two survey instruments were developed in the form of questionnaires; they were designed to capture 
information about both the formal rule and its actual application. The questionnaires were developed 
based partly on an analysis of the existing financial reporting enforcement literature and partly on 
discussions with a senior employee from a regulatory authority and a senior regulatory specialist from a Big 
4 accounting firm (henceforth referred to as insiders). The questionnaire is based on partially closed-ended 
questions with unordered response categories. It is believed that this provides an adequate range of 
answers while making the coding of the responses manageable. Both questionnaires were pretested and 
commented on by the insiders, who also provided valuable and constructive feedback that helped make 
the questionnaires shorter and more focused. 
The surveys were conducted in accordance with the tailored design method (TDM) (Dillmann et al. 2009) 
and executed from March to June 2013. Our insiders helped us identify respondents within the individual 
countries and enforcement authorities while also championing the survey within their networks, i.e., ESMA 
and the Big 4 accounting firm. The survey was performed as a mixed model, as some of the respondents 
preferred to be interviewed rather than fill in an e-survey. These respondents were contacted by phone, 
and an interviewer read out the questions and noted the answers of the respondent. In an attempt to 
increase our response rate, we sent letters to the respondents shortly before the start of the survey and 
reminders during the time span of the survey. Finally, follow-up interviews were conducted where 
respondents had left questions unanswered. If a respondent was unable to answer the question, we 
attempted to answer it based on publicly available information. The question was left unanswered if we 
were unable to identify a plausible answer. 
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The first of the two survey instruments was sent to enforcement bodies in 29 European countries covering 
approximately 88% of the population (33 countries). We received useful responses from 17 enforcement 
bodies, which equal a response rate of 59% on a country level and 52% on an enforcement-body level. The 
different response rates are because four countries have more than one body that enforces compliance 
with financial information. In these instances, one enforcement body typically focuses on financial 
institutions, while the other focuses on all other entities, or one enforces auditors while the other enforces 
issuers of financial information. Respondents have been selected based on a two-step process. First, the 
relevant enforcement body is identified. Some of the formal responsible enforcement bodies have chosen 
to delegate actual enforcement to other governmental agencies. This means that they are not involved in 
the practical aspects of enforcement. Consequently, the respondents have been selected from bodies that 
perform the actual financial reporting enforcement to ensure that the respondent is knowledgeable about 
how enforcement is performed. Second, the respondent must be a senior enforcement official because 
this, ceteris paribus, ensures that the respondent has a broad and deep knowledge of both the formal and 
the actual enforcement process. A list of potential respondents was developed by the researchers based on 
publicly available information. The list was discussed with the insiders, who added both new candidates 
and valuable comments to the existing candidates. The final list of respondents was then completed by the 
researchers.  
The second survey instrument was sent to senior regulatory experts from a Big 4 accounting firm for the 
same 29 European countries, and we received responses from all 29 countries. The purpose of this survey 
was slightly different, as the questions were designed to measure how the enforced entities, represented 
by senior regulatory experts, experience the performed financial reporting enforcement. Furthermore, the 
second questionnaire is primarily used to verify and authenticate the responses received from the 
enforcement bodies. Consequently, the questionnaire covers the same areas, but the questions were 
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phrased differently. With the second questionnaire, we risk receiving biased responses, as all the 
respondents are from the same network, which means that they may express firm policy rather than 
enforcement as it is actually applied. However, this risk is considered to be minor, as the information is 
primarily used to verify the responses of the enforcement bodies. 
The enforcement indices are primarily based on the questionnaire sent to the enforcement bodies, but 
have been supplemented with questions from the second questionnaire that provides information not 
covered by the first questionnaire or when there is a discrepancy between the answers to a similar 
question. Consequently, it is believed that the indices capture financial reporting enforcement as it is 
actually performed and thus provide fair and true picture of enforcement.  
7.2 Archival data 
The analysis of articles two and three are based on cross-sectional data partially retrieved from hand-
collected data sources and partially retrieved from large public databases such as DataStream and 
WorldScope. Although data retrieved from large public databases are considered reliable and trustworthy, 
a few additional comments must be added to the hand-collected data.  
7.2.1 Level of compliance with mandatory disclosures 
The level of compliance with mandatory disclosures is based on firms’ compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of IAS 36 – Impairment of Assets. This standard was chosen both because preparers find it 
challenging and because it has been a focus area for European enforcers (Glaum et al. 2013, ESMA 2014a, 
2014b, 2015). The level of compliance with mandatory disclosures is used as the independent variable in 
article 2 and is hand collected. The collection process for the data is described in the article, but a few 
additional comments are added. First, the analysis of financial reports was limited to the definition of a 
financial statement (IAS 1.103). This means that the management review has not been subject to a detailed 
                                                          
3
 According to this definition, a complete set of financial statements comprises the following:  
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analysis. Firms may have disclosed the required information outside the financial report, meaning that it 
has not been considered in the analysis. Second, the mandatory disclosure requirements listed in IAS 36 are 
not explicit in what they actually require firms to disclose. Consequently, the disclosure requirements may 
have been misinterpreted by the researcher and research assistants. To avoid misinterpretations of the 
disclosure requirements, the individual requirements have been compared both to the disclosures provided 
in the illustrative IFRS statements prepared by the Big 4 accounting firm (KPMG 2014, EY 2014, PwC 2014b, 
Deloitte 2014) and to the other relevant literature (PwC 2014a, Fedders and Steffensen 2012). This was 
done to establish a benchmark of which information the individual disclosures actually required. Naturally, 
it is not expected that the firms’ financial reports exhibit the same level of quality or detail as the 
illustrative financial reports from the Big 4 auditing firms, as the purpose of the illustrative financial reports 
are to inspire and guide other firms as to how they may present their disclosures and thus can be 
considered to represent the ‘state of the art’. However, they have been used to obtain a better 
understanding of the individual disclosure requirements in IAS 36. Based on these assumptions and the 
precautions taken, it is my belief that the estimated level of compliance is accurate.  
7.2.2 Audit fees 
The dependent variable in the third article is audit fees, which are also collected by hand because I did not 
have access to the relevant databases. The data collection was fairly simple, as it only required the use of 
judgement when it was not immediately apparent whether the fees related to the parent company or the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
a) a statement of financial position as at the end of the period;  
b) a statement of profit and loss and other comprehensive income for the period;  
c) a statement of changes in equity for the period;  
d) a statement of cash flows for the period;  
e) notes comprising significant accounting policies and other explanatory information;  
ea) comparative information with respect to the preceding period, as specified in paragraphs 38 and 38A 
(comparative figures); and 
f) a statement of financial position as at the beginning of the preceding period when an entity applies an accounting 
policy retrospectively or makes a retrospective statement of items in its financial statements, or when it reclassifies 
items in its financial statement in accordance with paragraph 40A-40D (changes in accounting policy, retrospective 
restatement or reclassification) (IAS 1.10). 
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group. However, this problem was also fairly easily settled, as information about the group’s total audit 
fees (including audit fees, non-auditing services, tax services and other services) to the auditor were 
available from Datastream. The hand-collected audit fees (including all other services) were compared with 
the figures from Datastream, and differences in excess of 5% were investigated and resolved. The 
differences were usually caused by a switch of the audit fee between the group and parent company.  
8 Presentation of findings 
The articles have explored different aspects of financial reporting enforcement, materiality, the 
enforcement of auditors, auditors’ auditing efforts and auditors’ liability. The findings of these explorations 
are summarised below. 
8.1 Enforcement  
To explore how enforcement varies among the European countries, it has been necessary to develop three 
enforcement indices that capture the various enforcement strategies4. Six key characteristics are identified 
as important for effective financial reporting enforcement, and the three enforcement indices are modelled 
based on these six key characteristics. The six characteristics5 are as follows: Independence, scope of 
enforcement, enforcement approach, sanctions and the ability to impose these sanctions on non-
performers, publishing of guidance and decisions, and interaction with stakeholders. The applied 
enforcement may emphasise different aspects of the six characteristics. Consequently, three enforcement 
                                                          
4
 The three enforcement strategies are the deterrence strategy, the persuasion strategy and a mix of the deterrence 
and the persuasion enforcement strategies (total enforcement). 
5
 Independence aims to ensure that the enforcers are independent from the stakeholders (for example, governments, 
auditors, market participants, preparers and users of financial reports, etc.). Scope of enforcement is needed because 
it clarifies and defines what the enforcers must enforce. 
The enforcement approach helps ensure consistent enforcement with regard to performing the actual enforcement 
(the enforcement follows similar principles) and evaluation of infringements and imposed sanctions. 
Sanctions and the ability to impose them on non-performers make it possible for enforcers to punish non-compliers 
using various sanctions and penalties.  
Publishing of guidance and decision refers to the need for enforcers to publish information about their activities, 
guidance and decisions. 
Interaction with stakeholders enables enforcers to dialogue with the enforced entities and provide pre-clearance. 
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indices have been created that capture different enforcement strategies. Two of the enforcement indices 
are based on the two archetypes of enforcement strategy (deterrence and persuasion), whereas the third is 
based on a mix of the two (responsive enforcement).  
The analysis finds variation in the strictness of financial reporting enforcement across the European 
countries and that the countries emphasise different aspects of enforcement, which is expected because of 
differences in institutional settings. However, some countries consistently engage in stricter enforcement, 
disregarding the chosen enforcement strategy, which indicates a generally strict enforcement environment 
of financial reporting. The three enforcement indices do not generally correlate with existing enforcement 
indices. This is not entirely surprising, as many of the existing indices are created for purposes other than 
the enforcement of financial reporting. However, it is surprising that indices specifically created to measure 
financial reporting enforcement (Brown et al. 2014) exhibit a similar lack of correlation. The reason for the 
lack of correlation between the three enforcement indices and the Brown et al. (2014) enforcement index 
is that Brown et al. (2014) capture the breadth and depth of actual enforcement only to a limited extent.  
8.2 Enforcement and materiality assessments on mandatory disclosure 
decisions 
In article two, the three enforcement indices created are used to analyse the effect of financial reporting 
enforcement on the materiality assessment and the disclosure decisions for mandatory disclosures. The 
results show that the strictness of the enforcement has both a positive and a significant influence on the 
level of compliance with mandatory disclosures if the applied enforcement strategy is either a mix of the 
deterrence and the persuasion strategies or the deterrence strategy only. Enforcement based on a 
persuasion strategy appears ineffective in securing compliance with mandatory disclosures. Furthermore, 
the results show that the level of disclosures is significantly lower when goodwill is immaterial, whereas the 
level of disclosures is insignificantly different once goodwill is material. In other words, the absolute and 
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relative size of goodwill does not influence the level of disclosures once goodwill is material. This result 
provides a clear indication that firms perform a materiality assessment when they decide to disclose 
mandatory disclosures. Finally, this study finds that strict enforcement does not influence the materiality 
assessment of the firms, which means that financial reporting enforcement does not influence the firms’ 
materiality assessments.  
8.3 Financial reporting enforcement, enforcement of auditors and limitations 
on the auditor’s liability 
The enforcement index created is also used to investigate how the strictness of enforcement impacts the 
audit efforts of the auditor while considering possible limitations on the auditor’s liability. The analysis finds 
that strict financial reporting enforcement has a negative and significant influence on the audit efforts, 
disregarding the applied enforcement strategy. This indicates that auditors apply less audit effort when 
financial reporting is strict because strict enforcement causes preparers to deliver a higher-quality financial 
report. Consequently, the auditor must perform fewer audits before he has achieved the desired level of 
assurance. However, strict enforcement of auditors (proxied by a modified Brown et al. 2014 audit 
measure) causes them to make significantly more auditing efforts if the enforcement of auditors is weak. 
These additional auditing efforts are most likely caused by the auditor’s attempt to hedge against the 
increased risk of penalties and/or reputational losses derived from the increased strictness of enforcement.  
Prior studies have found mixed results on how limitations on the auditor’s liability impact the applied audit 
efforts but provide an overall conclusion indicating that liability limitations reduce the audit efforts of the 
auditor. This thesis finds that limitations on the auditor’s liability significantly reduce the efforts of the 
auditor. However, robustness tests indicate that the effects of limitations on the auditor’s liability are 
highly susceptible to the enforcement environment of financial reporting because financial reporting 
enforcement based on an enforcement strategy of either deterrence or persuasion reduces the effect from 
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significant to insignificant, i.e., limitations on the auditor’s liability do not impact the applied auditing 
efforts. Consequently, it appears that the impact of limitations on the auditor’s liability depends upon the 
enforcement strategy applied. 
9 Contribution and implications 
The findings of this thesis may not provide clear-cut answers that enable decision-makers to make more 
enlightened decisions about the future allocation of resources to enforcement, which enforcement 
activities are directly harmful to the transparency and comparability of the financial reports or which 
enforcement strategy and enforcement strategies provide the optimal level of enforcement for a given 
country. However, it does provide a few new pieces to the puzzle, thereby bringing us one step closer to 
making such decisions. In this regard, this thesis makes several contributions, which are discussed below. 
9.1 Enforcement 
The thesis provides insights into how financial reporting enforcement is actually carried out in Europe. This 
is particularly interesting for academia because it questions the relevance of the indices used in the 
literature and thereby questions the validity of these results. Therefore, future studies must carefully 
consider the applied enforcement indices and whether these indices actually measure the subject of 
interest. Regulatory authorities in Europe should also be interested in the results because they indicate 
heterogeneous financial reporting enforcement, which is opposite of the ambition of ESMA. The results 
may be used to identify areas with variation and those in which harmonisation efforts may occur. However, 
it is important to note that totally aligned enforcement is undesirable because of the differences in the 
institutional settings. Applied financial reporting enforcement must duly consider the institutional setting 
of the individual country and ensure that it can operate effectively within that setting. The results also have 
implications for the issuers and users of the financial report. Enforcement has a direct impact on the 
interpretation of laws and standards, which means that national variations in financial reporting 
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enforcement increase the complexity of issuing a financial report. This is especially true if the issuers are 
listed on multiple exchanges in different countries, which may result in additional burdens. Likewise, the 
users must address variations in enforcement when they assess and evaluate financial information  
9.2 Enforcement and materiality assessments on mandatory disclosure 
decisions 
This thesis also contributes to the existing literature on enforcement by finding that strict enforcement is a 
significant determinant to the level of mandatory disclosures, as firms located in countries with strict 
enforcement exhibit a significantly higher level of compliance. This should be of interest to enforcers, 
thereby causing them to increase their cross-border cooperation and intensify their work to achieve a more 
homogeneous and uniform supervision of accounting regulation. Furthermore, enforcement based on 
either deterrence or a mix of deterrence and persuasion enforcement strategies appear to be better at 
ensuring a high level of compliance with mandatory disclosures. This finding should make enforcers 
consider whether the applied enforcement strategy is capable of ensuring the desired results. Furthermore, 
capital market participants are directly affected, as the findings confirm the uneven application of the 
accounting regulation, thus reducing the transparency and comparability of the financial reports. Market 
participants must therefore be forced to invest additional resources when analysing financial reports from 
countries with weak enforcement.  
This study also contributes to the literature on materiality, as it finds that preparers apply a materiality 
assessment when making decisions about mandatory disclosures. Further, it is found that firms provide 
significantly more disclosures when items are material than when items are immaterial, and the level of 
disclosures is insignificantly different once the item is considered material. This finding is of interest to the 
users of the financial report, as they are assured that preparers focus on providing information about the 
material items in the financial report. This finding is also of interest for the enforcers, especially if it is 
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coupled with the finding that enforcement does not appear to influence the preparers’ materiality 
assessment. This means that enforcers may increase the strictness of the performed enforcement without 
fearing that it will increase the complexity and opacity of the financial report, as suggested by some 
studies.  
9.3 Financial reporting enforcement, enforcement of auditors and limitations 
on the auditors’ liability 
Finally, the thesis documents that the institutional setting directly affects the auditors’ auditing efforts, as 
audit efforts decrease with the combination of strict enforcement of financial reporting, limitations on the 
auditors’ liability and weak enforcement of auditors. This finding contributes to the existing literature, 
which primarily focuses on a single country setting and therefore, has investigated the effects of 
enforcement only to a lesser degree. The findings have direct implications for the regulatory authorities, as 
they must consider whether the current liability structure for auditors can satisfactorily ensure the 
desirable behaviour of the auditors, especially considering that different enforcement strategies for 
financial reporting appear to significantly influence the auditors’ auditing efforts with respect to this issue. 
Furthermore, this study has implications for the users of the financial statement, as they must evaluate 
whether the performed auditing efforts provide them with the required level of assurance or whether they 
must perform additional information gathering and analysis before they can trust the information.  
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Abstract 
This paper analyses how the strictness in financial reporting enforcement varies across 17 European 
countries and the extent to which enforcement proxies in the existing accounting literature reflects the 
actual performed financial reporting enforcement. Based on survey responses from European enforcement 
bodies and regulatory specialists, the study observes extensive variations in the strictness of financial 
reporting enforcement across the European countries, despite ESMA’s efforts to achieve more 
homogeneous enforcement in Europe. Furthermore, existing enforcement indices used in the accounting 
literature do not generally correlate with the enforcement index developed in this study, which begs the 
question of what the existing enforcement indices of financial reporting are measuring. 
 
Keywords: Financial reporting, Financial reporting enforcement, Enforcement; Regulation 
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Introduction 
The accounting literature has increasingly focused on identifying the effects of financial reporting 
enforcement (Lambert et al. 2007, Daske et al. 2008, 2013 Bushman and Landsman 2010, Moran 2010, 
Aerts and Tarca 2010, Byard et al. 2011, Wysocki 2011, Christensen et al. 2013, Leuz and Wysocki 2016, 
Tsalauotas et al. 2014). The results of these studies are mixed but the emerging explanation appears to be 
that enforcement enhances the benefits of adopting a set of high quality accounting standards and thus 
ensures the capital market effects of accounting. The enforcement proxies utilized by these studies, 
however, face two significant challenges.  
First, the enforcement proxies rely heavily on the formal power (rule-of-the-book) of enforcers to 
investigate and sanction (Coffee 2009, Holthausen 2009, Jackson and Roe 2009, Mahoney 2009, Humphery-
Jenner 2013). This essentially means that the proxies are measurements of the formal regulation rather 
than the actual performed enforcement. This is a serious drawback as research indicates that the key issue 
in enforcement is not only whether enforcers have formal powers but also whether they actually exercise 
these powers (Jackson and Roe 2009, Humphery-Jenner 2013). Second, several enforcement proxies 
applied in prior literature are only indirect measures of financial reporting enforcement and some were 
even created to measure other items, such as the enforcement of shareholder and creditor protection (La 
Porta et al. 1997, 1998), minority shareholder protection (Djankov et al. 2008), investor protection (Jackson 
and Roe 2009) or the general legal environment (Kaufmann et al. 2014). While the existing literature has 
contributed to shaping the understanding of how institutional settings influence financial reporting 
outcomes, it does raise questions about the degree to which they capture enforcement of financial 
reporting.  
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The aim of this study is not to create new enforcement proxies for financial reporting, although we do so in 
the process, but more modestly, to measure how actual enforcement varies across the European countries 
as well as to show whether existing proxies grasp this variation.  
The study begins by discussing the concept of enforcement and identifies six key characteristics of effective 
enforcement: independence, scope of enforcement, enforcement approach, sanctions and the ability to 
impose these on non-performers, transparency and public availability of guidance and decisions, and 
interaction with stakeholders. 
To obtain a better understanding of financial reporting enforcement in Europe, we conduct a survey based 
on responses from national enforcement bodies and senior regulatory specialists from a Big Four 
accounting firm. The questionnaire covers both the formal rules and the actual performed enforcement. 
The study therefore provides unique insights into how enforcement is conducted, which, to our knowledge, 
no other study has provided. This allows us not only to compare how financial reporting enforcement is 
carried out in Europe but also to provide insights into how well previous financial reporting enforcement 
proxies capture enforcement. We use the six key characteristics as a frame for how financial reporting 
enforcement may be understood, and on that basis, we draw out items that indicate the level of strictness 
in enforcement. These items are then related to two distinct strategies of enforcement: deterrence and 
persuasion.  
Our results indicate great variation in the strictness of financial reporting enforcement in Europe. 
Furthermore, the enforcement indices used in prior studies do not seem to capture how financial reporting 
enforcement is carried out. As Brown et al. (2014) is the only index specifically designed to capture financial 
reporting enforcement, it is surprising that we find no correlation between their enforcement index and 
our indices. A closer look at the Brown et al. (2014) enforcement index shows that it primarily captures the 
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formal rules of enforcement and that the items constituting the index do not provide details on how the 
actual performed financial reporting enforcement is carried out. 
This study makes several contributions to the body of literature and current thinking on enforcement. First, 
we expose the variation in the strictness of financial reporting enforcement in Europe. This finding should 
be of interest to ESMA and other enforcement bodies as variations in the strictness of financial reporting 
enforcement are not in line with ESMA’s aspiration of homogenous enforcement in Europe (ESMA 2015). 
Our findings can be used to identify areas where enforcement bodies must align effort if the ambition is 
homogenous enforcement in Europe. Second, we believe this is the first study to empirically show that 
existing enforcement proxies used in the accounting literature are relatively poor in capturing the 
variations in the strictness of financial reporting enforcement across European countries. This suggests that 
future studies should be careful in using existing enforcement indices and that a new and more accurate 
financial enforcement index should be developed to capture variations in how enforcement is conducted 
across countries. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline financial reporting 
enforcement. Section 3 examines the different enforcement proxies used in the literature. Section 4 
discusses the survey used to collect enforcement data across European countries. In Section 5, the 
empirical results are presented and a comparison to prior enforcement indices is made. Section 6 presents 
the study’s conclusions. 
Financial Reporting Enforcement 
In this section, we discuss financial report enforcement from two perspectives: the characteristics of 
financial reporting enforcement and the enforcement strategies that enforcement bodies can adopt. 
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Key characteristics of financial reporting enforcement 
Enforcing regulations involves a range of activities and tools designed to monitor, inspect, punish, guide 
and encourage compliance with rules (FEE, 2002; Basel, 2012; ESMA, 2014; IOSCO, 2013; OECD, 2014b; SEC, 
2016a). In this section, we summarize these tools and activities into six key characteristics that are seen as 
associated with effective financial reporting enforcement: independence; scope of enforcement; 
enforcement approach; sanctions and the ability to impose these on non-performers; transparency and the 
public availability of guidance and decisions; and interaction with stakeholders.   
Independence 
Independence is widely seen as a requirement for an effective enforcement body, because it provides 
greater confidence in regulatory decisions (FEE, 2002; Basel, 2012; ESMA, 2014; IOSCO, 2013; OECD, 2014a; 
OECD, 2014b). Independence entails that the enforcement body is not influenced by governments, 
auditors, issuers of financial information or market participants and that the enforcement body has 
sufficient resources to ensure that issuers of financial reporting comply with IFRS (FEE, 2002).  
Scope of enforcement 
A clear scope of the financial information to be enforced is important for effective enforcement. FEE (2002) 
suggests the scope of financial reporting enforcement should be limited to the consolidated financial 
statements and only include documents prepared under IFRS and documents providing price-sensitive 
financial information for the capital markets. ESMA (2014) agrees with this view and proposes enforcing all 
financial information in harmonized documents.6 The scope of enforcement also extends to clear guidelines 
on what materials enforcers may use during their enforcement visits and thus also establishes a boundary 
for enforcement.  
                                                          
6
 A document is considered to be harmonized if its publication is required by the Transparency Directive. Harmonized 
documents contain financial information from issuers listed on a regulated market (ESMA 2014). Thus, harmonized 
documents include annual and interim financial statements and reports prepared on an individual and consolidated 
basis. 
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Enforcement approach 
The establishment of policies to ensure consistent enforcement is seen as a prerequisite for effective 
enforcement, although enforcement guidelines and frameworks are not explicit on how this should be 
implemented (Basel, 2012; IOSCO, 2013; ESMA, 2014; OECD, 2014b; SEC, 2016b). The aim of consistent 
enforcement is for similar infringements to be evaluated by similar measures and punished with similar 
sanctions across issuers. In addition, guidance suggests that it is important to monitor the activities under 
enforcement with a risk-based and forward-looking perspective as well as to identify focus areas that 
represent the priorities of enforcers.  
Sanctions and the ability to impose these on non-performers 
Assigned powers to conduct inspections of accounts must be complemented by a sanctioning system to 
punish non-compliance (FEE, 2002; Basel, 2012; IOSCO, 2013; ESMA, 2014; OECD, 2014b; SEC, 2016a). 
ESMA (2014) states, that sanctions include reissuance of the financial statement and a corrective note or 
correction in future financial statements with restatement of comparatives. OECD (2014b) extends possible 
sanctions to include criminal prosecution and further stresses the importance of keeping sanctions 
proportionate to infringements.  
Transparency and public availability of guidance and decisions 
Both FEE (2002) and IOSCO (2013) relate effective enforcement to the publication of guidance to ensure 
consistent and transparent enforcement, not only in regard to the enforcement activities but also in regard 
to the enforcement decision reached. OECD (2014b) further suggests that enforcers develop and publish 
guidance in the form of notes, toolkits, checklists, and so on, which must be easily accessible and 
comprehensible. ESMA (2014) recommends that enforcement bodies periodically issue a report containing 
a description of the performed enforcement activities, either with or without individual enforcement cases 
and with or without identification of the enforced entity. This is also current practice in the US, where the 
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SEC publishes an annual statement on examination priorities and interpretive guidance (SEC, 2016a; 2017) 
and further holds conferences with industry and securities regulators, both regionally and nationally.  
Interaction with stakeholders 
There seems to be some variation in how organizations and regulators that provide guidelines for 
enforcement allow for the prevention of infringements through interacting with entities under 
enforcement and other stakeholders. FEE (2002) and Basel (2012) argue that the purpose is to prevent 
errors and material misstatements in financial reporting, while others stress preventive measures such as 
the possibility of interaction with the enforcement bodies and the use of pre-clearance (IOSCO, 2013; 
OECD, 2014b). ESMA (2014), however, appear to consider the enforcement activity to be an ex-post activity 
by nature and does not recommend or reject the use of pre-clearances. 
Enforcement strategies 
Enforcement bodies may emphasize different aspects of the six characteristics depending upon the chosen 
enforcement strategy. According to the literature on law and economics, enforcement bodies may choose 
between two distinct enforcement strategies, or a mix of these (Ayres and Braitwaite 1992, Baldwin and 
Cave 1999, Baldwin et al. 2010, 2012). The ‘deterrence’ strategy enforces compliance through the use of 
penalties and prosecution. The penalties applied are usually severe and include sanctions such as criminal 
sanctions, license suspension and license revocation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Baldwin et al. 2010, 
2012). The second enforcement strategy is the ‘persuasion’ strategy, which enforces compliance through 
dialogue, encouragement and education (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Baldwin et al. 2010, 2012). The 
deterrence strategy tends to emphasize the detection of misconduct and the persuasion strategy tends to 
emphasize the prevention of misconduct. Finally, enforcement bodies may choose to mix the two 
enforcement strategies in an attempt to achieve a more flexible and agile enforcement. The mix of 
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enforcement strategies is referred to as ‘Responsive enforcement’ in the literature. The ‘Responsive’ 
enforcement strategy may be specifically implemented as a ‘tit for tat’7 enforcement approach. 
Enforcement Indices Developed in the Literature 
This section examines how prior studies measure enforcement and the extent to which the adopted 
measures capture financial reporting enforcement. The number of studies that examine the impact of 
enforcement on financial reporting quality has grown significantly over the last decade, but researchers do 
not seem to agree on a common measure for financial reporting enforcement. In fact, a wide number of 
financial reporting enforcement indices have been used. These indices are summarized in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Most enforcement indices used in the accounting literature are legally oriented, capturing some elements 
of a country’s legal system, security law or governance system. La Porta et al. (1998) develop an index 
covering legal rules pertaining to the rights of investors and the quality of enforcement of these rules. La 
Porta et al. (2006) assemble a database of rules and regulations governing security issuance with a focus on 
mandatory disclosure, liability standards, and public enforcement. Kaufmann et al. (2014) is a governance 
index with six dimensions. One of these dimensions (Rule of Law) is the perception of the general 
enforcement environment and has been used as a proxy for enforcement. A measure of legal protection of 
                                                          
7
 The ‘tit for tat’ approach refers to an enforcement approach where the enforcers initiate the enforcement process 
by applying the persuasion strategy, i.e., (s)he tries through dialogue, encouragement and education to make the 
enforced entity comply. If the enforcer is unsuccessful in achieving compliance through these measures, (s)he will 
switch to a deterrence strategy by applying punitive measures against the enforced entity. These punitive measures 
will start with warning letters that will escalate up to through the enforcement pyramid to criminal sanctions or 
license suspension and revocation if the enforced entity remains non-compliant. The enforcement pyramid is a 
hierarchical collection of enforcement tools that escalates from persuasion at the base, to warning letters and civil 
penalty in the middle to criminal sanctions and license suspension and revocation at the tip of the pyramid (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992). 
 54 | P a g e  
 
minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders is suggested by Djankov et al. (2008). 
Jackson and Roe (2009) develop several measures of the intensity of public enforcement of securities 
regulation based on the regulators’ budgetary resources and staffing levels.  
Some studies combine legally oriented indices with an auditing and accounting focus. Hope (2003) 
combines the index from La Porta et al. (1998) with a measure of how much a country spends on audit 
services relative to the economy as a whole. The audit measure aims to measure a country’s commitment 
to enforcement of annual reports. The World Economic Forum (2013) develops an investor protection 
index consisting of different legal measures, including a measure of the strength of accounting and auditing 
standards.  
Brown et al. (2014) present an index designed to capture differences between countries in relation to the 
institutional setting for financial reporting, specifically the auditing of financial statements and 
enforcement of compliance with financial reporting regulation. The measurement of financial reporting 
enforcement is based on six constructs measuring 1) whether a country has a regulatory body; 2) whether 
it can set standards (both accounting and auditing standards); 3) whether the regulatory body performs a 
review of issued financial statements; 4) whether the regulatory body publicly reports outcome of their 
reviews; 5) whether it takes enforcement actions against infringements; and 6) the level of resourcing. The 
index is created based on publicly available data in the form of surveys performed by FEE and IFAC. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 illustrates the extent to which each of the enforcement proxies used in the accounting literature 
appears to be related to the six key characteristics of enforcement outlined above. The proxies in Hope 
(2003) and Brown et al. (2014) are the only attempts to measure enforcement of financial reporting. 
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Nevertheless, these indices only relate, either partly or fully, to five of the six key characteristics of 
enforcement. This suggests that the existing indices do not capture the breadth of what is perceived to be 
financial reporting enforcement. Further, existing financial reporting enforcement indices tend to focus on 
formal rules and none of them include measures of how financial reporting enforcement is actually carried 
out. This is a significant weakness as a strict set of formal rules may not necessarily translate into strict 
enforcement in practice, as argued by both Coffee (2007) and Jackson and Roe (2009). Holthausen (2009) 
also notes that indices tend to focus on whether a rule or requirement exists, whereas the real matter of 
interest is whether the rule or requirement is applied and how it affects practice. Coffee (2007) argues that 
enforcement measurements based on inputs and outputs are likely to be superior to measurements based 
on formal rules. In response to such concerns, we create a financial reporting enforcement index in this 
study that captures not only the formal rules of enforcement but also how the enforcement is actually 
conducted.  
Methods 
In this section, we outline the survey approach, the sample used in this study and the design of the 
enforcement index. 
Survey approach 
To assess financial reporting enforcement activities in Europe, we adopt a survey approach to data 
collection. We develop two survey instruments in the form of questionnaires intended to collect 
information on the design and operation of national financial reporting enforcement. The topics included in 
these survey instruments are based on the key characteristics of effective enforcement as discussed above 
and discussions with a senior employee of an enforcement body, as well as a senior regulatory specialist 
from a Big Four auditing firm (henceforth referred to as our insiders). First drafts of the two instruments 
were pre-tested by our insiders. The purpose of the pre-testing was to examine the relevance and 
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understandability of each question and whether the instrument as a whole captures the relevant aspects of 
financial reporting enforcement. This led to the deletion, addition and rewording of questions. A pilot test 
of the modified instruments was performed with additional senior officials from enforcement bodies, 
senior regulatory specialists, and academic researchers. The pilot-test provided useful feedback on content, 
understandability and the time required to complete the survey. This feedback led to a reduction in the 
length and complexity of questions and improved the validity of the responses. 
The survey was arranged as an e-survey, but in a few cases the respondents preferred to be interviewed 
rather than to fill out the e-survey. The interviews were conducted by phone and followed the 
questionnaire. We further performed follow-up interviews in a few instances where the respondents left 
questions unanswered.   
Survey responses were cross-checked where relevant. For example, responses were compared with 
publicly available information. Further, the results have been presented for practitioners and regulatory 
officials and the results have been subject to vigorous debate, but no errors or mistakes were identified 
during this debate. We believe that these actions together with the general high level of experience of the 
respondents have helped to ensure a high validity of the received responses. 
Sample 
In 2013, the survey was mailed to 29 enforcement bodies in Europe (all EC countries and Norway) and 29 
senior regulatory specialists from a Big Four accounting firm operating in the same 29 countries. While the 
survey mailed to enforcement bodies provides insights on formal powers as well as the actual use of these 
powers, the survey mailed to senior regulatory specialists served two purposes: a) to collect information 
about design and actual use of enforcement in order to cross-check information received from authorities; 
and b) to shed light on how actual enforcement is perceived by issuers of financial information. 
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Enforcement bodies8 and regulatory specialists were contacted prior to the survey’s distribution. This 
ensured that respondents were committed and that each questionnaire was sent to senior employees with 
appropriate positions and experience. To increase the participation of the enforcement bodies that 
expressed concerns about disclosing confidential information, we agreed to grant them anonymity. We 
obtained answers from 17 enforcement bodies and 29 regulatory specialists corresponding to a response 
rate of 59% and 100%, respectively. 
Design of enforcement index 
The enforcement index consists of six constructs representing the six key characteristics, and the questions 
assigned to each construct are shown in appendix A. The appendix includes rationales and a justification of 
how they relate to strictness and enforcement strategy. We briefly discuss each of the six constructs.  
Independence 
Independence builds on three questions measuring different aspects of independence, including the 
enforcement body’s affiliation with other government agencies and a general evaluation of the 
competence level of the staff involved in enforcement of financial reporting. 
Scope of enforcement 
Scope of enforcement is based on questions measuring areas of responsibility within financial reporting 
enforcement (review, decision and actions, pre-clearance and informal guidance) and the proportion of 
issuers that are reviewed on an annual basis. The construct also measures what information enforcers can 
use during their review. 
                                                          
8
 In several countries, there is more than one enforcement body. In these countries, we followed the advice of 
regulatory specialists and only sent the survey to the body that covered most companies. 
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Enforcement approach 
Enforcement approach measures how enforcement is performed and is based on questions such as 
whether the enforcer identifies specific focus areas for review and whether there are internal available 
guidelines that ensure a consistent application of enforcement across time and employees.  
Actions and sanctions 
Actions and sanctions measure the actions and sanctions available to, and actually used, by the 
enforcement bodies. It is based on questions that measure the types of actions available to enforcement 
bodies and which actions the enforcement body actually uses. It also measures the extent to which 
enforcement bodies believe that issuers accept and respond to decisions, actions and sanctions used if 
issuers do not respond to decisions, and whether issuers believe that sanctions have affected their 
behaviour. 
Transparency 
Transparency is measured by items such as publicly available guidelines on enforcement activities, whether 
enforcers publish focus areas for the following year and how decisions are communicated. The construct 
also contains measures of how the issuers view these matters. 
Interaction with stakeholders 
The final construct addresses the opportunities for stakeholders to interact with the enforcement body and 
thus measures the extent to which enforcement bodies are willing to provide pre-clearances. It also 
measures whether the opportunities for interaction with the enforcement body are sufficient.  
Based on these six characteristics, we also create two sub-indices measuring the degree to which 
enforcement bodies emphasize a deterrence strategy or persuasion strategy. The two sub-indices consist of 
questions assigned to the six constructs. In appendix A, there is a justification for whether the questions 
relate to deterrence, persuasion or both. This implies that the ‘deterrence’ index is based on the score from 
questions related to deterrence and the ‘persuasion’ index is based on the score from questions related to 
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persuasion. We apply the score from a question to both sub-indices if it relates to both deterrence and 
persuasion.9 
Scoring 
The enforcement index is assigned a score based on the individual questions within each construct. Scores 
range from 0 to 1 and higher scores indicate stricter enforcement. The scores of each construct are scaled 
by the number of answered questions in order to avoid negative bias from unanswered question.10 We sum 
the scores of each construct and convert them into ranks, which produces a rank score for each construct 
ranging from 1 to 17. The ranking neutralizes the impact of different scores across constructs due to 
different numbers of questions. We then create enforcement indices for each country by adding the rank 
score of the six constructs. Because it is difficult to argue that some areas of enforcement are more 
important than others, each construct carries the same weight. A country’s enforcement score therefore 
ranges from a minimum of 6 (6x1) to a maximum of 102 (6x17) for each of the three enforcement indices. 
The two sub-indices – the ‘deterrence’ index and ‘persuasion’ index – consist of the average score from 
questions across all constructs classified as deterrence and persuasion, respectively. A high score on a sub-
index suggests that a country emphasizes that enforcement strategy. Thus, if a country obtains a higher 
score on the ‘deterrence’ index than on the ‘persuasion’ index, it suggests that a country emphasizes the 
deterrence strategy above the persuasion strategy. Further, if the enforcement indices used in the 
accounting literature are correlated with the ‘deterrence’ index but not with the ‘persuasion’ index, it 
suggests that these indices focus on the deterrence strategy. 
                                                          
9
 We also report results excluding the score from questions that relate to both the deterrence and persuasion 
strategies. 
10
 It should be noted that scores from ‘combined-questions’ are added together and divided by the number of 
questions within each combined-question in order to avoid including questions covering the same enforcement effect 
twice. All combined-questions come in pairs, i.e., two questions measuring the same enforcement effect. Combined-
questions are marked in both appendix A, and in Table 3.  
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Empirical Results 
In what follows, we discuss the empirical results of the survey. First, we compare financial reporting 
enforcement in the 17 countries included in the survey, after which we evaluate how well enforcement 
indices used in the accounting literature capture both formal and actual enforcement. This is done by 
comparing our enforcement indices with indices used previously in the accounting literature. 
Comparison of financial reporting enforcement in 17 European countries 
Table 3 reports the results across the six constructs. An examination of the ‘independence’ in Table 3, panel 
A shows that the enforcement bodies in all countries indicate that they are independent bodies (A1). There 
are great variations in the number of stakeholder groups involved in the enforcement activities (A2). Four 
countries include one or fewer stakeholders in the enforcement activities, three countries include six 
stakeholders and the remaining 9 countries include between two and six stakeholders in enforcement 
activities. Together, this indicates that few countries are concerned with the legitimacy of enforcement 
body composition. Furthermore, regulatory specialists score the competence level as high or very high in 12 
out of 17 countries (A3). This also means that in five countries, the competence level is viewed as average 
or below average by the regulatory specialists, which may be due to problems in recruiting and/or retaining 
staff with the right competencies. According to ESMA (2017), the problem is evident in relation to senior 
staff due to a larger remuneration gap between the public and private sector. The prospect of a less 
competent staff with fewer senior people is of concern as it threatens independent thinking and 
consistency of financial reporting enforcement resulting in lower quality enforcement.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The scores of the construct ‘scope of enforcement’ are reported in Table 3, panel B and reveal variation in 
the number of responsibilities within the financial reporting area, which vary between three (0.6) and five 
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(1.0) (B1). All 17 countries are empowered to review financial reporting, make decisions and issue actions, 
while eight countries may issue pre-clearances and 12 countries may issue informal guidance. All eight 
countries that may issue pre-clearance also issue informal guidance. Enforcers in all countries draw on 
publicly available documents in enforcement activities and 12 countries always make use of this option, 
while only one rarely uses the option (B2). They are also allowed to collect non-publicly available material 
directly from the issuers. This is an option three countries always use, while the remaining 14 countries 
sometimes or rarely use this option. Thirteen countries are allowed to obtain non-publicly available 
information from other enforcers (tax and market oversight); however, this option is rarely used. Fifteen 
countries are allowed to obtain non-publicly available information from the issuers’ auditor. One country 
indicates that they always do this, while the remaining 14 countries rarely use this option. The number of 
annual reviews (scaled by listed issuers under enforcement) varies widely (B3). One country reviews 100% 
of issuers, while another only reviews 13% of issuers. The remaining countries review on average 24% of 
the issuers under enforcement, which means they are reviewed approximately every 4th year. 
In Table 3, panel C, we report statistics on the ‘Enforcement approach’. Twelve countries have prepared 
internal guidelines to assist them in the enforcement activity (C1) and nine of these have added 
supplementary checklists to the internal guidelines. Thus, five countries do not have guidelines for their 
enforcement activities. Fifteen countries have identified focus areas for review, while two countries have 
not identified such areas (C2).  
The scores of ‘Actions and sanctions’ are reported in Table 3, panel D. The first row shows the actions 
available to enforcement bodies in Europe and the degree to which they are used (D1). One enforcer has 
only one action available (0.14) (public corrective note). Other enforcers typically have six to seven 
different actions available, but the extent to which they apply the actions varies. The most frequently 
applied actions are correction in the next year’s financial statement (12 countries), a public corrective note 
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(11 countries), issuing of new financial statements (eight countries) and warnings (five countries). The least 
commonly applied actions are fines (three countries) as well as the more severe delisting (one country) and 
suspension from trading (two countries). Two countries have not used any of their available actions, while 
three countries have only used one. The remaining 12 countries have used two to four of their available 
actions, thus supporting the finding by Jackson (2006) that the number of sanctions used is limited, relative 
to those available. All countries are able to sanction issuers if they do not respond to action imposed by the 
enforcement bodies but only 9 of the 17 countries have used these sanctions (D3). In five countries, there is 
limited issuer acceptance and response to decisions and actions, according to the enforcement bodies (D2). 
In this regard, it is worth noting that sanctions have been imposed for not responding to action in all five 
countries. Regulatory specialists believe that the acceptance among European issuers is even lower, 
however, as specialists indicate that issuers from as many as 15 countries do not always respond to the 
decisions and actions of enforcers (D4). This result indicates there is a discrepancy between the enforcers 
and the issuers in regard to the understanding of when a suitable response to an action or sanction has 
been provided. This discrepancy may jeopardize the credibility of the enforcers in the long term. 
Table 3, panel E reports statistics on ‘Transparency’. Enforcement bodies in 13 out of 17 countries have not 
prepared publicly available guidelines for enforcement activities (E1). This is not entirely in line with the 
fact that a majority of the regulatory specialists find that guidance from the enforcers contains information 
that is useful for financial reporting quality (E7). Four countries do not communicate identified focus areas 
for review to issuers, according to the enforcement bodies (E2). In comparison, regulatory specialists find 
that issuers in seven countries are not aware of focus areas of the enforcement, suggesting that the 
enforcement bodies in a few countries could improve communication (E6). Fifteen countries communicate 
a draft decision by letter to the issuer before the final decision is made, while two countries never 
communicate draft decisions (E4). Twelve countries communicate identified omission or misstatements to 
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the issuer even if they are immaterial (E5). Furthermore, enforcement bodies are generally reluctant to 
publish their decisions in full (E3). Only four countries publish all decisions. Most countries only publish 
some decisions and some of these decisions are only published in a condensed version. Two countries only 
publish their decisions to the issuers. In comparison, nine regulatory specialists agree or strongly agree that 
decisions are helpful for interpretation and used by most issuers in the preparation of financial statements 
(E8). 
The scores of ‘interaction with stakeholders’ are reported in Table 3, Panel F. We observed above that eight 
enforcement bodies are empowered to give pre-clearance. Here, we see that all eight enforcement bodies 
make use of this opportunity (F1). In two of the eight countries where pre-clearance is possible, the 
regulatory specialists do not believe that the opportunities for pre-clearance available from the enforcers 
are sufficient (F3). Interaction between issuer and enforcer is possible in all countries; however, the level of 
interaction varies across countries (F2). According to both the enforcement bodies and issuers, eight 
countries have active interaction. The remaining countries only have a few interactions. 
Table 4 provides a summary of the scaled score11 and the ranking score for each of the six constructs as 
well as for the total enforcement index. The mean ranking score of the total enforcement index is 59.88 
and the mean scaled score is 3.91 (panel A). The standard deviations of the ranking score (15.90) and the 
scaled score (0.60) suggest considerable differences in the enforcement approaches used in the 17 
countries. For example, two countries (10 and 14) have ranking scores of 35 and 24, respectively, indicating 
that enforcement is less strict in these countries. One country (3) has a ranking score as high as 89 and two 
countries (2 and 7) have ranking scores above 70, indicating that enforcement in these countries is stricter 
than other countries included in the sample.  
                                                          
11
 A scaled score is defined as the sum of the score divided by the number of questions in a construct. 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
If we compare how each country scores across the six constructs, we find that some countries appear to 
have different priorities as to which aspects of enforcement they consider important. For example, 
countries 4 and 16 have identical total ranking scores of 68; however, they obtain different scores across 
the constructs. Country 4 receives a ranking score of 17 for Independence and a ranking score of 8 for 
Transparency. Country 16, on the other hand, receives a ranking score of 7 for Independence and a ranking 
score of 17 for Transparency. This demonstrates that countries have different institutional settings, which 
may cause differences in enforcement strategies and priorities.  
Table 4, panel B reports the ‘deterrence’ and ‘persuasion’ indices for the 17 countries. The table shows that 
countries that obtain a high score on deterrence tend to also obtain a high score on persuasion and vice 
versa. For example, country 16 is ranked 17 on the ‘deterrence’ index and 16 on the ‘persuasion’ index. 
Country 14 is ranked 1 on both indices. This is also supported by statistics from Table 5, which show a 
positive and significant correlation between the two indices at the 10% level. There are also, however, 
some differences in the adopted enforcement strategy in certain countries. For example, country 4 is 
ranked 13 on the ‘deterrence’ index and only 5 on the ‘persuasion’ index, while country 12 is ranked 14 on 
the ‘persuasion’ index and only 6 on the ‘deterrence’ index. 
To sum up, the empirical results suggest that not only does the level of enforcement vary across countries, 
but the enforcement bodies also seem to emphasize different aspects of enforcement. Further, different 
enforcement strategies are adopted across countries. These findings support Leuz (2010), who argues that 
despite a common set of rules (directive 2004/109), differences in enforcement continue to persist. 
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Comparing enforcement indices  
In this section, we correlate our enforcement indices with existing enforcement indices used in the 
accounting literature. The correlations, which are reported in Table 5, show that our total enforcement 
index is only correlated with Jackson and Roe’s (2009) staff index; however, the correlation coefficient is 
negative. In this context, it is important to remember that Jackson and Roe’s staff and budget indices cover 
other aspects than just the financial reporting enforcement.  
Correlations involving the two sub-indices, ‘deterrence’ and ‘persuasion’, are largely similar. There are no 
significant correlations with other indices except for the significant and negative correlation between the 
‘persuasion’ index and the Jackson and Roe (2009) indices.12 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
 
The results reported in Table 5 suggest that none of the existing enforcement indices capture the strictness 
of how enforcement is actually carried out. We are especially puzzled by the fact that we do not observe 
any correlation between our enforcement indices and the Brown et al. (2014) enforcement index. As 
discussed above, the Brown et al. (2014) enforcement index was developed with the purpose of measuring 
enforcement of financial reporting. 
One potential explanation is that the Brown et al. (2014) index contains three constructs that are excluded 
from our enforcement index. We therefore re-measure the Brown et al. (2014) index excluding the three 
constructs that are not included in our index. This index is labelled the modified Brown et al. (2014) 
enforcement index. The modifications are explained in appendix B. 
                                                          
12
 As a sensitivity analysis, we also calculate the ‘deterrence’ and ‘persuasion’ indices by only including unique 
questions (i.e., excluding questions that cover both the ‘deterrence’ and the ‘persuasion’ strategy). The results appear 
robust to this adjustment of the data as we find correlations similar to the ones reported. 
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The modified Brown et al. (2014) enforcement index is therefore calculated from the remaining three 
constructs: Item #3 (Reviews financial statements), Item #4 (Reports surveillance programmes) and Item #5 
(Taken enforcement actions) and is based on values from the original Brown et al. (2014) index. 
Table 6 reports the correlations between the modified Brown et al. (2014) enforcement index and our 
enforcement indices and shows no significant correlations with Brown et al. (2014).  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
Another potential explanation for the lack of correlation between the Brown et al. (2014) index and our 
enforcement index is that our index is based on constructs that extend the constructs included in Brown et 
al. (2014). We address this issue by adjusting our enforcement index so that it a) consists of the three 
constructs in the modified Brown et al. (2014) that are similar to the ones in our enforcement index; and b) 
only includes questions from our survey that are relevant in describing each of the three constructs. This 
index is labelled the adjusted enforcement index. The adjusted enforcement index is explained in more 
detail in appendix C. 
Table 6 reports the correlations for the adjusted enforcement index. As expected, our adjusted 
enforcement index is positively correlated the enforcement index at the 1% level. This finding may not 
come as a surprise as we correlate six items from our adjusted enforcement index against our total 
enforcement index consisting of 23 items. This result does, however, provide indications that the adjusted 
enforcement index captures the breadth and depth of the actual enforcement. More interestingly, neither 
the Brown et al. (2014) index nor the modified Brown et al. (2014) index is correlated with the adjusted 
enforcement index. Thus, even when we apply the same constructs as in Brown et al. (2014) and use 
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questions that we believe describe the actual enforcement more accurately, we cannot find any correlation 
with Brown et al. (2014). 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate how the strictness of financial reporting enforcement varies across 17 
European countries, and we perform a critical review of enforcement indices used in prior accounting 
studies. In an attempt to understand the degree to which previous enforcement indices capture the actual 
enforcement performed, we conduct a survey of the enforcement activities in European countries. Our 
respondents are enforcers and regulatory specialists from a Big Four accounting firm. Our survey shows 
that there are variations in the strictness of enforcement of financial reporting in Europe. Enforcement 
bodies seem to emphasize different aspects of enforcement, which is expected considering differences in 
their institutional settings; however, some countries consistently exhibit a stricter enforcement. 
Furthermore, it appears that European enforcement bodies choose different enforcement strategies. 
Our enforcement indices do not generally correlate with existing enforcement indices. The general lack of 
correlation may not be a surprise as many of the existing enforcement indices were created to measure 
other things than financial reporting enforcement; however, we are puzzled by the fact that there is no 
correlation between our enforcement index and the enforcement index developed by Brown et al. (2014). 
A closer look at the enforcement index developed by Brown et al. (2014) suggests that the main reason is 
that the items used by Brown et al. (2014) captures the breadth and depth of how the actual enforcement 
is carried out to a limited extent at best.  
This paper contributes to previous knowledge by providing insights into how financial reporting 
enforcement is actually carried out in Europe. This may be of interest to academia as it questions the 
relevance of enforcement indices used in prior studies. In fact, enforcement indices used in prior studies 
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seem to be at best only vague proxies for how financial reporting enforcement is actually carried out. 
Future research should therefore carefully consider which enforcement index is used and what that index 
actually measures. The results should also be of interest to regulators such as ESMA and other enforcement 
bodies. The variations in the strictness of financial reporting enforcement in Europe are not aligned with 
ESMA’s ambition of a homogenous enforcement in Europe and the findings may be used to identify areas 
where variations exist. The way in which financial information is enforced also has an impact on issuers and 
auditors. They must address variations in the strictness of financial reporting enforcement. As enforcement 
has an impact on the interpretation of laws and standards, such variation may add a layer of national 
divergence to financial reporting regulation on top on international standards (IFRS). Issuers listed in more 
than one country may incur additional burdens as they must address more than one enforcer and possibly 
also increased levels of disclosure due to differences in guidance.  
A major challenge in this study has been that respondents participated on the condition of anonymity. This 
made the comparison of enforcement in Europe more complicated and limited the possibilities of debating 
the relationships between results and institutional contexts. It has also restricted our ability to elaborate on 
the results, and we have not been able to make the enforcement indices available for use in other studies. 
We therefore hope that future studies will be more successful in gaining access to enforcement data 
without such restrictions. This obviously requires that regulators support research on enforcement.  
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Table 1 – Overview of enforcement indices 
Proxy Source Examples of accounting 
studies using enforcement 
proxy 
Legal oriented indices 
Investor protection (shareholder rights, 
creditors rights) 
Legal enforcement 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) Hope (2003);  
Leuz et al. (2003); 
Hopp and Dreher (2013); 
Brown et al. (2014); 
Preiato et al. (2015) 
Legal enforcement Kaufmann et al.13 Daske et al. (2008); 
Florou and Pope (2012); 
Houqe et al. (2012) 
Brown et al. (2014) 
Beuselinck et al. (2016) 
Christensen et al. (2016) 
Investor protection 
Public and private enforcement 
La Porta et al., 2006 Leuz (2010); 
Barth et al. (2012) 
Christensen et al. (2016) 
Public and private enforcement 
Resources (budget and staff) 
Jackson and Roe (2009)  
Investor protection (protection of 
minority shareholders) 
Private enforcement 
Djankov et al. (2008) Armour et al. (2009); 
Spamann (2010); 
Klerman et al. (2011); 
Xu (2014) 
                                                          
13
 The index is updated yearly, which is why an individual year has not been assigned. The year of the index also 
varies from study to study, which is why no year has been assigned to the index. We use the index from 2014. 
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Legal, auditing and accounting oriented indices 
Audit spending/auditor type/ 
stock exchange listing  
Legal enforcement 
Investor protection 
Hope (2003) Hope (2003) 
Preiato et al. (2015) 
 
Legal enforcement 
Investor protection 
Auditing and accounting enforcement 
World Economic Forum 
(2008) 
Houqe et al (2012) 
Preiato et al. (2015) 
 
Accounting oriented index 
Auditing and accounting enforcement Brown et al. (2014) Tsalavoutas et al. (2014) 
Preiato et al. (2015) 
André et al. (2015) 
Bischof et al. (2015) 
Beeks et al. (2016) 
Florou et al. (2017) 
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 b
el
o
w
) 
 
Ta
b
le
 5
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
 W
EC
 (
W
o
rl
d
 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fo
ru
m
) 
(2
01
3)
 
 J
ac
ks
o
n
 a
n
d
 
R
o
e
, S
ta
ff
$ 
(2
00
9)
 
 J
ac
ks
o
n
 a
n
d
 
R
o
e
, B
u
d
ge
t$
 
(2
00
9)
 
 L
a 
P
o
rt
a 
e
t 
al
. (
20
06
) 
 L
a 
P
o
rt
a 
e
t 
al
. (
19
98
) 
 L
a 
P
o
rt
a 
e
t 
al
. (
19
97
) 
 M
o
d
if
ie
d
 
B
ro
w
n
 e
t 
al
. -
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
W
EC
 (
W
o
rl
d
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
 F
o
ru
m
) 
(2
01
3)
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
   
  
Ja
ck
so
n
 a
n
d
 R
o
e
, S
ta
ff
$ 
(2
00
9)
0,
57
27
   
   
   
   
   
  
 *
 
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
Ja
ck
so
n
 a
n
d
 R
o
e
, B
u
d
ge
t$
 (
20
09
)
-0
,0
96
4
   
   
   
   
   
0,
58
18
   
   
   
   
  
*
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
La
 P
o
rt
a 
e
t 
al
. (
20
06
)
-0
,1
39
9
   
   
   
   
   
 
0,
38
10
   
   
   
   
  
0,
58
74
   
   
   
   
  
*
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
La
 P
o
rt
a 
e
t 
al
. (
19
98
)
0,
73
56
   
   
   
   
   
  
**
*
0,
26
19
   
   
   
   
  
-0
,2
59
2
   
   
   
   
-0
,1
71
6
   
   
   
   
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
La
 P
o
rt
a 
e
t 
al
. (
19
97
)
0,
79
04
   
   
   
   
   
  
 *
 
0,
30
95
   
   
   
   
  
-0
,2
39
3
   
   
   
   
-0
,1
37
8
   
   
   
   
0,
95
88
   
   
   
   
  
**
*
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
S
p
e
a
rm
a
n
 c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 
*,
 *
*,
 *
**
 in
d
ic
at
e
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
a 
10
%
, 5
%
 a
n
d
 1
%
 le
ve
l,
 r
e
sp
e
ct
iv
e
ly
. $
Th
e
 p
ro
xi
e
s 
u
se
d
 a
re
 f
o
r 
b
o
th
 p
ro
xi
e
s 
th
e
 e
xt
ra
p
o
la
te
d
  v
e
rs
io
n
 o
f 
th
e
 a
s 
th
is
 in
cr
e
as
e
s 
th
e
 u
n
d
e
rl
yi
n
g 
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
u
se
d
 in
 t
h
e
 c
al
cu
al
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e
 c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
.
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 T
a
b
le
 6
 –
 C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
s 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 m
o
d
if
ie
d
 e
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
in
d
ic
e
s 
  
 S
p
e
a
rm
a
n
 c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 
 E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
in
d
e
x 
 D
e
te
rr
e
n
ce
 
in
d
e
x 
 P
e
rs
u
as
io
n
 
in
d
e
x 
 B
ro
w
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
01
4)
 -
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
 B
ro
w
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
01
4)
 -
 
3 
it
e
m
 
e
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
in
d
e
x 
 M
o
d
if
ie
d
 
B
ro
w
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
01
4)
 -
 
e
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
 E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
in
d
e
x 
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
D
e
te
rr
e
n
ce
 in
d
e
x
0,
71
82
   
   
   
   
  
**
*
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
 P
e
rs
u
as
io
n
 in
d
e
x 
0,
67
04
   
   
   
   
  
 *
**
 
0,
46
31
   
   
   
   
  
 *
 
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
 B
ro
w
n
 e
t 
al
. (
20
14
) 
- 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
-0
,0
21
8
   
   
   
   
0,
21
34
   
   
   
   
  
0,
01
05
   
   
   
   
  
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
B
ro
w
n
 e
t 
al
. (
20
14
) 
3 
it
e
m
 e
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
in
d
e
x
0,
10
21
   
   
   
   
  
0,
16
54
   
   
   
   
  
0,
07
82
   
   
   
   
  
0,
88
74
   
   
   
   
  
**
*
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
M
o
d
if
ie
d
 B
ro
w
n
 e
t 
al
. (
20
14
) 
- 
e
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t
0,
67
49
   
   
   
   
  
**
*
0,
73
37
   
   
   
   
  
**
*
0,
52
95
   
   
   
   
  
**
-0
,2
16
9
   
   
   
   
-0
,2
51
0
   
   
   
   
1,
00
00
   
   
   
   
  
*,
 *
*,
 *
**
 in
d
ic
at
e
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
a 
10
%
, 5
%
 a
n
d
 1
%
 le
ve
l,
 r
e
sp
e
ct
iv
e
ly
. 
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 A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 A
. O
v
e
rv
ie
w
 o
f 
q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
in
cl
u
d
e
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 e
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
p
ro
x
y
 a
n
d
 l
in
k
 t
o
 k
e
y
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
o
f 
e
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
  
A
. I
n
d
ep
e
n
d
en
ce
 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
* 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
A
1
. P
le
as
e 
in
d
ic
at
e 
w
h
et
h
er
 t
h
e 
[b
o
d
y]
 is
 
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t.
  
A
n
 in
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
b
o
d
y 
is
 s
u
p
p
o
se
d
 t
o
 s
tr
en
gt
h
en
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
b
y 
su
p
p
ly
in
g 
a 
h
ig
h
er
 le
ve
l o
f 
au
th
o
ri
ty
 a
n
d
 r
e
sp
ec
t.
 T
h
is
 is
 n
ee
d
ed
 f
o
r 
al
l 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 b
u
t 
is
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 
im
p
o
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
e
gy
 a
s 
it
 o
ff
er
s 
th
e 
e
n
fo
rc
er
 a
 s
tr
o
n
ge
r 
b
as
e 
w
h
en
 it
 m
u
st
 
co
n
vi
n
ce
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
ed
 e
n
ti
ty
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e 
q
u
al
it
ie
s 
o
f 
th
e 
re
gu
la
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 r
u
le
s.
 (
FE
E 
2
00
2
, C
ih
ak
 a
n
d
 
P
o
d
p
ie
ra
 2
0
06
, L
a 
P
o
rt
a 
et
 a
l. 
2
00
6
, B
as
el
 2
0
12
, 
IO
SC
O
 2
0
13
, O
EC
D
 2
0
14
a,
 2
01
4
b
, B
ar
th
 e
t 
al
. 
2
01
3
b
).
 
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
= 
1
 If
 in
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
b
o
d
y 
is
 in
d
ic
at
ed
, 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
  
A
2
. D
o
es
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 in
cl
u
d
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
s 
an
d
 w
h
at
 is
 t
h
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
s 
fr
o
m
 
ea
ch
 g
ro
u
p
? 
B
ro
ad
 r
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 s
tr
e
n
gt
h
en
s 
th
e 
in
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
b
o
d
y 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
in
fl
u
en
ce
 o
f 
a 
si
n
gl
e 
gr
o
u
p
 o
f 
st
ak
e
h
o
ld
er
s.
 
Fu
rt
h
er
, i
t 
p
ro
vi
d
es
 a
n
 in
cr
ea
se
d
 le
ve
l o
f 
le
gi
ti
m
ac
y,
 w
h
ic
h
 m
ak
es
 it
 e
as
ie
r 
to
 p
er
su
ad
e 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
ed
 e
n
ti
ty
 t
o
 c
o
m
p
ly
 w
it
h
 r
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 (
O
EC
D
 
2
01
4
a,
 2
0
14
b
, E
C
 2
0
17
).
 
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
Th
e 
o
p
ti
o
n
s 
p
ro
vi
d
ed
 in
 t
h
e 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
 a
re
 
R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
s 
fr
o
m
 A
u
d
it
o
rs
, I
ss
u
er
s,
 In
ve
st
o
rs
, 
A
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
, L
eg
al
 b
ac
kg
ro
u
n
d
, 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 b
ac
kg
ro
u
n
d
, G
o
ve
rn
m
e
n
t 
o
ff
ic
ia
ls
, 
O
th
er
. T
h
e 
sc
o
re
 is
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
gr
o
u
p
s 
d
iv
id
ed
 
b
y 
8
.  
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 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
* 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
A
3
. (
S)
 T
o
 w
h
at
 e
xt
en
t 
d
o
   
   
   
yo
u
 a
gr
ee
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
st
at
em
en
t:
 
‘T
h
o
se
 w
h
o
 r
ev
ie
w
 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
, 
ge
n
er
al
ly
 h
av
e 
an
 
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e
 c
o
m
p
et
e
n
ce
 
le
ve
l’.
 
H
ig
h
er
 c
o
m
p
et
en
ce
 le
ve
ls
 im
p
ro
ve
 in
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
th
in
ki
n
g,
 r
es
u
lt
in
g 
in
 f
in
an
ci
al
 r
ep
o
rt
in
g 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
o
f 
a 
h
ig
h
er
 q
u
al
it
y 
u
n
d
er
 b
o
th
 a
 
d
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
e
gy
 (
B
al
d
w
in
 
2
01
0
, E
rn
st
b
er
ge
r 
et
 a
l. 
2
01
2
, B
ar
th
 e
t 
al
. 2
01
3
b
, 
ES
M
A
 2
01
4
).
 
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
Th
e 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 a
 5
-p
o
in
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
 s
ca
le
, 
ra
n
gi
n
g 
fr
o
m
 s
tr
o
n
gl
y 
d
is
ag
re
e 
(0
) 
to
 s
tr
o
n
gl
y 
ag
re
e 
(4
),
 a
n
d
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
4
.  
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 B
. S
co
p
e 
o
f 
En
fo
rc
em
e
n
t 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
* 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
B
1
. P
le
as
e 
st
at
e
 t
h
e 
ar
ea
s 
o
f 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
ili
ty
 w
it
h
in
 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 r
ep
o
rt
in
g.
  
En
fo
rc
em
en
t 
b
ec
o
m
es
 s
tr
ic
te
r 
as
 t
h
e 
ra
n
ge
 o
f 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
ar
ea
s 
in
cr
ea
se
; h
o
w
ev
er
, t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
ili
ti
es
 a
re
 u
ti
liz
ed
 t
o
 a
 v
ar
yi
n
g 
d
eg
re
e 
b
y 
th
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
s 
th
e 
d
et
er
re
n
ce
 s
tr
at
e
gy
 p
ri
m
ar
ily
 w
ill
 u
se
 r
ev
ie
w
, 
d
ec
is
io
n
 a
n
d
 a
ct
io
n
s,
 w
h
ile
 t
h
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 
st
ra
te
gy
 w
ill
 p
ri
m
ar
ily
 u
se
 t
h
e 
p
re
-c
le
ar
an
ce
, 
in
fo
rm
al
 g
u
id
an
ce
 a
n
d
 r
ev
ie
w
 (
A
yr
es
 a
n
d
 
B
ra
it
h
w
ai
te
 1
9
92
, B
al
d
w
in
 2
01
0
, B
al
d
w
in
 e
t 
al
. 
2
01
0
, 2
0
12
).
  
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
Th
e 
o
p
ti
o
n
s 
p
ro
vi
d
ed
 in
 t
h
e 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
 a
re
: 
re
vi
ew
, d
ec
is
io
n
, a
ct
io
n
, p
re
-c
le
ar
an
ce
 a
n
d
 
in
fo
rm
al
 g
u
id
an
ce
. T
h
e 
sc
o
re
 is
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
5
.  
B
2
. P
le
as
e 
ti
ck
 o
ff
 t
h
e 
m
at
er
ia
ls
 t
h
at
 c
an
 b
e 
u
se
d
 b
y 
re
vi
ew
e
rs
 in
 
re
vi
ew
in
g 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 f
ro
m
 a
 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
is
su
er
. 
Th
e 
av
ai
la
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
en
ti
ty
-s
p
ec
if
ic
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
b
ey
o
n
d
 t
h
e 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 s
tr
en
gt
h
en
s 
th
e 
b
as
is
 o
n
 w
h
ic
h
 e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
is
 c
o
n
d
u
ct
e
d
. T
h
is
 
ac
ce
ss
 t
o
 m
at
e
ri
al
s 
ap
p
ea
rs
 t
o
 b
e 
es
se
n
ti
al
 f
o
r 
b
o
th
 e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 (
FE
E 
2
0
02
, C
ih
ak
 
an
d
 P
o
d
p
ie
ra
 2
0
06
, B
as
el
 2
0
12
, I
O
SC
O
 2
0
13
, 
O
EC
D
 2
0
14
a,
 2
01
4
b
, E
SM
A
 2
01
4
, S
EC
 2
01
6
a)
.  
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
Th
e 
ty
p
es
 o
f 
m
at
er
ia
ls
 li
st
ed
 a
re
: P
u
b
lis
h
ed
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 b
ey
o
n
d
 t
h
e 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 r
e
p
o
rt
, N
o
n
-
p
u
b
lic
ly
 a
va
ila
b
le
 d
o
cu
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 is
su
er
s 
as
 
re
ce
iv
ed
 d
ir
ec
tl
y 
b
y 
re
vi
ew
er
s/
en
fo
rc
er
s,
 N
o
n
-
p
u
b
lic
ly
 a
va
ila
b
le
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 r
e
ce
iv
ed
 f
ro
m
 
o
th
er
 e
n
fo
rc
er
s,
 s
u
ch
 a
s 
ta
x 
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
 o
r 
th
o
se
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 m
ar
ke
t 
o
ve
rs
ig
h
t,
 N
o
n
-p
u
b
lic
ly
 
av
ai
la
b
le
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 r
e
q
u
es
te
d
 f
ro
m
 a
u
d
it
o
rs
, 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 r
ec
e
iv
ed
 f
ro
m
 o
th
er
 e
n
fo
rc
er
s,
 O
th
er
 
m
at
er
ia
ls
. T
h
e 
4
-p
o
in
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
 s
ca
le
 is
 n
o
t 
p
o
ss
ib
le
 (
0
),
 p
o
ss
ib
le
 b
u
t 
ra
re
ly
 u
se
d
 (
1
),
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 
(2
),
 a
lw
ay
s 
in
cl
u
d
ed
 in
 r
ev
ie
w
 (
3
).
 T
h
e 
sc
o
re
 is
 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 b
y 
ad
d
in
g 
th
e 
re
sp
o
n
se
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 t
yp
e 
o
f 
m
at
er
ia
l a
n
d
 d
iv
id
in
g 
th
is
 b
y 
1
8
.  
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 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
* 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
B
3
. R
at
io
 o
f 
lis
te
d
 
co
m
p
an
ie
s 
u
n
d
er
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
w
h
o
 h
av
e 
b
ee
n
 r
ev
ie
w
e
d
 d
u
ri
n
g 
th
e 
ye
ar
. 
Th
is
 is
 a
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
o
f 
th
e 
ac
tu
al
 p
er
fo
rm
ed
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 a
n
d
 is
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 im
p
o
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
d
et
er
re
n
ce
 s
tr
at
e
gy
 a
s 
it
 m
u
st
 s
h
o
w
 a
 
re
as
o
n
ab
le
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
e
n
ti
ty
 r
ev
ie
w
s 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r 
b
ef
o
re
 t
h
e 
‘d
et
er
re
n
ce
 e
ff
ec
t’
 is
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 t
o
 b
e 
re
al
 (
B
er
ge
r 
2
01
0
, E
SM
A
 2
0
1
4
, 2
0
17
).
 
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 
Th
is
 r
at
io
 is
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
w
o
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
s:
 ‘P
le
as
e
 
es
ti
m
at
e 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
is
su
er
s 
p
er
 y
ea
r 
se
le
ct
e
d
 
fo
r 
re
vi
ew
s 
in
 t
h
e 
p
as
t 
3
 y
ea
rs
’,
 a
n
d
 ‘P
le
as
e 
es
ti
m
at
e 
th
e 
to
ta
l i
ss
u
er
s 
u
n
d
er
 e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
as
 
an
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 
th
e 
p
as
t 
3
 y
ea
rs
’. 
Th
e 
ra
ti
o
 is
 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
is
su
er
s 
se
le
ct
e
d
 f
o
r 
re
vi
ew
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
to
ta
l i
ss
u
er
s 
u
n
d
er
 e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t.
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 C
. E
n
fo
rc
em
e
n
t 
ap
p
ro
ac
h
 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
* 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
C
1
. H
as
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
er
 in
 
yo
u
r 
co
u
n
tr
y 
gu
id
el
in
es
 
fo
r 
it
s 
e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
? 
B
o
th
 e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 m
u
st
 h
av
e 
gu
id
el
in
es
 f
o
r 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 a
s 
th
ey
 
en
su
re
 c
o
n
si
st
en
t 
e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t,
 a
lt
h
o
u
gh
 it
 m
ay
 
b
e 
ar
gu
ed
 t
h
at
 g
u
id
el
in
es
 a
p
p
ea
r 
to
 b
e 
m
o
re
 
im
p
o
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
e
gy
 a
s 
it
 b
u
ild
s 
o
n
 c
o
n
se
n
su
s.
 T
h
is
 r
e
q
u
ir
es
 t
h
at
 a
ll 
is
su
er
s 
ar
e 
tr
ea
te
d
 e
q
u
al
ly
 a
n
d
 t
h
at
 s
im
ila
r 
in
fr
in
ge
m
en
ts
 a
re
 
su
b
je
ct
 t
o
 s
im
ila
r 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
an
d
 s
an
ct
io
n
s 
(C
ih
ak
 
an
d
 P
o
p
ie
ra
 2
00
6
, B
al
d
w
in
 2
01
0
, O
EC
D
 2
01
4
b
).
 
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
= 
1
 if
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
er
 h
as
 in
te
rn
al
 g
u
id
el
in
es
 f
o
r 
it
s 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
, 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 
C
2
. D
o
es
 t
h
e 
e
n
fo
rc
er
 
id
en
ti
fy
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 f
o
cu
s 
ar
ea
s 
fo
r 
re
vi
ew
 -
 e
it
h
er
 
p
er
m
an
en
tl
y 
es
ta
b
lis
h
ed
 
fo
cu
s 
ar
ea
 o
r 
ar
ea
s 
th
at
 
m
ay
 c
h
an
ge
 f
ro
m
 y
ea
r 
to
 
ye
ar
? 
Th
e 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
sp
ec
if
ic
 f
o
cu
s 
ar
ea
s 
in
 
ad
d
it
io
n
 t
o
 t
h
e 
ro
u
ti
n
e 
ar
ea
s 
in
d
ic
at
es
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
er
 s
ys
te
m
at
ic
al
ly
 a
d
d
re
ss
es
 t
h
e 
ar
ea
s 
in
 
w
h
ic
h
 s
h
o
rt
co
m
in
gs
 a
re
 e
xp
ec
te
d
 in
 t
h
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
t.
 F
ro
m
 a
 p
er
su
as
io
n
 p
er
sp
ec
ti
ve
, t
h
e 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
fo
cu
s 
ar
ea
s 
w
ill
 s
er
ve
 a
s 
se
rv
ic
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 t
o
 is
su
er
s 
th
at
 t
h
is
 is
 a
n
 a
re
a 
o
f 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
in
te
re
st
 w
h
ile
 it
 f
ro
m
 a
 d
et
e
rr
en
ce
 
p
er
sp
ec
ti
ve
 m
ay
 b
e 
se
en
 a
s 
a 
w
ar
n
in
g 
o
f 
w
h
ic
h
 
ar
ea
s 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
er
s 
w
ill
 r
ev
ie
w
. I
ss
u
er
s 
w
ill
 
th
er
ef
o
re
 u
n
d
er
ta
ke
 a
d
d
it
io
n
al
 e
ff
o
rt
s 
to
 e
n
su
re
 
co
m
p
lia
n
ce
 in
 t
h
es
e 
ar
ea
s 
(E
rn
st
b
er
ge
r 
et
 a
l. 
2
01
2
, E
SM
A
 2
0
14
, S
EC
 2
0
16
a)
. 
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
=
 1
 if
 f
o
cu
s 
ar
ea
s 
ar
e 
id
en
ti
fi
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
er
, 0
 
o
th
er
w
is
e.
  
 
 
 
 9
2
 |
 P
a
g
e
 
 D
. A
ct
io
n
s 
an
d
 s
an
ct
io
n
s 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
* 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
D
1
. P
le
as
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
te
 1
00
 
p
o
in
ts
 t
o
 t
h
e 
ac
ti
o
n
s 
av
ai
la
b
le
 in
 y
o
u
r 
co
u
n
tr
y 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 y
o
u
r 
e
st
im
at
io
n
 
o
f 
th
e 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 o
f 
ac
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
th
e 
p
as
t 
3
 
ye
ar
s.
 T
h
e 
m
o
st
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 
sh
o
u
ld
 b
e 
as
si
gn
ed
 w
it
h
 
th
e 
h
ig
h
es
t 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
o
in
ts
.  
Th
e 
ra
n
ge
 o
f 
ac
ti
o
n
s 
av
ai
la
b
le
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
to
 w
h
ic
h
 t
h
ey
 a
re
 u
se
d
 in
d
ic
at
e
 t
h
e 
p
o
w
e
rs
 o
f 
an
 
en
fo
rc
er
. T
h
e 
d
et
er
re
n
ce
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
m
ak
e
s 
h
ea
vy
 
u
se
 o
f 
sa
n
ct
io
n
s 
as
 it
 r
el
ie
s 
o
n
 d
et
er
ri
n
g 
th
e 
is
su
er
s 
in
to
 c
o
m
p
lia
n
ce
 b
y 
es
ta
b
lis
h
in
g 
a 
‘D
et
er
re
n
ce
 e
ff
ec
t’
 (
La
 P
o
rt
a 
e
t 
al
. 2
0
06
, C
o
ff
ee
 
2
00
7
, J
ac
ks
o
n
 a
n
d
 R
o
e 
2
0
09
, E
rn
st
b
er
ge
r 
et
 a
l. 
2
01
2
).
  
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 
Th
e 
o
p
ti
o
n
s 
p
ro
vi
d
ed
 in
 t
h
e 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
 a
re
: 
W
ar
n
in
g,
 C
o
rr
ec
ti
o
n
 in
 t
h
e 
n
ex
t 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
t,
 P
u
b
lic
 c
o
rr
ec
ti
ve
 n
o
te
, I
ss
u
an
ce
 o
f 
n
ew
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
, F
in
e,
 S
u
sp
en
si
o
n
 f
ro
m
 
tr
ad
in
g,
 D
el
is
ti
n
g.
 T
h
e 
sc
o
re
 h
as
 t
w
o
 p
ar
ts
 t
h
at
 
ar
e 
ad
d
ed
 t
o
ge
th
er
 a
n
d
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
1
4
: (
1)
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
er
 m
u
st
 in
d
ic
at
e 
if
 a
n
 a
ct
io
n
 is
 p
o
ss
ib
le
 (
1
 is
 
ad
d
ed
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 p
o
ss
ib
le
 a
ct
io
n
) 
an
d
 (
2
) 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
er
 is
 a
sk
e
d
 t
o
 in
d
ic
at
e 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t 
to
 w
h
ic
h
 
it
 h
as
 b
ee
n
 u
se
d
 f
o
r 
th
e 
p
as
t 
3
 y
ea
rs
 (
1
 is
 a
d
d
ed
 
fo
r 
al
l v
al
u
es
 a
b
o
ve
 0
 p
o
in
ts
).
  
D
2
. T
o
 w
h
at
 e
xt
en
t 
d
o
 
yo
u
 b
el
ie
ve
 t
h
at
 is
su
er
s 
ge
n
er
al
ly
 a
cc
e
p
t 
an
d
 
re
sp
o
n
d
 t
o
 d
ec
is
io
n
s 
an
d
 
ac
ti
o
n
s?
 
A
 la
ck
 o
f 
ac
ce
p
ta
n
ce
 a
n
d
 r
es
p
o
n
se
 t
o
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
an
d
 a
ct
io
n
s 
w
ill
 
u
n
d
er
m
in
e 
b
o
th
 t
h
e 
d
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
e
gy
. T
h
e 
d
et
er
re
n
ce
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
re
q
u
ir
es
 a
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
 a
n
d
 r
es
p
o
n
se
 t
o
 m
ai
n
ta
in
 
th
e 
‘d
et
er
re
n
ce
 e
ff
ec
t’
 (
B
al
d
w
in
 e
t 
al
. 2
0
10
, 2
01
2
, 
Er
n
st
b
er
ge
r 
et
 a
l. 
2
0
12
, B
ar
th
 e
t 
al
. 2
0
13
b
, C
h
o
i 
et
 a
l. 
2
01
6
).
 T
h
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
re
q
u
ir
es
 it
 t
o
 
en
su
re
 b
u
y-
in
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
is
su
er
s 
as
 t
h
is
 e
n
su
re
s 
co
m
p
lia
n
ce
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
an
d
 a
ct
io
n
s 
(E
rn
st
b
er
ge
r 
e
t 
al
. 2
0
12
, B
ar
th
 e
t 
al
. 2
0
13
b
).
 
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
Th
e 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 a
 f
iv
e
-p
o
in
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
 
sc
al
e 
ra
n
gi
n
g 
fr
o
m
 ‘I
ss
u
er
s 
n
ev
er
 a
cc
ep
t 
an
d
 
re
sp
o
n
d
 t
o
 d
ec
is
io
n
s 
an
d
 a
ct
io
n
s’
 (
0
) 
to
 ‘I
ss
u
er
s 
al
w
ay
s 
ac
ce
p
t 
an
d
 r
e
sp
o
n
d
 t
o
 d
ec
is
io
n
s 
an
d
 
ac
ti
o
n
s’
 (
4
),
 a
n
d
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
4
. T
h
is
 is
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 
to
 b
e 
a 
co
m
b
in
ed
-q
u
es
ti
o
n
, a
s 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 f
o
r 
th
is
 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 is
 a
d
d
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
sc
o
re
 f
o
r 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 D
4
. 
Th
e 
su
m
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o
 s
co
re
s 
is
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
tw
o
 in
 
th
e 
in
d
ic
es
.  
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 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
* 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
D
3
. W
h
at
 h
ap
p
en
s 
if
 
is
su
er
s 
d
o
 n
o
t 
re
sp
o
n
d
 t
o
 
ac
ti
o
n
s 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
b
o
d
y?
 
P
le
as
e 
as
si
gn
 1
00
 p
o
in
ts
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 t
h
e 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 o
f 
sa
n
ct
io
n
s 
w
h
en
 is
su
er
s 
d
o
 n
o
t 
re
sp
o
n
d
 t
o
 a
n
 a
ct
io
n
. 
W
h
et
h
er
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
er
 c
an
 s
an
ct
io
n
 n
o
n
-
re
sp
o
n
se
s 
in
d
ic
at
es
 t
h
e 
p
o
w
e
r 
o
f 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
er
 
an
d
 is
 a
 c
ri
ti
ca
l a
b
ili
ty
 f
o
r 
en
fo
rc
er
s 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
th
e 
d
et
er
re
n
ce
 s
tr
at
e
gy
. T
h
er
ef
o
re
, i
t 
is
 im
p
er
at
iv
e 
th
at
 e
n
fo
rc
er
s 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
th
is
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
ar
e 
ab
le
 t
o
 
fo
rc
e 
th
ei
r 
w
ill
 o
n
to
 t
h
e 
is
su
er
s 
(B
al
d
w
in
 2
0
10
, 
B
as
el
 2
01
2
, E
rn
st
b
er
ge
r 
et
 a
l. 
2
01
2
, B
ar
th
 e
t 
al
. 
2
01
3
a,
 2
0
13
b
, S
EC
 2
0
16
a)
. 
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 
Th
e 
sc
o
re
 h
as
 t
w
o
 e
le
m
en
ts
: w
h
et
h
er
 s
an
ct
io
n
s 
ar
e 
av
ai
la
b
le
 (
1
 if
 t
h
ey
 a
re
, 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e)
 a
n
d
 
w
h
et
h
er
 s
an
ct
io
n
s 
ar
e 
u
se
d
 (
1
 if
 t
h
ey
 a
re
, 0
 
o
th
er
w
is
e)
, a
n
d
 t
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o
 e
le
m
en
ts
 is
 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
2
.  
  
D
4
. (
S)
 T
o
 w
h
at
 e
xt
en
t 
d
o
 
yo
u
 a
gr
ee
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
st
at
em
en
ts
 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 d
ec
is
io
n
s:
 
‘I
ss
u
er
s 
al
w
ay
s 
ac
ce
p
t 
an
d
 r
es
p
o
n
d
 t
o
 d
ec
is
io
n
s 
an
d
 s
an
ct
io
n
s’
. 
Se
e 
ra
ti
o
n
al
e 
u
n
d
er
 D
2
. 
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
Th
e 
sc
o
re
 f
o
r 
th
is
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 a
s 
x/
4
, a
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
5
 p
o
ss
ib
le
 a
n
sw
er
s 
(a
s 
th
e 
m
in
im
u
m
 
sc
o
re
 is
 0
 t
h
e 
sc
o
re
 is
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
4
).
 A
n
 a
n
sw
e
r 
o
f 
‘S
tr
o
n
gl
y 
ag
re
e’
 is
 g
iv
en
 a
 s
co
re
 o
f 
4
 a
n
d
 a
n
 
an
sw
e
r 
o
f 
‘S
tr
o
n
gl
y 
d
is
ag
re
e’
 is
 g
iv
en
 a
 s
co
re
 o
f 
0
. 
Th
is
 is
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 t
o
 b
e 
a 
co
m
b
in
ed
-q
u
es
ti
o
n
, a
s 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 f
o
r 
th
is
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 is
 a
d
d
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
sc
o
re
 
o
f 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 D
2
. T
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o
 s
co
re
s 
is
 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
tw
o
 in
 t
h
e 
in
d
ic
es
. 
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 E.
 T
ra
n
sp
ar
en
cy
 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
* 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
E1
. H
av
e 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
er
s 
in
 
yo
u
r 
co
u
n
tr
y 
p
re
p
ar
ed
 
p
u
b
lic
ly
 a
va
ila
b
le
 
gu
id
el
in
es
 f
o
r 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
? 
Th
is
 in
d
ic
at
es
 w
h
et
h
er
 e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 a
re
 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
t.
 T
h
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
re
q
u
ir
es
 
th
at
 e
n
fo
rc
er
s 
p
u
b
lis
h
 g
u
id
el
in
es
 t
o
 in
cr
ea
se
 t
h
e 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 a
n
d
 u
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g 
o
f 
th
e 
p
er
fo
rm
ed
 e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
(F
EE
 2
0
02
, A
rm
o
u
r 
et
 a
l. 
2
00
9
, B
al
d
w
in
 2
0
1
0
, O
EC
D
 2
01
4
a,
 2
0
14
b
, S
EC
 
2
01
6
b
) 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
= 
1
 if
 g
u
id
el
in
es
 f
o
r 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 a
re
 
p
u
b
lic
ly
 a
va
ila
b
le
, 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 T
h
is
 is
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 
to
 b
e 
a 
co
m
b
in
ed
-q
u
es
ti
o
n
, a
s 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 o
f 
th
is
 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 is
 a
d
d
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
sc
o
re
 o
f 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 E
7
. 
Th
e 
su
m
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o
 s
co
re
s 
is
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
tw
o
 in
 
th
e 
in
d
ic
es
. 
 
E2
. A
re
 f
o
cu
s 
ar
ea
s 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e
d
 t
o
 is
su
er
s 
(e
.g
.,
 in
 a
le
rt
s 
o
r 
in
 a
n
 
an
n
u
al
 le
tt
er
)?
 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 is
 im
p
o
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 
st
ra
te
gy
. C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
in
g 
fo
cu
s 
ar
ea
s 
to
 t
h
e 
p
u
b
lic
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
th
e 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 o
f 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
co
n
si
st
e
n
cy
 o
f 
ar
ea
s 
b
ei
n
g 
e
n
fo
rc
ed
 (
A
yr
es
 a
n
d
 B
ra
it
h
w
ai
te
 1
9
92
, F
EE
 
2
00
2
, A
rm
o
u
r 
et
 a
l. 
2
0
0
9,
 B
al
d
w
in
 e
t 
al
. 2
0
10
, 
2
01
2
, O
EC
D
 2
01
4
b
).
 
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
= 
1
 if
 f
o
cu
s 
ar
ea
s 
o
f 
e
n
fo
rc
er
s 
ar
e 
kn
o
w
n
 t
o
 
is
su
er
s,
 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 T
h
is
 is
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 t
o
 b
e 
a 
co
m
b
in
ed
-q
u
es
ti
o
n
, a
s 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 o
f 
th
is
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
is
 a
d
d
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
sc
o
re
 o
f 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 E
6
. T
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o
 s
co
re
s 
is
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
tw
o
 in
 t
h
e 
in
d
ic
es
. 
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R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
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e
m
e
n
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st
ra
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gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
E3
. P
le
as
e 
id
en
ti
fy
 w
h
ic
h
 
o
f 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
st
at
em
en
ts
 a
re
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
in
 
d
es
cr
ib
in
g 
th
e 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 o
f 
d
ec
is
io
n
s.
 
Th
e 
p
u
b
lic
at
io
n
 o
f 
e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
th
e 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t.
 T
h
is
 b
en
ef
it
s 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 
st
ra
te
gy
 b
y 
m
ak
in
g 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
t 
an
d
 t
h
e 
d
et
er
re
n
ce
 s
tr
at
e
gy
 b
y 
cr
ea
ti
n
g 
an
d
 
m
ai
n
ta
in
in
g 
th
e 
‘D
et
er
re
n
ce
 e
ff
ec
t’
 (
B
al
d
w
in
 
2
01
0
, B
al
d
w
in
 e
t 
al
. 2
01
0,
 2
01
2
, E
rn
st
b
er
ge
r 
et
 a
l. 
2
01
2
, B
ar
th
 e
t 
al
. 2
01
3
b
, O
EC
D
 2
01
4
b
, S
EC
 
2
01
6
a)
. 
D
et
er
re
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
Th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
o
p
ti
o
n
s 
ar
e 
p
ro
vi
d
ed
: d
ec
is
io
n
s 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
p
u
b
lic
ly
 a
va
ila
b
le
 (
0
),
 s
o
m
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
p
u
b
lic
 b
u
t 
in
 a
 c
o
n
d
en
se
d
 
ve
rs
io
n
 (
1
),
 s
o
m
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
p
u
b
lic
 a
s 
a 
fu
ll 
ve
rs
io
n
 (
2
),
 a
ll 
e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
p
u
b
lic
 b
u
t 
in
 a
 c
o
n
d
en
se
d
 
ve
rs
io
n
 (
3
),
 a
ll 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
p
u
b
lic
 a
s 
a 
fu
ll 
ve
rs
io
n
 (
4
).
 T
h
e 
va
lu
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
in
d
ic
at
ed
 o
p
ti
o
n
 is
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
4
.  
  
E4
. H
o
w
 a
re
 d
ra
ft
 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
ed
 
to
 t
h
e 
is
su
er
s?
 
If
 e
n
fo
rc
er
s 
in
te
ra
ct
 w
it
h
 is
su
er
s 
o
n
 t
h
e 
b
as
is
 o
f 
d
ra
ft
 d
ec
is
io
n
s,
 it
 s
tr
en
gt
h
en
s 
th
e 
b
as
is
 o
n
 w
h
ic
h
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
is
 c
ar
ri
ed
 o
u
t,
 w
h
ic
h
 is
 a
t 
th
e 
co
re
 o
f 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
(A
rm
o
u
r 
e
t 
al
. 2
0
09
, 
B
al
d
w
in
 2
0
10
, a
n
d
 O
EC
D
 2
0
14
b
).
  
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
= 
1
 if
 d
ra
ft
 d
ec
is
io
n
s 
ar
e 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
ed
 t
o
 
is
su
er
s,
 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 
 
E5
. A
re
 o
m
is
si
o
n
s 
o
r 
m
is
st
at
em
en
ts
 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e
d
 t
o
 is
su
er
s 
if
 t
h
ey
 a
re
 n
o
t 
co
n
si
d
er
ed
 
m
at
er
ia
l?
 
If
 is
su
er
s 
re
ce
iv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 a
b
o
u
t 
im
m
at
e
ri
al
 
o
m
is
si
o
n
s 
o
r 
m
is
st
at
em
en
ts
, i
t 
m
ay
 im
p
ac
t 
th
ei
r 
b
eh
av
io
u
r 
go
in
g 
fo
rw
ar
d
, w
h
ic
h
 is
 t
h
e 
o
b
je
ct
iv
e 
o
f 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
(O
EC
D
 2
0
1
4
b
).
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
= 
1
 if
 is
su
er
s 
re
ce
iv
e 
n
o
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 a
b
o
u
t 
im
m
at
e
ri
al
 o
m
is
si
o
n
s 
an
d
 m
is
st
at
em
en
ts
, 0
 
o
th
er
w
is
e.
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a
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a
le
 
En
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rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
E6
. (
S)
 A
re
 y
o
u
 a
w
ar
e 
o
f 
fo
cu
s 
ar
ea
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d
 a
n
d
 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e
d
 b
y 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
b
o
d
ie
s 
(e
.g
.,
 
in
 a
n
 a
le
rt
, a
n
 a
n
n
u
al
 
le
tt
er
 o
r 
o
n
 t
h
e 
w
e
b
si
te
 
o
f 
th
e 
e
n
fo
rc
er
)?
 
If
 t
h
e 
p
ri
o
ri
ti
es
 o
f 
e
n
fo
rc
er
s 
ar
e 
b
et
te
r 
kn
o
w
n
 b
y 
is
su
er
s,
 it
 m
ea
n
s 
th
at
 e
ff
o
rt
s 
to
 b
e 
tr
an
sp
ar
e
n
t 
h
av
e 
b
ee
n
 m
o
re
 e
ff
ec
ti
ve
 a
n
d
 t
h
u
s 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
e 
im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
A
rm
o
u
r 
et
 a
l. 
2
00
9
, B
al
d
w
in
 e
t 
al
. 2
01
0,
 2
01
2
, O
EC
D
 2
01
4
b
).
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
= 
1
 if
 r
e
gu
la
to
ry
 s
p
ec
ia
lis
ts
 a
re
 a
w
ar
e 
o
f 
fo
cu
s 
ar
ea
s,
 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 T
h
is
 is
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 t
o
 b
e 
a 
co
m
b
in
ed
-q
u
es
ti
o
n
, a
s 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 o
f 
th
is
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
is
 a
d
d
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
sc
o
re
 o
f 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 E
2
. T
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o
 s
co
re
s 
is
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
tw
o
 in
 t
h
e 
in
d
ic
es
. 
 
E7
. (
S)
 T
o
 w
h
at
 e
xt
e
n
t 
d
o
 
yo
u
 c
o
n
si
d
er
 t
h
e 
gu
id
el
in
es
 t
o
 b
e 
u
se
fu
l 
fo
r 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
p
ar
ti
es
? 
Th
e 
o
b
je
ct
iv
e 
o
f 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
e
gy
 is
 t
o
 
n
u
d
ge
 a
n
d
 g
u
id
e 
th
e 
e
n
fo
rc
ed
 in
to
 c
o
m
p
lia
n
ce
 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
re
gu
la
ti
o
n
. T
h
e 
p
u
b
lic
at
io
n
 o
f 
gu
id
el
in
es
 
m
ay
 in
cr
ea
se
 t
h
e 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 a
n
d
 
u
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g 
o
f 
th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t.
 (
FE
E 
20
02
, 
A
rm
o
u
r 
e
t 
al
. 2
0
09
, B
al
d
w
in
 2
01
0
, O
EC
D
 2
01
4
a,
 
2
01
4
b
, S
EC
 2
01
6
b
).
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
R
eg
u
la
to
ry
 s
p
ec
ia
lis
ts
 a
re
 a
sk
e
d
 t
o
 r
at
e
 t
h
e 
p
er
ce
iv
ed
 u
se
fu
ln
es
s 
fo
r 
is
su
er
s 
an
d
 a
u
d
it
o
rs
 
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
. T
h
e 
re
sp
o
n
se
 s
ca
le
 is
 f
ro
m
 n
o
t 
u
se
fu
l (
0
) 
to
 v
er
y 
u
se
fu
l (
4
) 
o
r 
it
 m
ay
 b
e 
in
d
ic
at
ed
 
th
at
 g
u
id
el
in
es
 a
re
 n
o
t 
u
se
d
 (
0
).
 T
h
e 
re
sp
o
n
se
s 
ar
e 
ad
d
ed
 a
n
d
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
8
. T
h
is
 is
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 t
o
 
b
e 
a 
co
m
b
in
ed
-q
u
es
ti
o
n
, a
s 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 o
f 
th
is
 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 is
 a
d
d
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
sc
o
re
 o
f 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 E
1
. 
Th
e 
su
m
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o
 s
co
re
s 
is
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
tw
o
 in
 
th
e 
in
d
ic
es
. 
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a
ti
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n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
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n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
E8
. (
S)
 T
o
 w
h
at
 e
xt
e
n
t 
d
o
 
yo
u
 a
gr
ee
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
st
at
em
en
t 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 d
ec
is
io
n
s:
 
‘D
ec
is
io
n
s 
ar
e 
h
el
p
fu
l f
o
r 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 u
se
d
 
b
y 
m
o
st
 is
su
er
s 
in
 t
h
e 
p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
’. 
D
ec
is
io
n
s 
sh
o
u
ld
 c
o
n
ta
in
 s
o
m
e 
d
is
cu
ss
io
n
 a
b
o
u
t 
w
h
at
 w
as
 w
ro
n
g 
an
d
 t
h
u
s 
in
cr
ea
se
 t
h
e 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 a
n
d
 p
ro
vi
d
e 
gu
id
an
ce
 f
o
r 
o
th
er
 
si
m
ila
r 
ar
ea
s,
 w
h
ic
h
 is
 in
-l
in
e 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
p
ri
n
ci
p
le
s 
o
f 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
(A
ry
es
 a
n
d
 B
ra
it
h
w
ai
te
 
1
99
2
, B
al
d
w
in
 e
t 
al
. 2
01
0,
 2
01
2
, O
EC
D
 2
01
4
a,
 
2
01
4
b
).
   
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
Th
e 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 a
 f
iv
e
-p
o
in
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
 
sc
al
e,
 r
an
gi
n
g 
fr
o
m
 s
tr
o
n
gl
y 
d
is
ag
re
e 
(0
) 
to
 
st
ro
n
gl
y 
ag
re
e 
(4
),
 a
n
d
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
4
.  
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 F.
 I
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
 w
it
h
 s
ta
ke
h
o
ld
er
s 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
* 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
F1
. I
s 
it
 p
o
ss
ib
le
 t
o
 g
et
 a
 
p
re
-c
le
ar
an
ce
 in
 y
o
u
r 
co
u
n
tr
y?
 
Th
e 
u
se
 o
f 
p
re
-c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 a
n
 im
p
o
rt
an
t 
as
p
ec
t 
o
f 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
as
 it
 e
n
ab
le
s 
en
fo
rc
er
s 
to
 h
av
e 
a 
fl
ex
ib
le
 e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
b
as
ed
 
o
n
 a
n
 o
p
en
 d
ia
lo
gu
e 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
ed
 e
n
ti
ty
 
(A
ry
es
 a
n
d
 B
ra
it
h
w
ai
te
 1
99
2
, D
ja
n
ko
v 
et
 a
l. 
2
00
3
, S
h
le
if
er
 2
0
0
5,
 J
ac
ks
o
n
 2
0
0
6
, 2
0
07
, C
o
ff
ee
 
2
00
7
, B
al
d
w
in
 e
t 
al
. 2
01
0,
 2
01
2
, E
SM
A
 2
0
14
, 
C
h
o
i e
t 
al
. 2
01
6
).
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
= 
1
 if
 p
re
-c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 p
o
ss
ib
le
, 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 T
h
is
 
is
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 t
o
 b
e 
a 
co
m
b
in
ed
-q
u
es
ti
o
n
, a
s 
th
e 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
o
f 
th
is
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 is
 a
d
d
ed
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
o
f 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
 F
3
. T
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o
 
sc
o
re
s 
is
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
tw
o
 in
 t
h
e 
in
d
ic
es
 
 
F2
. (
S)
 T
o
 w
h
at
 e
xt
en
t 
d
o
 y
o
u
 a
gr
ee
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
st
at
em
en
ts
: 
‘T
h
e 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
fo
r 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
er
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 a
re
 
su
ff
ic
ie
n
t’
. 
Th
e 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
fo
r 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
er
 a
re
 a
n
 im
p
o
rt
an
t 
as
p
ec
t 
o
f 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
e
gy
. T
h
is
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 r
el
ay
s 
w
h
et
h
er
 t
h
e 
is
su
er
s 
ar
e 
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
fo
r 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
e
n
fo
rc
er
s 
an
d
 t
h
u
s 
if
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
er
s 
ar
e 
ab
le
 t
o
 e
st
ab
lis
h
 a
n
 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
is
su
er
s 
(A
ry
es
 a
n
d
 
B
ra
it
h
w
ai
te
 1
9
92
, S
h
le
if
er
 2
0
0
5
, B
al
d
w
in
 2
0
1
0
, 
B
al
d
w
in
 e
t 
al
. 2
0
10
, 2
01
2
, O
EC
D
 2
0
14
a,
 2
01
4
b
).
  
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
Th
e 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 a
 f
iv
e
-p
o
in
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
 
sc
al
e,
 r
an
gi
n
g 
fr
o
m
 s
tr
o
n
gl
y 
d
is
ag
re
e 
(0
) 
to
 
st
ro
n
gl
y 
ag
re
e 
(4
),
 a
n
d
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
4
. 
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 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
* 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 
En
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
B
as
is
 f
o
r 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
F3
. (
S)
 T
o
 w
h
at
 e
xt
en
t 
d
o
 
yo
u
 a
gr
ee
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
st
at
em
en
ts
: ‘
Th
e 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
fo
r 
p
re
-
cl
ea
ra
n
ce
 a
va
ila
b
le
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
er
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 a
re
 s
u
ff
ic
ie
n
t’
. 
Th
e 
u
se
 o
f 
p
re
-c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 a
n
 im
p
o
rt
an
t 
as
p
ec
t 
o
f 
th
e 
p
er
su
as
io
n
 s
tr
at
e
gy
 a
s 
it
 e
n
ab
le
s 
en
fo
rc
er
s 
to
 h
av
e 
a 
fl
ex
ib
le
 e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 a
n
 o
p
en
 
d
ia
lo
gu
e 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
ed
 e
n
ti
ty
. T
h
is
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
w
h
et
h
er
 t
h
e 
en
fo
rc
er
s 
h
av
e 
b
ee
n
 a
b
le
 
to
 e
st
ab
lis
h
 p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
 t
h
at
 p
re
-c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 a
n
 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
is
su
er
s 
(A
ry
es
 a
n
d
 
B
ra
it
h
w
ai
te
 1
9
92
, D
ja
n
ko
v 
et
 a
l. 
2
0
0
3
, S
h
le
if
er
 
2
00
5
, J
ac
ks
o
n
 2
0
06
, 2
00
7
, C
o
ff
ee
 2
0
07
, B
al
d
w
in
 
et
 a
l. 
2
01
0
, 2
0
12
, E
SM
A
 2
0
1
4
, C
h
o
i e
t 
al
. 2
0
16
).
 
P
er
su
as
io
n
 
Th
e 
sc
o
ri
n
g 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 a
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Appendix B. Modified Brown et al. (2014) 
The first construct removed from the original Brown et al. (2014) enforcement index is item #1 (Regulatory 
body). This construct measures whether a country has established a body that is responsible for monitoring 
and promoting compliance with accounting standards. This measure may be relevant from a global 
perspective, but it is irrelevant from a European perspective, as regulation 1606/2002 requires all countries 
to establish an enforcement body that monitors and promotes compliance with the financial framework. 
The second construct removed is item #2 (Power to set accounting standards). According to Brown et al. 
(2014, p.16), this construct is included because it ‘…is likely to be associated with higher degree of financial 
reporting because it suggests activity, involvement and responsibility in relation to auditing and standard 
setting norms’. Our enforcement index does not contain a similar construct as we find it questionable 
whether the ability to set accounting standards actually enhances the ability to perform the enforcement of 
financial reporting, The issuing of accounting standards risks undermining flexible and agile enforcement 
due to political compromises made during the accounting setting process. Our position is supported by 
both ESMA and SEC as they rely on the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to set and issue accounting standards, respectively. In fact, ESMA even 
discourages the issuing of general IFRS application guidance (ESMA 2014).  
The third construct removed is item #6 (Level of sourcing). This construct measures the number of staff in 
the enforcement body per million of population. This measurement is based on the index created by 
Jackson and Roe (2009). Jackson and Roe (2009) have based their measurement on ‘How Countries 
Supervise Their Banks, Insurers and Securities Markets’ from 2006 and 2007, which focuses on the 
enforcement of financial institutions and securities markets, and not the enforcement of financial 
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reporting.14 Consequently, the figures used include enforcement activities around other areas than 
financial reporting enforcement. In our survey, we asked for the level of staff resources involved in financial 
reporting enforcement; however, the answers were of poor quality. Survey responses often included staff 
members involved in activities other than financial reporting enforcement when the enforcement body had 
additional responsibilities. 
  
                                                          
14
 Jackson and Roe (2009) provide data on 15 of our 17 countries and only 6 of the countries provide direct data for 
their budgeting and staffing of supervision. The data for the remaining 9 countries are either extrapolated on a 
median ratio (4 countries), or estimated from a ratio of enforcement activities relatively to the agencies total activity 
level (5 countries) (Jackson and Roe 2009). 
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Appendix C. Aligning index with constructs in modified Brown et al. (2014) 
In the first construct in the adjusted enforcement index (Item #3, Reviews of financial statements), Brown 
et al. (2014) examine whether the enforcement body actually undertakes reviews of financial statements. 
We use two items from our index that we believe measure the variation in the review activities across 
countries. The first item (B1) measures the ratio of companies under enforcement that have been reviewed 
during the year. The second item (B3) measures the powers of the enforcers performing the review, i.e., 
what responsibilities does the enforcer have (review, decision, actions, pre-clearance and informal 
guidance)? 
In the second construct in the adjusted enforcement index (Item #4, Reports surveillance programme), 
Brown et al. (2014) measure whether the enforcement body publicly reports outcomes of their reviews. 
We use two items from our index to capture this construct. The first item (E3) measures how enforcement 
decisions are communicated, i.e., if all or some of the enforcement decisions are made publicly available, 
either fully or partially. The second item (E5) measures whether omissions and/or misstatements identified 
by the enforcers are communicated to the enforced entity, even if they are immaterial. 
In the third and final construct in the adjusted enforcement index (Item #5, Taken enforcement actions), 
Brown et al. (2014) measure whether enforcement activities lead to enforcement action. The construct is 
measured by two items from our survey where the first item (D1) measures which actions are available and 
the frequency with which they have been used over the past 3 years. The second item (D3) measures 
whether the enforcer can impose additional sanctions if the enforced entity does not respond to the 
enforcement decisions and actions already imposed upon it. 
The three constructs are weighted equally, and the two items making up each construct carry the same 
weight.  
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Abstract 
This study discusses how the strictness of financial reporting enforcement, the applied enforcement 
strategy, and the materiality assessment impact firms’ mandatory disclosure decisions. Based on a sample 
covering 285 firms in 12 European countries, this study finds that immaterial items exhibit a significantly 
lower level of compliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements of IAS 36, than material items. This 
indicates that preparers conduct a materiality assessment when deciding on the level of mandatory 
disclosures, and that the materiality assessment considers both the absolute and relative size of the item 
being disclosed. The strictness of enforcement is a significant determinant of the level of compliance. 
However, this holds true only if the enforcement is based on either the deterrence enforcement strategy or a 
combination of the deterrence and persuasion enforcement strategies, as the persuasion enforcement 
strategy does not appear to influence the level of compliance. Furthermore, the study finds that the 
strictness of financial reporting enforcement does not significantly influence materiality assessment. Thus, 
the findings of this study do not support the argument that a strict enforcement forces preparers to disclose 
immaterial information.  
 
Key words: Financial reporting enforcement, Materiality, Materiality assessment, Enforcement strategy 
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Introduction 
Users, preparers, and academicians have criticised the ever-growing number of disclosure requirements in 
IFRS to increase the complexity and decrease the transparency of financial statements (Schipper 2007, FRC 
2009, 2011, EFRAG 2012, 2013, IASB 2013). This criticism is centred on two elements. First, firms are 
criticised for not applying the materiality concept accurately in regard to mandatory disclosures. Second, a 
strict financial reporting enforcement is criticised for forcing preparers to include all mandatory disclosures 
in the financial report, even when the disclosures are immaterial. Together, these two elements and the 
absence of a conceptual framework for mandatory disclosures are considered to cause information 
overload and poor transparency in financial reports (Schipper 2007, Beyer et al. 2010, Barker et al. 2013, 
FASB 2015). This study examines whether the strictness of enforcement, the applied enforcement strategy, 
and the materiality assessment affect the level of mandatory disclosures provided by preparers. 
Materiality is pervasive in the preparation of the financial report, as it provides a threshold for determining 
when an item can reasonably be expected to influence the decisions of the primary users. Thus, materiality 
warrants separate presentation, either in financial statements or notes (IAS 1.29-31, IASB 2010, 2015a, 
IASB 2017). However, the literature on materiality is limited and focuses on the materiality assessment of 
preparers, auditors, regulators, and enforcers rather than the users (Iskandar and Iselin 1999, Brennan and 
Gray 2005, Eilifsen and Messier 2014, Barker et al. 2013). Furthermore, this literature focuses on the 
materiality assessment of recognition rather than of disclosures. It is important to distinguish between the 
materiality assessment of recognition and that of disclosures, as materiality assessment is split into two 
elements: misstatements and omissions. Misstatements relate to the financial statements (Palmrose and 
Scholz 2004), while omissions relate to both the financial statement and disclosures (IAS 8.5). Omissions 
and misstatements in the financial statement are assessed relatively to a pre-determined threshold which 
measures whether the omission or misstatement is material (Eilifsen and Messier 2014). However, a pre-
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determined threshold may not be particularly useful in assessing the materiality of disclosures as these may 
have been omitted because either the information is immaterial or the firm is unwilling to disclose the 
information, or simply because the information has a value of zero. However, the information may still be 
material if assessed on qualitative factors and thus warrants disclosure in the notes. Because materiality 
assessment is persuasive in the preparation of the financial report, it becomes essential to understand how 
materiality is applied in regard to mandatory disclosures. Previous literature on materiality and mandatory 
disclosures has left this area largely untouched.  
Previous research indicates that the benefits of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption 
are only achieved if the adoption is coupled with a strict financial reporting enforcement (Hail and Leuz 
2006, Daske et al. 2008, Christensen et al. 2013). Furthermore, research suggests that a strict enforcement 
ensures that IFRS is adopted in substance and not just in words (Daske et al. 2013). However, a strict 
enforcement is also criticised for forcing preparers to disclose all mandatory disclosures without 
consideration of the relevance and usefulness of the information (FRC 2009, 2011, IASB 2013, ESMA 2012, 
IAASB 2012, FASB 2015). In other words, a strict enforcement is criticised for suspending the materiality 
assessment of mandatory disclosures. This makes the notes lengthier and more complex, which decrease 
the transparency and usefulness of the financial report. However, no existing studies have investigated if a 
strict enforcement truly suppresses the materiality assessment of disclosures. This study aims to investigate 
not only how enforcement interacts with materiality assessment but also how different enforcement 
strategies impact the level of mandatory disclosures, and if preparers actually apply a materiality 
assessment on mandatory disclosures.  
This study focuses on compliance with the disclosure requirements in IAS 36 – Impairment of Assets. This 
standard is chosen because preparers find it challenging (Glaum et al. 2013) and because it has been a 
focus area for European enforcers (ESMA 2014, 2015). The study is based on a hand-collected sample 
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measuring individual firms’ level of compliance with the disclosures required by IAS 36. The level of 
compliance is analysed based on the 2014 financial report, covering 285 firms in 12 European countries. 
Using the firms’ goodwill as the disclosed item and comparing it with the estimated planning materiality 
level15, the study finds that firms make more mandatory disclosures when goodwill is material relatively to 
when it is immaterial. In other words, firms make more mandatory disclosures when goodwill exceeds the 
planning materiality level and fewer mandatory disclosures when goodwill is below the planning materiality 
level. This indicates that preparers do apply a materiality assessment when deciding the level of mandatory 
disclosures. Interestingly, the study finds that both the absolute and relative levels of goodwill affect the 
level of disclosures and that the level of compliance exhibits insignificant differences once goodwill is 
material.  
Further, the study investigates how enforcement and its application impact the level of mandatory 
disclosures and preparers’ materiality assessments. The study finds that enforcement and the applied 
enforcement strategies are significant determinants of the level of compliance with mandatory disclosures. 
An enforcement strategy16 comprising a combination of the deterrence and persuasion strategies (total 
enforcement) exhibits a significant and positive impact on the level of compliance, that is, firms disclose 
more. A similar pattern is evident if the deterrence enforcement strategy (deterrence) is applied, while the 
persuasion enforcement strategy (persuasion) has an insignificant influence on the level of compliance. This 
is a novel finding as previous studies have only focused on the strictness of the enforcement and not the 
applied enforcement strategy. Finally, the study finds that a strict enforcement does not significantly 
influence the preparers’ materiality assessment on disclosures, regardless of the applied enforcement 
                                                          
15
 Please see footnote 25 for an explanation on how planning materiality is estimated. 
16
 The difference in the enforcement strategies may shortly be described as follows: The deterrence strategy seeks to 
ensure compliance through the use of sanctions and penalties. On the other hand, the persuasion strategy attempts 
to ensure compliance by using dialogue, encouragement, and education. The two strategies may be combined into 
what this article calls the total enforcement strategy. The enforcement strategies are discussed in further detail in 
sub-section ‘Enforcement’ under the section ‘Background and hypothesis development’. 
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strategy. This implies that preparers continue to apply a materiality assessment on mandatory disclosures, 
even when operating under a strict enforcement regime. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it extends the existing literature by 
investigating how different enforcement strategies impact the level of mandatory disclosures. Previous 
literature has analysed the effects of enforcement by applying enforcement indices, which are broad 
measurements of enforcement, without considering different ways of applying the enforcement. 
Consequently, very little is known about how differences in the enforcement strategies impact financial 
reporting. By considering the applied enforcement strategy while analysing the effects of financial 
reporting enforcement provides a new and more nuanced perspective on the effects of enforcement.  
Second, the study extends the existing literature by investigating how enforcement influences the level of 
mandatory disclosures by applying enforcement indices which measure the actual public financial report 
enforcement. Thus, the study provides evidence that public enforcement of financial reporting matters in 
regard to mandatory disclosure, if an appropriate enforcement strategy is applied. Previous studies utilise 
enforcement indices which measure the ‘rule-of-the-book’ rather than the actual performed enforcement 
(Holthausen 2009, Johansen et al. 2018). Applying the formal enforcement proxies used by previous 
literature yields mixed results as only two of the four enforcement proxies17 exhibit a significant and 
positive impact on the compliance level, that is, a strict enforcement increases the level of compliance. The 
remaining two enforcement proxies exhibit insignificant results. This raises the question whether the 
results of previous studies are reliable and provide an accurate picture of the effects of enforcement. 
                                                          
17
 The four formal enforcement proxies are as follows: Legal origin (La Porta et al. 1998); general legislative and legal 
environment (Kaufmann et al. 2014); activity of enforcement bodies (Brown et al. 2014); and debt enforcement 
(Djankov et al. 2008). For additional information on the test results, see the section entitled ‘Robustness tests’. 
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Third, the study extends the scarce literature on disclosure of materiality assessments. Previous literature 
investigating disclosure of materiality assessments usually focuses on the auditors’ perception of 
materiality (Eilifsen and Messier 2014). This study focuses on materiality from the preparer’s perspective 
and uses the actual disclosures provided in the 2014 financial reports to assess the preparers’ materiality 
assessment. The preparers’ materiality assessment is analysed by different measurements and perspectives 
on materiality. 
Fourth, the study examines how the joint effects of financial reporting enforcement and the materiality 
assessment impact the compliance level. Several parties have argued that a strict enforcement forces 
preparers to discard the materiality assessment and include immaterial information (FRC 2009, 2011, IASB 
2013, ESMA 2012, IAASB 2012, FASB 2015). However, no studies have investigated whether these 
allegations are well founded or not. The answer to this question is important as it provides insights into the 
factors preparers consider during the materiality assessment, and thereby which items are disclosed in the 
financial report. This study is the first to provide such insights.  
The article is organised as follows. The next section outlines the background for mandatory disclosures 
along with the development of the research hypotheses. The third section describes the data employed, its 
collection and the research design. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis follow in the fourth 
section, while the empirical results are analysed and presented in the fifth section. Robustness tests are 
conducted in the sixth section and the article closes with a brief summary and conclusion. 
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Background and hypothesis development 
Mandatory disclosure – Effect and value 
The purpose of the general financial statement is to provide financial information to existing and potential 
capital providers18 (Healy and Palepu 2001, IASB 2010, FASB 2010, EFRAG 2012). Accounting information 
allows potential capital providers to evaluate the return on their investment opportunities (the valuation 
perspective) and existing capital providers to monitor the management of the invested resources (the 
stewardship perspective). It is the firms’ management that discloses the financial information which is 
based on an evaluation of the information needs and relative strength of the potential and current capital 
providers (Gjesdal 1981, Beyer et al. 2010). Research indicates that firms only disclose information if they 
have an incentive to do so, or if the information has a private or social value (Solomons 1991, Admati and 
Pfleiderer 2000). Some firms may therefore not voluntarily disclose the information needed by the capital 
providers as firms do not expect to benefit from the disclosure. To ensure that the information is provided, 
regulation may therefore mandate its disclosure (Leuz and Wysocki 2016).  
A solid framework specifying when regulation should require specific information disclosed does not exist. 
However, several reasons have been put forth to justify mandatory disclosures (Leuz 2010). First, the social 
value of the information exceeds the private value for the firm due to the existence of positive 
externalities. In such circumstances, firms will not disclose enough information on a voluntary basis which 
may lead to private over- or under-production of information. Regulation may mitigate this problem by 
requiring firms to disclose information to match the socially optimal level of disclosure. Second, a 
mandatory regime can ensure cost savings at the market level. For example, one entity (regulator) can 
establish a common set of disclosure requirements rather than having each capital provider setting their 
                                                          
18
 The term ‘existing capital providers’ covers both existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors (IASB 
2010). 
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own disclosure requirements. This set-up will reduce the accumulated agency costs at the market level. 
Third, the sanctions for non-compliance are only enforceable through public enforcement activities and not 
through private enforcement activities (Admati and Pfleiderer 2000, Coffee 2007, Barker et al. 2013, Leuz 
and Wysocki 2016). Fourth, mandatory disclosure ensures that both the potential and current capital 
providers are provided with a satisfactory level of information as failure to do so may have severe 
consequences (Akerlof 1970).  
Potential and existing capital providers have different information needs. Potential capital providers 
request information to evaluate the profitability of future investment opportunities. As outsiders, they risk 
over-pricing firms with low profitability prospects and under-pricing those with high profitability prospects. 
Thus, a rational capital provider values both firms at an average price, which eventually may lead to a 
market breakdown (Akerlof 1970). Firms with high profitability prospects will remedy this ‘lemon problem’ 
by providing additional disclosures (Beyer et al. 2010, Leuz and Wysocki 2016). Existing capital providers 
(principles) request information to help them resolve the problem caused by hiring a professional agent to 
supervise the daily operations. The professional agent (steward) can only effectively manage the daily 
operations if he is equipped with some degree of decision-making power. However, the transfer of 
decision-making power may entice the agent to pursue his own interests rather than those of the principles 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). The principles may resolve this problem by monitoring the behaviour of the 
agent by using information systems or outcome-based contracts (Eisenhardt 1989). Existing capital 
providers therefore demand information which they can use to monitor and determine the efforts and 
ability of the steward. However, the relationship between the agent and the principles is not permanent as 
current capital providers may withdraw their invested resources any time. Under such circumstances, the 
principles are faced with the lemon problem as they must identify a willing buyer among the potential 
capital providers. Consequently, both current and potential capital providers are interested in receiving 
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transparent and reliable information about a firm. However, the timing of when the information is made 
publicly available differs. Mandatory disclosures may help level the playing field and ensure a continuous 
and uniform flow of financial information. 
Notes and mandatory disclosure requirements 
The purpose of the notes is to amplify, elaborate or explain figures recognised in the financial statement 
and to provide information not presented elsewhere, if relevant for the understanding of the financial 
report (IAS1.112, FASB 2008). Disclosures mandated by individual accounting standards must be included in 
the financial report if the information is material and if the benefits are expected to exceed the costs of 
providing the information (FASB 2008, 2010, IASB 201019, IAS 1.31). In fact, IAS 1.31 specifically stresses 
that immaterial information should not be disclosed, even if it is required to be disclosed by a specific 
IAS/IFRS accounting standard. However, firms must evaluate if the mandated disclosures are sufficient to 
enable the users to understand the impact of a particular transaction or event, or if additional disclosures 
are needed to enhance the understanding of the transaction or event. Consequently, firms are provided 
with a considerable degree of judgement when deciding what to disclose. 
Previous studies show that firms do not fully comply with all mandatory disclosure requirements and that 
the level of compliance is influenced by both firm characteristics and institutional settings (Cooke 1989, 
Street and Gray 2002, Glaum and Street 2003, Tsalavoutas 2011, Glaum et al. 2013, Tsalavoutas and 
Dionysiou 2014, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014). Firm characteristics include attributes such as being listed in the 
US, size, auditor, and industry. Institutional settings include factors such as the strictness of the financial 
reporting enforcement, culture, and size of national capital market. The explanatory variables in this study 
                                                          
19
 In FASB, 2008 (Statement of Financial Accounting No. 5), the cost constraint is mentioned in paragraph 63. In FASB, 
2010 (Statement of Financial Accounting No. 8 – Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Chapter 1, The 
Objective of General Purpose Financial Reporting, and Chapter 3, Qualitative Characteristics of Useful Financial 
Information), the cost constraint is mentioned in paragraph QC35-QC39. In IASB, 2010 (Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting 2010), the cost constraint is mentioned in paragraph QC35-QC39. 
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are materiality and enforcement. Factors known to influence the level of compliance are included as 
control variables. The research hypotheses are developed below along with an elaboration of the 
explanatory variables in the section ‘Research Methodology’.  
Materiality 
The concept of disclosure materiality has received increasing attention owing to the discussion of reducing 
the complexity and increasing the transparency of financial reports, that is, the cutting clutter discussion. 
Several organisations have issued discussion papers, exposure drafts and hearings on materiality, which 
have identified three problems with the application of materiality (EFRAG 2012, ESMA 2011, 2012, IAASB 
2012, IASB 2013, 2015b, FASB 2015). First, preparers, auditors, regulators, and enforcers should become 
better at assessing materiality. Doing so is expected to increase the understandability and transparency of 
financial reports (ESMA 2012, IASB 2013, 2015a). Second, the materiality assessment for disclosures should 
be based on similar considerations as the materiality assessment of items in the primary statement; 
however, such assessment should focus more on the qualitative aspects of the information (ESMA 2012, 
FASB 2015, IASB 2017). Third, the concept of materiality must be well understood by the participants, 
except users, as half of them have expressed concerns about the clarity and understandability of the 
concept (ESMA 2012).  
Previous literature finds that the materiality assessment for recognised items is primarily conducted based 
on quantitative thresholds, estimated on a set of relatively clear criteria (Iskandar and Iselin 1999, Brennan 
and Gray 2005, Eilifsen and Messier 2014) while the materiality assessment for disclosures are less clear. 
Iselin and Iskandar (2000) find that auditors have a significantly lower threshold for recognition than for 
disclosures. They also find that the industry of the audited firm influences auditors’ materiality assessment. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) finds that materiality assessments usually focus almost 
entirely on the magnitude of monetary amounts, even for disclosures (FASB 2015). Similarly, Christensen 
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and Ryttersgaard (2016) find that preparers and auditors primarily focus on quantitative measures in their 
materiality assessment of disclosures, especially the actual amounts. Gleason and Mills (2002) find that 
disclosures for contingent tax liability increase with the amount of the tax claim, that managers assess 
materiality based on stable measurements and that the applied thresholds are difficult to identify. IASB 
(2017) suggests in their Practice Statement 2 that the materiality assessment should follow a four-step 
process and that the assessment is based on a set of materiality factors20. Further, they suggest that the 
identification of an initial quantitative threshold which may later be modified by quantitative factors could 
be a practical approach towards a materiality assessment of disclosures (IASB 2017, ar.54). Thus, it appears 
that the materiality assessment of disclosure is blurred and focuses on quantitative factors. 
According to the definition of materiality (IASB 2010, par QC11, 2015b, par. IN2) the materiality assessment 
requires consideration of both qualitative and quantitative factors. The materiality assessment is split into 
two elements: misstatements and omissions (IAS 8.5). Misstatements relate to the primary financial 
statement (Palmrose and Scholz 2004), while omissions relate to both the primary financial statement and 
disclosures (IAS 8.5). Both are typically assessed relatively to a pre-determined threshold (Eilifsen and 
Messier 2014). Further, disclosures may be omitted if they are irrelevant or immaterial (IAS 1.31). Since 
disclosures may be purely descriptive and/or explanatory in nature and have a book value of zero, a 
materiality threshold may be of little use. The materiality assessment becomes even more complicated 
when two users may assign different levels of importance to the same disclosures (Barker et al. 2014). 
Consequently, the assessment of materiality becomes a matter of professional judgement. In these 
situations, a pre-determined materiality threshold is not particularly useful as it fails to disclose the 
                                                          
20
 Materiality factors are divided into quantitative and qualitative factors which are identified by the firm based on the 
requirements of IFRS standards and the firms’ knowledge about information needs of the primary users (IASB 2017). 
Quantitative factors are typically measured as a threshold, such as a specific level, rate, or amount. On the other hand, 
qualitative factors are characteristics of a transaction, other events, and conditions or of their context which are likely 
to influence the decision of the primary user. Furthermore, qualitative factors may be either entity-specific or external 
(IASB 2017. Par. 44-51). 
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information needed by the stakeholders. A quantitative threshold may be seen as a proxy for the true 
materiality of the item and as a practical usage of the materiality concept in the daily operations. However, 
a quantitative threshold is not always sufficient to conclude if an item is material (IASB 2017).  
In principle, materiality should have a direct effect on the compliance level with mandatory disclosures as 
firms should exclude immaterial disclosures from the financial report. This will, ceteris paribus, cause the 
number of undisclosed items to increase and thereby decrease the level of compliance. Furthermore, a 
strict application of the materiality concept will cause a steep increase in compliance at the materiality 
threshold, as firms begin to adhere to the mandatory disclosure requirements. If the absolute amount is 
considered during the materiality assessment, firms with very high absolute amounts will exhibit relatively 
higher levels of compliance than those with low absolute amounts. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The materiality of a disclosure item is positively associated with the degree to which firms 
comply with mandatory disclosure requirements. 
Enforcement 
Enforcement has been identified as a key determinant if the benefits of adopting a set of high-quality 
accounting standards are to be realised (Hail and Leuz 2006, Daske et al. 2008, Christensen et al. 2013). Hail 
and Leuz (2006) find that firms located in countries with stringent security regulations, stricter enforcement 
mechanisms and extensive disclosure requirements experience a significantly lower cost of capital. Daske 
et al. (2008) find that IFRS adoption is associated with significant beneficial capital market effects (cost of 
capital and Tobin’s q), but only if the firms are located in countries with relatively strict enforcement 
regimes and if there exists an institutional incentive for firms to be transparent.  
Enforcement is also found to ensure firms’ compliance with accounting standards in substance rather than 
in words (Daske et al. 2013, Glaum et al. 2013, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014, Preiato et al. 2015). Daske et al. 
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(2013) find that firms adopting IFRS in substance rather than in words experience beneficial capital market 
effects in the form of lower cost of capital and increased liquidity, which supports the findings of their 
previous study (Daske et al. 2008). Glaum et al. (2013) find that a strict enforcement environment increases 
the compliance with mandatory disclosures. Tsalavoutas et al. (2014) find that the enforcement of financial 
reporting requirements is ineffective in ensuring compliance with mandatory disclosures, but that the 
enforcement of auditors has a significant impact. Preiato et al. (2015) find that analysts’ consensus 
forecasts and the level of disagreement among analysts are lower for firms located in countries with a 
strong enforcement environment. Collectively, studies on enforcement indicate that enforcement is key for 
ensuring compliance and achieving the benefits of a set of high quality accounting standards.  
Previous studies investigating the effects of enforcement utilise different proxies to measure the strictness 
of enforcement. Most of the utilised proxies do not capture the actual public financial reporting 
enforcement activities, but rather the general enforcement environment, or at best the formal rules of the 
financial reporting enforcement (Johansen et al. 2018). Thus, it remains unclear how the actual public 
financial reporting enforcement affects compliance with accounting standards. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The strictness of financial reporting enforcement is positively associated with the degree to 
which firms comply with mandatory disclosures requirements. 
The actual enforcement can be implemented through various strategies among which the most common is 
a combination of two opposing arch-types (total enforcement) (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Baldwin and 
Cave 1999, Baldwin et al. 2010, 2012). The first arch-type is the deterrence strategy which attempts to 
ensure compliance by punishing non-compliers. The punishment may include criminal sanctions, license 
suspension and revocation (Ayres and Braitwaite 1992, Baldwin et al. 2010, 2012). The persuasion strategy 
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is the second arch-type and it attempts to ensure compliance by dialogue, encouragement, and education 
(Ayres and Braitwaite 1992, Baldwin et al. 2010, 2012). Choi et al. (2016) investigate how a gradual change 
(over 15 years) from a deterrence strategy (from 1992 to 2001) to a persuasion strategy (in 2002 and 2003) 
and thereafter to a combination of the two enforcement strategies (from 2004 to 2006) affects compliance 
with the level of general corporate disclosures. They find that the adoption of the responsive strategy is 
associated with a reduction in the analysts’ forecast errors and the narrowing of the bid-ask spread which 
indicates improvement in the corporate disclosures. These findings indicate that the adoption of a mixed 
enforcement strategy helps regulators to better ensure compliance with disclosure requirements (Choi et 
al. 2016). The apparent importance of enforcement strategies and the lack of studies investigating their 
effects lead to the third hypothesis which is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Different enforcement strategies are differently associated with the degree to which firms 
comply with mandatory disclosure requirements. 
Moderating effect of enforcement on materiality 
Enforcers have been accused of following a ‘tick-the-box’ enforcement approach towards disclosures, 
which forces preparers to disclose immaterial information (ESMA 2012, IAASB 2012, IASB 2013, 2015b). A 
‘tick-the-box’ enforcement approach effectively means that the materiality assessment is suspended as all 
mandatory disclosure requirements are complied with, irrespective of their materiality. This effect varies 
with the strictness of the enforcement. The strictness of enforcement has been proven to influence 
compliance with accounting standards (Hail and Leuz 2006, Daske et al. 2008, 2013, Christensen et al. 2013, 
Glaum et al. 2013, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014; Preiato et al. 2015). Materiality is pervasive in the preparation of 
the financial report as it helps to determine if a piece of information must be disclosed. Consequently, it is 
interesting to know how enforcement interacts with the materiality assessment and in particular, if a strict 
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enforcement causes preparers to disregard their materiality assessment and include immaterial items. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The strictness of financial reporting enforcement moderates the positive association between 
materiality and mandatory disclosure requirements. 
Research Methodology 
Data 
The level of compliance with IAS 36 is chosen as representative of the general level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements. IAS 36 has a significant influence on the financial report because it 
governs the rules for the estimation of impairment charges recognised in the profit and loss statement. IAS 
36 also contains a substantial number of disclosure requirements which allow for variation in the level of 
compliance across countries and firms. IAS 36 has been a focus area for the European enforcement 
authorities during the last few years (ESMA 2014, 2015). The enforcement authorities have either focused 
on the level and quality of the disclosures or the inputs used to estimate the recoverable amount. It is 
therefore assumed that preparers are intimately familiar with the disclosure requirements of IAS 36. 
Further, it is assumed that preparers have taken due diligence in preparing their financial statements and 
that any non-compliance is due to a deliberate choice, that is, all the information they wish to disclose has 
also been disclosed. 
Sample 
The sample was selected in an eight-step process. First, countries without significant merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity were eliminated from the sample. Significant M&A activity is defined as M&A 
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transactions worth more than 1% of total M&A transactions in Europe21 in 2014. This selection criterion 
increases the likelihood that firms in the sample have goodwill, which requires a yearly impairment test in 
accordance with IAS 36 (IAS 36.10). Second, countries with minor capital markets are eliminated from the 
sample. Minor capital markets are defined as capital markets which constitute less than 1% of the total 
capital markets in Europe in 201222. This selection criterion was applied to focus on the capital markets in 
which the majority of investors are present. Third, only firms that are constituents of the leading European 
stock indices as on 31 December 2014 is included in the sample. This selection criterion ensures that the 
study focuses on the most valuable firms and those followed by a significant number of capital providers. 
Fourth, firms from Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, and Switzerland have been eliminated from the sample due 
to inadequate enforcement data. Fifth, firms with year-ends outside the time span of 31 December 2014 
through 31 March 2015, or not providing a financial statement in English, or not issuing a financial 
statement according to IFRS, have been eliminated from the sample. Sixth, firms with missing data have 
also been eliminated from the dataset. Seventh, firms not audited by a Big-4 auditing firm are eliminated 
from the dataset as this will make the dataset more homogeneous. Eighth, countries with five or fewer 
observations after taking into account the above listed criteria are eliminated from the sample. Firms with 
listings on multiple stock exchanges are included only once. Based on these criteria, the sample was 
reduced from 509 potential firms to 285 firms. The allocation of firms across countries and industries is 
shown in Table A.  
                                                          
21
 The European region is defined in Thomson ONE as comprising the following countries: Albania, Andorra, Austria, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, 
Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Svalbard and Jan Mayen, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. The completed M&A transactions for member countries of the 
European Union and Norway and Switzerland amount to USD 564 billion, which is equivalent to EUR 457 billion. 
22
 The World Bank does not provide data for more recent periods on the capitalisation of listed companies. The total 
capitalisation values of listed companies amount to USD 11,732 billion which is converted to EUR 8,899 billion using 
the year-end cross-currency rate listed by the Danish National Bank as of 30 December 2014. 
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[Insert Table 1 – Overview of sample by country and industry] 
Dependent variable – Level of compliance 
The dependent variable is the level of compliance with IAS 36. The data used to calculate the level of 
compliance is collected by hand from the 2014 consolidated financial reports. Following Street and Gray 
(2002), Glaum and Street (2003), Glaum et al. (2013), Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou (2014) and Tsalavoutas et 
al. (2014), a checklist was developed containing all mandatory disclosure requirements of IAS 36, effective 
31 December 2014. All mandatory disclosure requirements were included in the checklist to avoid potential 
selection bias. The final checklist contains 46 individual disclosure items.  
The items on the checklist were coded as 1 (disclosed), 0 (not disclosed) or n/a (not applicable). The coding 
required some degree of judgement because it was necessary to evaluate whether a disclosure 
requirement was complied with, not complied with, or not applicable. Firms were therefore given the 
benefit of doubt, if there was any doubt about the compliance or applicability of an item. In these cases, 
the item was coded as not applicable. For example, it is assumed that a firm which writes in its principle 
accounting policy section that it reverses impairment charges (tangible assets), but does not provide a 
specification of its reversals, has not had any reversals during the year. This approach will result in an 
upward bias in compliance.  
The data were collected with the help of seven research assistants who, independently of each other, 
collected data for 168 observations (firms). The research assistants compared the collected data to check 
for any overlap in the observations (118 observations). Overlapping observations were compared and the 
identified discrepancies were discussed and settled among the research assistants. The sample was then 
finalised by the research assistants and sent to the researcher. Eighty observations in the final sample were 
re-performed by the researcher. This re-performance revealed only minor discrepancies. The remaining 
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part of the sample (117 observations) was collected by the researcher. Of the 117 observations, the first 24 
observations collected were re-performed by the researcher at the end of the collection process. An 
additional 13 observations were selected (using a haphazard method, and excluding the first 24 
observations) and re-performed by the researcher at the end of the collection process. This re-performance 
only revealed minor discrepancies. Thus, approximately 41% of the final sample was been re-performed 
and verified. 
Following Cooke (1989), Street and Gray (2002), Tsalavoutas (2011), Glaum et al. (2013), Tsalavoutas and 
Dionysiou (2014) and Tsalavoutas et al. (2014), the level of compliance is calculated as the ratio of items 
complied with over the total applicable number of items (aggregated number of items complied with and 
not complied with)23. Users of financial reports may prioritise some information over others, which argues 
for weighing the different disclosure requirements relatively to this prioritisation. However, it has not been 
possible to identify objective weights for the individual disclosure requirements without introducing 
significant selection bias. Consequently, all disclosure items are weighted equally as they are assumed to be 
of equal importance. The level of compliance is therefore considered to provide a true and fair view of the 
disclosures as envisioned by the firms.  
Independent variables 
The independent variables are divided into explanatory variables, for which hypotheses have been 
developed, and control variables. This section contains a description of how the explanatory and control 
variables have been measured and the reasons for including the individual control variables. Table 2 
                                                          
23
 For example, assume that there is a total of 40 disclosure items. Also assume that the firm is compliant with 15 
items and non-compliant with 4 items. The remaining 21 items are not applicable for the firm. Then the level of 
compliance of the firm is 79% (15/(15+4)=0.789). Items considered not applicable for the firm are, as shown by this 
example, not included in the ratio for level of compliance.  
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defines the independent variables and the data source. Panel A of Table 2 contains information on the 
explanatory variables, while Panel B contains those pertaining to the control variables. 
Explanatory variables 
Materiality 
Hypothesis 1 questions whether preparers apply a materiality assessment when preparing the items for 
mandatory disclosure in the financial report. The materiality assessment should include an assessment of 
both quantitative and qualitative characteristics; a perfect measurement of materiality must therefore 
consider both of these characteristics. The measurement of materiality used in this article is based solely on 
quantitative characteristics due to limitations in the available resources and lack of access to relevant 
information. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the quantitative threshold used is a fair proxy 
for the true materiality while also being a pragmatic application of the qualitative materiality assessment. 
This is considered especially true in regard to the disclosures about impairments as the information 
disclosed largely depends on the importance of the underlying assets, and especially the size of goodwill. 
The reason for this is that impairment charges must be offset against goodwill before other asset classes in 
the cash-generating unit (IAS 36.104a). Consequently, a quantitative materiality measure is in this instance 
considered to be a fair representation of the materiality assessment.  
Materiality is proxied by the line item ‘goodwill’ because impairment charges must be offset against 
goodwill before they are allocated to the remaining assets of the cash-generating unit. Because of this, 
goodwill is considered to be a good proxy for materiality, even though it does not capture non-goodwill 
impairments. The reason for this is that all firms included in the sample have some amount of goodwill. 
Materiality is analysed from four different perspectives. The first measure (ABSOLUTE) is based on the 
absolute (log) size of goodwill. The debate on materiality suggests that preparers carefully consider the 
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absolute size of goodwill (ESMA 2012, IAASB 2012, IASB 2013, 2015b, 2016, 2017, FASB 2015, Christensen 
and Ryttersgaard 2016). ABSOLUTE is expected to have a positive association with compliance as a higher 
amount of goodwill, ceteris paribus, is accompanied by more disclosures. The second measure (RELATIVE) 
considers goodwill relative to the planning materiality level of the firm and is calculated by dividing the 
absolute amount of goodwill with the planning materiality level24. This measure covers the relative aspect 
of materiality. The planning materiality level is calculated based on the guidelines used by the Big 4 
auditors25 (Eilifsen and Messier 2014) and relevant auditing standards (IAASB 2009a, 2009b, PCAOB 2010a, 
2010b). The third measure (IMMATERIAL) is an indicator variable and it is coded 1 if goodwill is smaller than 
the level of the planning materiality and 0 if goodwill exceeds the planning materiality level. IMMATERIAL is 
expected to have a negative influence on compliance because immaterial items are omitted from 
disclosure in the financial report and consequently coded as non-compliant. The fourth measure 
(QUARTILED MATERIALITY) is an indicator measurement of RELATIVE partitioned into quartiles. This 
measure is included to measure how different levels of relative materiality influence the compliance level. 
It is expected that the lower quartile (0% to 25% of the observations with the lowest relative materiality) is 
negatively associated with compliance because this quartile primarily contains firms with immaterial levels 
of goodwill. The direction of the other quartiles is unpredictable as these quartiles should be insignificantly 
different from each other.  
                                                          
24
 For example, assume that the absolute amount of goodwill is EUR 1,000k and the planning materiality level is EUR 
500k; then, the value of the variable RELATIVE would be 2 (1,000/500=2), thereby indicating that goodwill is material 
for the firm. On the other hand, if the absolute amount of goodwill is EUR 250k, the value of the variable RELATIVE 
would be 0.5 (250/500=0.5), thereby indicating that goodwill is immaterial for the firm. 
25
 The planning materiality level of the individual firms is based on the average of the following four measures: total 
assets (average of 0.5% and 1%), net income (average of 5% and 10%), total revenue (average of 0.5% and 1%) and 
equity (average of 1% and 5%). 
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Enforcement 
Enforcement (ENFORCEMENT) is measured by the three enforcement indices developed by Johansen et al. 
(2018). The indices are based on a questionnaire covering both the formal enforcement (rules-of-the-book) 
and the actual performed enforcement. The respondents of the questionnaire are European enforcement 
bodies and regulatory specialists of a Big 4 auditing firm in 17 European countries. The indices provide a 
more accurate measurement of financial reporting enforcement than other available enforcement indices 
which are based on either the general rules of law or the formal rules of financial reporting enforcement 
(Johansen et al. 2018). The indices provided by Johansen et al. (2018) are anonymous, which means that 
specific information in the indices are undisclosed at a country level. The indices in Johansen et al. (2018) 
measure enforcement based on different enforcement strategies. The first index measures the total 
enforcement (combination of the deterrence and persuasion strategies) and the second index measures 
enforcement if it is applied following the deterrence strategy. The third index measures enforcement 
performed according to the persuasion enforcement strategy. The three indices are anonymous and taken 
from an unpublished paper, which is why the results are compared with previous indices used in the 
accounting literature. This is partly done to verify the results obtained by using the index and partly to 
make the results comparable with the previous literature. The comparison uses enforcement indices 
developed by La Porta et al. (1998), Djankov et al. (2008), Kaufmann et al. (2014) and Brown et al. (2014) 
and is included as part of the robustness tests. It is expected that ENFORCEMENT has a positive association 
with compliance.  
[Insert Table 2 – Overview of independent variables – description and source – around here] 
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Control variables 
Several control variables are included to capture the effect of different factors documented in previous 
studies and considered to influence the level of compliance. The control variables are as follows: auditors, 
cultural characteristics, capital markets, industry type, US-listing, size of the firm, profitability, corporate 
governance, and ownership concentration. Each control variable is described shortly below. 
Auditors 
Previous studies find that firms being audited by Big 4 auditing firms exhibit a higher level of compliance 
than those audited by non-Big 4 auditing firms (Cooke 1989, Street and Gray 2001, Glaum and Street 2003, 
Tsalavoutas 2011, Glaum et al. 2013, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014, Cascino and Gassen 2015). However, while 
none of the firms included in this sample are audited by non-Big 4 auditing firms,26 an indicator variable is 
included to test for differences between the Big 4 auditors. It has not been possible to set the direction of 
the individual indicator variables. 
Industry of the firm 
Previous studies have found that some industries adopt specific accounting policies and interpretations of 
the general accounting rules and firms in similar industries are exposed to the same level of competition, 
risk, and regulation (Herrmann and Thomas 1996, Jaafar and Mcleay 2007, Nobes 2013). Furthermore, 
studies on mandatory disclosure find that industry is a significant determinant for the level of compliance 
(Street and Gray 2002, Glaum and Street 2003, Glaum et al. 2013, Tsalavoutas 2011, Tsalavoutas and 
                                                          
26
 In the original sample, three firms were audited by non-Big 4 auditing firms. These firms have been eliminated 
because they are too few to make solid statistical inferences. To reduce the noise generated from these firms, they 
have been eliminated from the sample. Models including the three firms show a significant negative impact, i.e. they 
have a significantly lower level of compliance than firms being audited by a Big 4 auditing firm.  
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Dionysiou 2014, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014). Industries are controlled for by a four digit ICB code27. No 
expectation has been set for the direction of the individual industries.  
Dual listing in the US 
Previous studies find that a dual US listing significantly increases the accounting quality and level of 
compliance because US regulations are considered to be stricter than similar regulations in the rest of the 
world (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, Glaum and Street 2003, Hail and Leuz 2006, La Porta et al. 2006, Hodgdon 
et al. 2008; Ernstberger et al. 2012, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014). This effect is controlled by the dichotomous 
variable US-LISTING which is expected to have a positive association with compliance. 
Size of the firm 
The size of the firm has been documented to have a positive association with compliance (Cooke 1989, 
Street and Gray 2002, Glaum and Street 2003, Glaum et al. 2013, Tsalavoutas 2011, Tsalavoutas and 
Dionysiou 2014, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014). The control variable SIZE is used to capture the effects of 
differences in the size of firms and it is expected to be positively associated with compliance. 
Profitability 
The profitability of a firm is used as an indicator for impairments because a Cash Generating Unit (CGU) 
operating at a loss, ceteris paribus, is subject to impairment and should thereby provide additional 
disclosure to explain recognised impairment charges, or the lack of impairment charges. In line with the 
previous literature, an indicator variable PROFIT is used to capture this effect, which is expected to be 
negatively associated with compliance (Street and Gray 2002, Glaum and Street 2003, Tsalavoutas 2011, 
Erstberger et al. 2012, Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou 2014, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014, Cascino and Gassen 2015). 
                                                          
27
 The ICB industry categories are as follows: Oil & Gas (ICB code 0001), Industrial (ICB code 1000), Basic Materials (ICB 
code 2000), Consumer Goods (ICB code 3000), Healthcare (ICB code 4000), Consumer Services (ICB code 5000), 
Telecommunication (ICB code 6000), Utilities (ICB code 7000), Financials (ICB code 8000) and Technology (ICB code 
9000). The ICB category for individual firms has been found by searching the company in Thomson One Banker. 
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Corporate governance  
Research indicates that corporate governance influences the quality of disclosure and is usually measured 
by the existence of an audit committee (Bushman et al. 2006, Verriest et al. 2013). To capture the effect of 
corporate governance, the variable AUDIT_COM has been included. AUDIT_COM measures the number of 
meetings held in the audit committee during 2014 as the mere existence of an audit committee is 
considered to be an inadequate measure. Admittedly, the number of meetings does not provide much 
information about the work performed by the audit committee and may be influenced by a number of 
factors, such as the financial position of the firm and material transactions (M&A activity). AUDIT_COM is 
expected to have a positive association with compliance.  
Ownership concentration 
Concentration in ownership may negatively influence the level of disclosure in both positive and negative 
directions28. Large shareholders may benefit from a less transparent financial statement (La Porta et al. 
1997, Leuz and Wysocki 2016) as a large dispersion in ownership may cause individual shareholders to lose 
interest in monitoring the performance of the firm due to a low level of ownership or an inability to 
influence the decisions of the firm (Zeckhauser and Pound 1990, Barako et al. 2006). This effect is 
controlled for by the two control variables CLOSELY_HELD and CLOSELY_HELD2 and no expectation been 
assigned to their direction.  
Cultural characteristics 
Previous studies find that national cultural characteristics influence accounting structure and practices 
(Gray 1988, Salter and Niswander 1995, Schultz and Lopez 2001, Glaum et al. 2013, Aggarwal and Goodell 
2014). The cultural trait of being uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity is characterised as 
                                                          
28
 The fact that both a high and a low level of ownership may influence level of compliance indicates that there is an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between the level of compliance and mandatory disclosure requirements. 
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conservative and has been found to have a negative influence on compliance (Gray 1988, Salter and 
Niswander 1995, Schultz and Lopez 2001, Glaum et al. 2013). The variable UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE is 
included to capture this effect and it is expected to be negatively associated with the level of compliance. 
Other cultures favour competitiveness and assertiveness, which have been associated with a positive 
impact on the level of disclosure (Gray 1998, Salter and Niswander 1995). This effect is captured by the 
control variable MASCULINITY and it is expected to exhibit a positive association with compliance. Both 
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE and MASCULINITY are taken directly from Hofstede et al. (2010) cultural 
measurements which have been criticised for being outdated as they were collected between 1967 and 
1973. Additional data from six cross-national studies were gathered between 1990 and 2002 and added to 
the dataset. However, Hofstede’s cultural indicators may still be considered accurate because cultural traits 
only change slowly over time (Hofstede et al. 2010, Wysocki 2011).  
Capital markets 
Previous studies find that active capital markets create a demand for decision-useful information (Leuz et 
al. 2003, Frost et al. 2006, Glaum et al. 2013, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014). Following the previous literature, the 
effect of the capital markets (S_MARKET) is measured by the averaged ranked score of the market 
capitalisation of listed companies, stock traded total value (both relative to GDP) and number of listed 
companies relative to population in millions (Leuz et al. 2003, Frost et al. 2006, Glaum et al. 2013, 
Tsalavoutas et al. 2014). S_MARKET is expected to be positively associated with compliance. 
Model 
Following previous studies, an OLS-regression is applied to test the four hypotheses (Street and Gray 2002, 
Glaum and Street 2003, Tsalavoutas 2011, Glaum et al. 2013, Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou 2014, Tsalavoutas 
et al. 2014). A total of eight models are estimated for each enforcement strategy and the results are 
presented in Tables 6 and 7, panels A to C. Models 1 to 4 (Table 6) estimate the effects of enforcement and 
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the various measurements of materiality. Models 5 to 8 (Table 7) introduce the moderating effect of 
enforcement on materiality, but are otherwise similar to Models 1 to 4. Panels A to C exhibit the results of 
different enforcement strategies, where Panels A, B and C show the results of the mixed strategy (total 
enforcement), the deterrence strategy and the persuasion strategy, respectively. Following Jaccard and 
Turrisi (2003) and Brambor et al. (2006), the models have been centred at the mean values. This also eases 
the interpretation of the results as the base will be equal to the mean value. Model 1 is stated as follows: 
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Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
The descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables are presented in Tables 3 and 4, 
respectively. The average level of compliance is 72.1% (median: 75.0) and the most compliant country is 
Denmark (mean: 82.4%; median: 83.3%) followed by Sweden (mean: 79.0%; median: 79.7%) and Ireland 
(mean: 78.9%; median: 77.3%). The least compliant countries are Spain (mean: 57.4%; median: 60.8%) 
followed by Portugal (mean: 66.0%; median: 65.9%) and the UK (mean: 69.3%; median 72.7%). Overall, only 
one firm complies with all relevant disclosure requirements, while 25 firms demonstrate a compliance level 
of 90.0% or higher. These firms are generally located in the UK (4), Germany (4), France (3) or Denmark (3). 
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Thirty-one firms provide 50.0% or less of the mandated disclosures and seven of these firms provide less 
than 30.0% of the mandatory disclosure requirements. These firms are primarily located in Spain (11) or the 
UK (10). These findings are in line with those of previous studies which demonstrate an average level of 
compliance of 55.0% to 82.8% (Cooke 1989, Street and Gray 2002, Tsalavoutas 2011, Glaum et al. 2013, 
Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou 2014 and Tsalavoutas et al. 2014). However, Glaum et al. (2013) and Tsalavouts 
et al. (2014), which are more comparable studies that include compliance with IAS 36, find an average 
compliance of 72.8% and 81.3%, respectively. Analysing the level of compliance in these studies at a 
country level reveals close proximity with the level of compliance at a country level in this study.   
The average amount of goodwill is EUR 3.483 million (median: EUR 1,087 million) with a minimum value of 
EUR 1.2 million and a maximum value of EUR 58.2 billion. Twenty-nine firms have goodwill in excess of EUR 
10.0 billion, while 134 firms have goodwill of less than EUR 1.0 billion. The average level of materiality is 
EUR 574 million (median: EUR 136 million). Forty-one firms have a materiality level of more than EUR 1.0 
billion and 28 of these are located in the financial industry. One hundred and twenty-five firms have a 
materiality level of less than EUR 100.0 million; 53 firms have goodwill below the level of materiality. Firms 
with immaterial goodwill exhibit an average level of compliance of 63.1% (median: 68.2%) compared to 
those with a material goodwill which exhibit a compliance level of 74.1% (median: 76.2%). Clients of the 
auditing firm KPMG exhibit the highest average level of compliance of 75.8% (median: 76.9%), while those 
of Deloitte exhibit the lowest average level of compliance of 66.3% (median: 65.8%). The average level of 
compliance increases from QUARTILE 0–25%, which has the lowest compliance level of 64.9% (median: 
69.6%), to QUARTILE 75-100%, which demonstrates the highest compliance level of 76.9% (median: 80.0%). 
A similar pattern is observed in the average amount of goodwill which increases from EUR 1,084 million in 
QUARTILE 0–25% to an average of EUR 6,810 million in QUARTILE 75–100%. There is a large variation in 
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goodwill within the individual quartiles, which is illustrated by QUARTILE 75–100%, in which goodwill 
ranges from a low of EUR 301 million to a high of EUR 58,189 million. 
 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 around here] 
 
The average strictness of total enforcement is 60.4 and ranges from 35 (country #8) to 89 (country #2). The 
average strictness of the deterrence strategy is 9.15, and country #8 has the lowest score while country #11 
has the highest score. The persuasion enforcement strategy has an average score of 9.52 with the lowest 
score of 2 (country #8) and the highest score of 17 (country #2). Two countries have an enforcement score 
above the average on all three enforcement strategies (country #2 and #11) while only one country has a 
score below the average for all the three strategies. This indicates some variance in the enforcement in 
Europe.  
The development of the capital markets varies widely as the market capitalisation of listed companies, 
relative to GDP, ranges from 30.3% in Portugal to 114.8% in the UK. A similar pattern is observed in the 
activity of the capital markets where traded stock in Ireland only amounts to 4.2% of GDP, while it amounts 
to 93.9% of GDP in the UK. Likewise, cultural characteristics differ significantly among countries. 
Uncertainty avoidance is very high in Portugal (99), Belgium (94) and France (86) and therefore these 
countries are least receptive to new ideas and behaviour. In contrast, Denmark (23) and Sweden (29) are 
the most receptive to new ideas and behaviour. The need for achievement and assertiveness is most 
pronounced in Ireland (68), the UK (66) and Germany (66), while Sweden (5) and Norway (8) are the most 
consensus-oriented countries in Europe.  
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Strategic shareholders own, on average, 19.6% shares of the firms. However, there are wide variations in 
strategic ownership; it ranges from a low of 0.0% to a high of 87.8%. The average capitalised value of the 
firms is EUR 19.8 billion (median: 9.7 billion). Twenty-nine firms have a value of more than EUR 50.0 billion 
and eight of these firms have a value in excess of EUR 90 billion. On the other hand, 146 firms have a 
capitalised value of EUR 10.0 billion or less and 12 of these firms have a value of EUR 1.0 billion or less. The 
average total assets are EUR 106.8 billion (median: EUR 14.0 billion); 48 firms have total assets exceeding 
EUR 100.0 billion and eight of these firms have assets exceeding EUR 1.0 trillion; all these firms belong to 
the financial industry. Five firms have total assets of EUR 1.0 billion or less. The average revenue is EUR 19.3 
billion (median: EUR 7.4 billion). Twenty-four firms have revenues exceeding EUR 50.0 billion and eight of 
these have revenues exceeding EUR 100.0 billion. In contrast, 19 firms have revenues of EUR 1.0 billion or 
less. The average number of employees is 56,895 (median: 24,274); 49 firms have more than 100,000 
employees, while 12 firms employ fewer than 1,000 employees. 
 
[Insert Table 5 – Correlations – around here] 
 
The correlations of the variables are presented in Table 5. Spearman’s correlation coefficients are shown 
above the diagonal and the Pearson’s correlation coefficients are shown below the diagonal. The results 
indicate a significant and positive association between compliance and three of the measurements of 
materiality (ABSOLUTE, RELATIVE and QUARTILE 75–100%). The variables IMMATERIAL and QUARTILE 0–
25% both show a significant negative association with compliance while QUARTILE 25–50% and QUARTILE 
50–75% exhibit an insignificant association with compliance. The correlation among the four 
measurements of materiality is well below 1, suggesting that the four measurements capture materiality 
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differently. The exception to this is the association between QUARTILE 0–25% and IMMATERIAL and 
between QUARTILE 75–100% and RELATIVE, which exhibit a correlation of 0.83 and 0.84, respectively. 
Unsurprisingly, the combination of enforcement strategies (TOTAL) exhibits a positive and significant 
correlation with both the enforcement strategies of deterrence (DETERRENCE) and persuasion 
(PERSUASION). DETERRENCE and PERSUASION also exhibit a positive and significant correlation which 
suggests some degree of overlap between the two enforcement strategies. 
Compliance exhibits a significantly negative correlation with the auditor as DELOITTE and a positive 
correlation with KPMG. S_MARKET, UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE and MASCULINITY all exhibit a significant 
and negative correlation with compliance while USLISTING shows a weak positive correlation with 
compliance. The remaining control variables exhibit an insignificant correlation with COMPLIANCE, though 
they are correlated with each other with varying degrees of significance. This may indicate problems of 
multicollinearity. Consequently, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is inspected and reported along with the 
empirical results. The VIFs in models 1 to 8 range from 1.25 to 3.64 across the three different enforcement 
strategies and are therefore well below the critical threshold of 1029, which implies that multicollinearity is 
not a problem. Despite this, all reported standard errors are Huber-White-adjusted.  
Empirical results 
Panels A to C of Table 6 report the results of the four regression models (models 1 to 4) used to test 
hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, while panels A to C of Table 7 report the results of the four regression models 
(models 5 to 8) used to test hypothesis 4.  
                                                          
29
 Variables are considered to be at an acceptable level if their VIFs are below 10 (Wooldridge 2013, page 94) and also 
below the more conservative threshold of 5 (Montgomery et al. 2015, page 296). 
 134 | P a g e  
 
Materiality 
Model 1 in panel A of Table 6 shows that the absolute amount of goodwill (GOODWILL) is positive and 
significant (t=5.13; p=<.0001). This indicates that the absolute amount of goodwill influences the disclosure 
decision and that a large amount of goodwill results in more disclosures. Similar results are found in panels 
B and C, indicating that the results are valid, irrespective the applied enforcement strategy. The effect is not 
only significant statistically but also economically as an increase in the absolute amount of goodwill of 1%, 
ceteris paribus, will increase the level of compliance by approximately 7.5% (based on total enforcement). 
This result confirms the finding of previous studies that the decision is influenced by the absolute amount 
of goodwill. 
The relative size of goodwill (RELATIVE) is also positive and significant (t=3.05; p=0.0025) as indicated by 
Model 2 in panel A of Table 6. Similar results are exhibited in panels B and C. This implies that the number 
of times goodwill exceeds the planning materiality level influences preparers’ disclosure decision. In other 
words, a firm in which goodwill is ten times the size of the planning materiality level has a higher level of 
compliance, ceteris paribus, than that in which goodwill is only five times the size of the planning 
materiality level. From Model 3 in Table 6, panel A, it is apparent that the firms apply a materiality 
assessment for their disclosure decisions because firms provide significantly fewer disclosures (t=-3.68; 
p=0.0003) if goodwill is immaterial (IMMATERIAL) than if goodwill is material. This result is significant both 
statistically and economically because firms with immaterial amounts of goodwill provide approximately 
9.9 percentage points fewer disclosures than if goodwill is material. This result is in line with the 
expectation and suggests that firms apply a materiality assessment of mandatory disclosures when 
preparing the financial reports. The results are consistent across the applied enforcement strategies, as 
shown in Table 6, panels A to C.  
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If RELATIVE is partitioned into quartiles (Model 4, table 6, panel A), it becomes evident that the relative size 
matters. Firms located in the quartile of 0–25% of RELATIVE exhibit a significant and negative association 
(t=-4.06; p=<.0001) with level of compliance. This implies that firms in this quartile have a level of 
compliance that is approximately 11.6 percentage points lower than those in the highest quartile of 75–
100%). This result is expected as the majority of firms in this quartile have an amount of goodwill which is 
immaterial, as shown in Table 4. Firms in the quartiles of 25–50% (t=-1.63; p=0.1051) and 50–75% (t=-1.52; 
p=0.1298) exhibit an insignificantly lower level of compliance that firms in the highest quartile (75-100%) as 
these firms have a compliance which is approximately 3.7 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively, lower 
than that of firms in the highest quartile. This result suggests that firms apply a materiality assessment 
when preparing the financial reports and the assessment appears to be relatively attuned to the planning 
materiality threshold, that is, firms provide insignificantly different levels of disclosures if goodwill is 
material. The results in panels B and C of Table 6 are similar to those with one exception that QUARTILE 25–
50% in model 4, panel B, is significantly different at the 10% level (t=-1.80; p=0.0726). These results suggest 
that a quantitative threshold measuring materiality provides a relatively good indicator for whether an item 
is considered material or immaterial. In summary, it appears that firms apply a materiality assessment 
when deciding which mandatory disclosures to disclose. Firms clearly provide fewer disclosures if goodwill 
is immaterial than when it is material.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
Enforcement 
Models 1 to 4 in panel A of Table 6 show a positive and significant association between compliance and 
TOTAL (t=2.25; t=0.0252) in Model 3 and (t=2.71; p=0.0072) in Model 1, which indicates that a strict 
enforcement increases the level of mandatory disclosures if the applied enforcement strategy is a 
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combination of deterrence and persuasion strategies. However, the effect of enforcement becomes 
stronger if the enforcers apply a deterrence strategy, which is shown in panel B of Table 6. In these cases, 
enforcement is positively associated with compliance at the 1% level across all four models (Models 1–4) as 
the four models ranges from a significance of t=3.08 and p=0.0023 in Model 3 to t=3.37 and p=<.0001 in 
Model 1. Interestingly, enforcement becomes insignificant if a persuasion enforcement strategy is applied 
(Table 6, panel C). Consequently, it appears that enforcement of disclosures must include elements of 
deterrence before it is effective in ensuring compliance with the mandatory disclosures.  
Effects of enforcement on the concept of materiality 
The question remains whether a strict enforcement mitigates the materiality assessment in the disclosure 
decision. It is evident from Models 5–8 in panels A–C of Table 7 that a strict enforcement does not 
significantly influence how firms apply their materiality assessments during their disclosure decisions. This 
is not surprising when it comes to persuasion strategy, considering this strategy has an insignificant effect 
on mandatory disclosures. However, it is more surprising that neither the deterrence strategy nor a mixed 
enforcement strategy significantly affects the level of compliance as the enforcement in both enforcement 
strategies is found to be highly significant. These results indicate that a strict enforcement, irrespective of 
the applied enforcement strategy, do not force firms to disclose immaterial information in the financial 
reports as suggested by several stakeholders (FRC 2011, EFRAG 2012, 2013, ESMA 2012, IAASB 2012, IASB 
2013, 2015b).  
 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
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Control variables 
Firms in different industries do not exhibit significantly different levels of compliance, as shown in panels 
A–C of Tables 6 and 7. However, the choice of auditor does appear to have a slight influence as the clients 
of KPMG in all models and across the different enforcement strategies exhibit a significantly higher level of 
compliance (at either a 10% or 5% level) compared to those of Deloitte. Clients of EY and PwC exhibit 
insignificantly different levels of compliance relative to Deloitte. The cultural characteristic of 
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE exhibits the expected negative association with compliance and is highly 
significant for all models and enforcement strategies. MASCULINITY generally exhibits a significant and 
negative association to compliance at the 5% or 1% level except if a deterrence enforcement strategy is 
applied. Contrary to the expectations S_MARKET is negative and is significantly associated with compliance. 
This is puzzling as previous research has shown that an active capital market should create a demand for 
useful information (e.g. more disclosures). Consequently, the effects of capital markets have been 
estimated by using the individual components of S_MARKET and an alternative measure of market 
efficiency developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Svirydzenka, 2016). These estimations 
provide similar results. 
Robustness tests 
The enforcement indices used in the main test are constructed using private information, which implies 
that the enforcement scores are anonymous. The findings of this study are therefore difficult to reproduce 
and compare with the previous literature. This weakness is overcome by performing robustness tests using 
enforcement indices used in previous literature. Furthermore, such robustness tests help to validate the 
results of the main investigation and will thereby add credibility to the study.  
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Previous literature has used a series of different proxies; the most frequently used are legal origin (La Porta 
et al. 1998), elements of the general legislative and legal environment (Kaufmann et al. 2014), activity of 
enforcement bodies (Brown et al. 2013) and debt enforcement (Djankov et al. 2008). The selected 
enforcement indices have been used in several previous studies, including La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), La 
Porta et al. (2006), Hope (2003), Leuz et al. (2003), Daske et al. (2008), Florou and Pope (2012), Christensen 
et al. (2013), Glaum et al. (2013), Brown et al. (2014), Tsalavoutas et al. (2014) and Preiato et al. (2015). The 
classification of legal origin follows La Porta et al. (2008) and consists of the following four groups: English30, 
French31, Scandinavian32 and German33. The enforcement proxy used in Kaufmann et al. (2014) was taken 
from the section ‘Rule of Law’ from the Worldwide Governance Indicators project. The results of the 
robustness test are tabulated in Table 8 and they are directly comparable with the results of the main 
analysis as tabulated in able 6, panels A to C.  
 
[Insert Table 8 – Robustness tests of enforcement indices – around here] 
The legal origin model produces very high VIFs (in excess of 20) for both English and Scandinavian legal 
origin due to MASCULINITY. However, the VIFs are reduced by eliminating MASCULINITY from the legal 
origin regressions. Models 1 to 4 from the main test have been re-run without MASCULINITY (not 
tabulated) without material changes to the results (changes in level of significance on the explanatory 
variables). It is therefore assumed that the legal origin model shown in panels A–C of Table 8 is comparable 
with Models 1 to 4 from the main test.  
                                                          
30
 English legal origin consists of the following countries: United Kingdom and Ireland. 
31
 French legal origin consists of the following countries: Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
32
 Scandinavian legal origin consists of the following countries: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. 
33
 German legal origin consists of the following country: Germany. 
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Table 8 shows that materiality measurements of the absolute (ABSOLUTE) and relative (RELATIVE) amount 
of goodwill are significantly and positively associated with the level of compliance at the 1% level for all of 
the applied enforcement indices. Items below the planning materiality level (IMMATERIAL) are significantly 
and negatively associated with compliance at the 1% level, as expected. For all enforcement indices, the 
lowest quartile (QUARTILE 0–25%) exhibits a negative and significantly lower level of compliance relatively 
to the benchmark (QUARTILE 75–100%). The other quartiles are all insignificantly different from the 
benchmark except for the Kaufmann et al. (2014) index, where the quartile 25–50% is significant at the 10% 
level. In sum, materiality exhibits a similar level of significance and behaviour as in the main test; these 
results are thus considered to be robust.  
Enforcement is significant (at the 1% level) in all models when measured with legal origin or the Kaufmann 
et al. (2014) enforcement index. The results of legal origin show that firms located in countries with 
Scandinavian legal origin have a significantly higher level of disclosure than those located in countries with 
English legal origin. Firms located in a country with German or French legal origin exhibit insignificantly 
different levels of compliance relatively to those located in countries with an English legal origin. The Brown 
et al. (2014) and Djankov et al. (2008) enforcement indices are not associated with the level of compliance 
in any of the models examined.  
The sample is not equally distributed across countries which entail the risk that one country drives the 
results. Models 1–4 have therefore been re-run with a sample where countries with more than 20 
observations (France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, or the UK) have been excluded, both individually and 
combined. The results of these tests (un-tabulated) do not alter the results for any of the explanatory 
variables. A similar test has been performed excluding the two industries Financials and Utilities as these 
industries are associated with additional regulatory burdens. These results (un-tabulated) are similar to 
those of the main test. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This study examined how materiality and enforcement influence compliance with mandatory disclosures in 
firms constituting the leading stock indices in Europe. Focusing on the mandatory disclosure requirements 
in IAS 36, the study identifies a considerable level of non-compliance as the level of compliance ranges from 
a low of 57.4% in Spain to a high of 82.5% in Denmark with an average compliance of 71.2%. The analysis 
finds that firms with material amounts of goodwill disclose significantly more mandatory disclosures than 
those with immaterial amounts of goodwill. The amount of disclosures provided when goodwill is material 
is not influenced by the absolute or relative size of goodwill as firms with high levels of goodwill provide 
insignificantly different levels of disclosures, relatively to firms where goodwill is only marginally material. 
Consequently, the results indicate that preparers consider both the relative and absolute aspects of the 
item being disclosed when making their disclosure decision.  
Furthermore, the analysis finds that the strictness of enforcement influences the disclosure decision as 
firms located in countries with strict enforcement exhibits a significantly higher level of compliance than 
those located in countries with an average or weak enforcement. However, these results are only true if 
the applied enforcement strategy is based on a deterrence strategy or a combination of the deterrence and 
persuasion strategies. Thus, it appears that the ability to apply sanctions is a critical element for the 
enforcement of disclosures. The results are robust to changes in the measurement of enforcement as two 
of the four alternative enforcement measures exhibit a significant and positive association with the level of 
compliance. Finally, the analysis finds that strict enforcement does not influence how firms apply the 
concept of materiality as the moderating terms between enforcement and materiality are insignificant, 
implying that financial reporting enforcement does not influence materiality assessment.  
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This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it sheds light on how materiality is 
associated with mandatory disclosure requirements. Several stakeholders (FRC 2009, 2011, IASB 2013, 
ESMA 2012, IAASB 2012, FASB 2015) have claimed that a strict enforcement approach and a ‘tick-the-box’ 
attitude towards mandatory disclosures may result in clutter in the financial report. This study does not 
support this claim as the results clearly show that a strict enforcement does not supress the materiality 
assessment. The second contribution is based on the variation in the level of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures across countries. This finding should be of particular interest to the enforcers and should 
encourage them to increase their cross-border cooperation and intensify the work to achieve a more 
homogeneous and uniform supervision of accounting regulations across the different countries. 
Furthermore, enforcers interested in increasing the compliance with mandatory disclosures may consider 
adopting a more the deterrence oriented enforcement strategy, as this strategy appears to have a higher 
impact on the level of compliance.  
Third, the results of this study have direct implications for participants in capital markets because they 
confirm and quantify the uneven application of accounting rules. This reduces the transparency and 
comparability of financial reports which should make users more cautious and diligent when analysing and 
using financial reports from firms located in countries with a weak enforcement.  
The findings are bound by several limitations. First, all data were hand-collected. Collection of data by hand 
requires the use of judgement to evaluate whether a disclosure is complied with, not complied with or not 
applicable. These judgements may cause bias in data collection and results. Due care has been taken to 
minimise the likelihood of errors, mistakes, and bias. Admittedly, additional work must be performed on 
the materiality proxies before a clear conclusion on how firms apply the concept of materiality in regard to 
mandatory disclosures can be reached. Future research on materiality should include the creation of a 
proxy for materiality that incorporates qualitative elements. These proxies must be designed specifically to 
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assess the materiality of mandatory disclosures. Additional research is needed to investigate how firms 
assess the qualitative aspects of the mandatory disclosure requirements and how these aspects are 
included in the disclosure decision. Case studies and other qualitative research techniques may be the most 
suitable ways of achieving these insights. Furthermore, future research must evaluate how compliance with 
mandatory disclosures evolves over longer periods of time. This would make it possible to examine 
whether firms evolve in their level of compliance or whether they are locked at a given level, thus making it 
possible to evaluate whether the factors influencing compliance change over time or remain constant.  
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Table 1 – Overview of sample by country and industry 
 
 
  
Panel A
Country Index
Countries 
without 
enforcement 
data
Financial 
statement is 
not IFRS
Year-end 
outside of 
interval
Firm is 
without 
goodwill
Firms with 
missing data 
or non-big 4 
auditor
Countries 
with fewer 
than 5 
observations Final sample
Percentage 
of sample
Austria ATX 20 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,0%
Belgium Bel20 20 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 6,3%
Czech republic Px index 13 2 0 0 1 0 3 3 4 0 0,0%
Denmark OMX C20 20 1 1 0 0 2 3 4 0 9 3,2%
Finland OMX Hex25 24 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 19 6,7%
France CAC40 40 4 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 30 10,5%
Germany DAX30 30 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 27 9,5%
Ireland ISEQ 20 20 0 1 0 0 3 6 0 0 10 3,5%
Italy FTSE MIB 40 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,0%
Luxemburg LuxX 9 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,0%
Netherlands AEX 25 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 21 7,4%
Norway OMXO 20GI 25 0 0 0 3 0 3 4 0 15 5,3%
Poland WIG index 20 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 5 0 0,0%
Portugal PSI-20 18 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 14 4,9%
Spain IBEX 35 35 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 30 10,5%
Sweden OMX S30 30 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 24 8,4%
Switzerland SMI 20 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,0%
United Kingdom FTSE100 100 4 2 0 0 17 9 0 0 68 23,9%
Total 509 21 7 89 5 28 30 35 9 285 100,0%
Panel B
Country Index
Oil & Gas 
(ICB 0001)
Industrial 
(ICB 1000)
Basic 
Materials 
(ICB 2000)
Consumer 
Goods 
(ICB 3000)
Healthcare 
(ICB 4000)
Consumer 
Services 
(ICB 5000)
Telecom-
munications 
(ICB 6000)
Utilities 
(ICB 7000)
Financials 
(ICB 8000)
Technology 
(ICB 9000)
Final 
sample
Belgium Bel20 0 2 2 1 1 4 0 1 6 1 18
Denmark OMX C20 1 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 1 0 9
Finland OMX Hex25 1 7 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 19
France CAC40 2 5 0 6 2 5 1 3 4 2 30
Germany DAX30 0 2 5 7 3 1 1 2 5 1 27
Ireland ISEQ 20 0 3 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 10
Netherlands AEX 3 4 3 2 0 2 2 0 3 2 21
Norway OMXO 20GI 7 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 3 0 15
Portugal PSI-20 1 2 2 0 0 4 0 3 2 0 14
Spain IBEX 35 4 7 0 1 1 4 0 3 9 1 30
Sweden OMX S30 0 8 2 3 1 1 2 0 6 1 24
United Kingdom FTSE100 2 13 5 7 4 12 2 4 18 1 68
Total 21 55 24 36 16 38 10 17 58 10 285
Percentage of sample 7,4% 19,3% 8,4% 12,6% 5,6% 13,3% 3,5% 6,0% 20,4% 3,5% 100,0%
Number of 
firms
Firm included 
in other index
Information 
not 
available 
due to 
language or 
other 
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Table 2 – Overview of independent variables – description and source 
Variable Description Source 
Panel A – Explanatory variables 
Materiality Four measurements of materiality are applied: ABSOLUTE, RELATIVE, 
IMMATERIAL and QUARTILED MATERIALITY. Each of these is described below.  
(ABSOLUTE) Measurement of materiality when it is based on 
the absolute amount of goodwill and is calculated 
as the log of goodwill at year-end 2014.  
Calculated based on hand-
collected figures from the 
2014 financial statement 
(RELATIVE) Measurement of materiality when the goodwill is 
viewed relatively to the size and activities of the 
firms.  
RELATIVE is calculated as follows: 
                  
                   
, where 
Goodwill is the amount of goodwill reported by 
the firm at year-end 2014. 
Planning materiality is the average of:  
 0.5% and 1% of Total Assets, 
 5% and 10% of Net Income,  
 0.5% and 1% of Total Revenue and  
 1% and 5% of the Equity  
Ratios above 1 indicate that goodwill is material 
for the firm.  
Calculated based on hand-
collected figures from the 
2014 financial statement 
(IMMATERIAL) Indicator variable measuring if RELATIVE is above 
or below one. The variable is coded 1 if the 
carrying amount of goodwill is less than the level 
Calculated based on hand-
collected figures from the 
2014 financial statement 
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Variable Description Source 
of the planning materiality and 0 if goodwill 
exceeds the planning materiality level. 
(QUARTILED 
MATERIALITY) 
Four indicator variables showing to which quartile 
the firm belongs when classified based on 
RELATIVE.  
Each indicator is coded as either 1 (included in 
quartile) or 0 (excluded from quartile).  
The quartiles are classified in the following ranges: 
0–25%; 25–50%; 50–75% and 75–100%. 
Calculated based on hand-
collected figures from the 
2014 financial statement 
Enforcement 
(ENFORCEMENT) 
Three indices of the public enforcement of 
financial reporting. The indices measure the actual 
applied enforcement on preparers of financial 
report. The indices contain measurements of both 
the formal and the actual performed 
enforcement.  
Each of the three enforcement indices measures a 
different enforcement strategy. These are as 
follows: 
Total enforcement: measures enforcement when 
the enforcers apply a combined strategy of the 
deterrence and the persuasion strategies. 
Deterrence: measures enforcement when the 
enforcers apply a deterrence enforcement 
strategy. 
Persuasion: measures enforcement when the 
Johansen et al. 2018 
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Variable Description Source 
enforcers apply a persuasion enforcement 
strategy 
Panel B – Control variables 
Auditors 
(DELOITTE, EY, PWC and 
KPMG) 
Auditors are shown by four indicator variables, 
one for each of the Big 4 auditing firms.  
Firms audited by more than one auditor are coded 
as being audited by the auditing firms that charge 
the highest auditing fee. Deloitte is used as the 
benchmark. 
Hand-collected from the 
2014 financial statement 
Capital Markets 
(S_Market) 
Index measuring the development of the national 
stock market.  
The measurement is based on a ranked score of 
the following three factors:  
 total capitalisation to GDP, 
 number of listed countries to total 
population in million and  
 ratio of market turnover to GDP 
All measures have been 
obtained from the World 
Bank database 
 
The measures are from 
2012. 
Industry of the firm 
(OIL & GAS, INDUSTRIAL, 
BASIC MATERIALS, 
CONSUMER GOODS, 
HEALTHCARE, 
CONSUMER SERVICES, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 
UTILITIES, TECHNOLOGY, 
Industry effects are controlled for by ten industry 
indicators. Industries are coded by the four digit 
ICB industry code.  
Each industry has its own indicator variable and is 
coded as 0 (firm does not work within the 
industry) or 1 (firm works within the industry).  
Thomson One Banker 
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Variable Description Source 
AND FINANCIALS) 
 
Cultural characteristic 
(MASCULINITY) 
Measurement of the preference for achievement, 
assertiveness, and material rewards for success in 
a society. 
Hofstede et al. (2010 
(UNCERTAINTY 
AVOIDANCE) 
Measurement of how rigid a society is in accepting 
new ideas and behaviour and how the society 
deals with the fact that the future is unknown. In 
societies with a high uncertainty avoidance 
culture, principles count more than practices. 
Hofstede et al. (2010) 
Size of the firm 
(SIZE) 
The control variable measures the size of the firm. 
The measurement used is based on an averaged 
ranked score of the following items:  
 total assets at the end of 2014,  
 total revenue at the end of 2014,  
 number of employees (average FTE) and  
 market capitalisation at the end of 2014. 
Hand-collected from the 
2014 financial statement 
Market capitalisation has 
been retrieved from 
DataStream 
Dual listing in the US 
(USLISTING) 
Indicator variable if the firm has a dual listing in a 
US stock exchange (US-listed =1; not US-listed=0) 
Hand-collected from the 
2014 financial statement  
Profit 
(PROFIT) 
Indicator variable if the firm was profitable in 
2014 (profits=1; losses=0). 
Hand-collected from the 
2014 financial statements 
Corporate governance 
(AUDIT_COM) 
Proxy for the quality of work performed by the 
audit committee.  
Hand-collected from the 
2014 financial statement or 
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Variable Description Source 
The proxy is based on the number of meetings 
held by the audit committee in 2014 and is 
calculated as the log of the number of meeting in 
2014. 
company website 
Ownership structure 
(CLOSELY-HELD) and 
(CLOSELY-HELD2) 
Percentage of equity shares closely held by 
strategic investors (foundations, institutional 
investors, and families).  
The values are expressed in % and squared % to 
measure the inversed U-shaped relationship to 
disclosure. 
Thomson One Banker  
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
 
 
  
n Mean Std Dev Median Minimum
Dependent variable
COMPLIANCE 285 72,05                          15,55                          75,00                          15,00                          100,00                    
-By country
Belgium 18 76,16                          14,70                          80,00                          38,10                          100,00                    
Denmark 9 82,47                          12,70                          83,33                          53,85                          96,15                      
Finland 19 75,33                          7,83                             76,19                          65,00                          90,91                      
France 30 73,62                          14,75                          80,00                          40,91                          95,65                      
Germany 27 76,51                          14,67                          80,65                          20,00                          93,33                      
Ireland 10 78,85                          8,70                             77,33                          63,64                          95,65                      
Netherlands 21 73,33                          13,49                          72,00                          45,00                          95,45                      
Norway 15 75,76                          20,62                          81,82                          15,00                          95,45                      
Portugal 14 65,98                          9,36                             65,91                          50,00                          90,91                      
Spain 30 57,37                          18,45                          60,79                          25,71                          88,57                      
Sweden 24 78,95                          7,47                             79,66                          62,50                          95,24                      
United Kingdom 68 69,33                          15,82                          72,73                          18,18                          95,24                      
-By Auditor
- Deloitte 58 66,28                          19,73                          65,83                          15,00                          100,00                    
- E&Y 58 71,60                          17,84                          78,71                          18,18                          95,65                      
- KPMG 79 75,79                          11,77                          76,92                          20,00                          96,15                      
- PwC 90 72,78                          12,74                          75,00                          25,71                          95,24                      
-By Industry
Oil & Gas (ICB 0001) 21 71,26                          17,26                          76,19                          25,71                          95,45                      
Industrial (ICB 1000) 55 73,13                          14,42                          75,00                          27,91                          95,65                      
Basic Materials (ICB 2000) 24 72,20                          15,67                          76,19                          30,77                          95,24                      
Consumer Goods (ICB 3000) 36 76,46                          10,51                          76,73                          52,38                          96,15                      
Healthcare (ICB 4000) 16 74,42                          14,88                          79,47                          31,82                          95,24                      
Consumer Services (ICB 5000) 38 69,75                          14,61                          74,34                          25,71                          86,36                      
Telecommunications (ICB 6000) 10 81,00                          10,32                          84,41                          62,50                          95,24                      
Utilities (ICB 7000) 17 71,50                          14,38                          71,43                          37,14                          93,33                      
Financials (ICB 8000) 58 68,54                          18,43                          72,73                          15,00                          100,00                    
Technology (ICB 9000) 10 67,93                          22,06                          75,30                          20,00                          95,65                      
-By IMMATERIALITY
IMMATERIAL (goodwill is immaterial) 53 63,10                          20,54                          68,18                          15,00                          95,45                      
IMMATERIAL (goodwill is material) 232 74,10                          13,41                          76,19                          20,00                          100,00                    
-By QUARTILED MATERIALITY
0-25% quartile 71 64,92                          19,53                          69,57                          15,00                          95,45                      
25-50 quartile 72 73,02                          13,43                          76,56                          30,77                          100,00                    
50-75% quartile 71 73,32                          12,47                          75,00                          31,82                          95,65                      
75-100% quartile 71 76,94                          13,52                          80,00                          20,00                          96,15                      
Level of compliance
Maximum
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
 
Explanatory variables
Total Enforcement 
Deterrence 
Enforcement
Persuasion 
Enforcement
1 68                                   16                                   8
2 89                                   14                                   17
3 68                                   13                                   5
4 66                                   4                                     7
5 67                                   8                                     15
6 50                                   5                                     12
7 42                                   11                                   3
8 35                                   2                                     2
9 61                                   3                                     7
10 67                                   12                                   9
11 68                                   17                                   16
12 55                                   8                                     11
Mean 60,3754                        9,1509                                                    9,5228 
Median 66,0000                        8,0000                                                    9,0000 
Std Dev 11,2596                        4,5224                                                    4,2273 
 
n Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum
Non-dichotomous
ABSOLUTE (log of goodwill) 285 5,9647                           0,8492                           6,0364                        3,0941                            7,7648                      
ABSOLUTE in '000 EUR (Goodwill) 3.482.817                    6.297.647                    1.087.421                  1.242                              58.189.320             
RELATIVE 285 14,7499                        15,9701                        10,0711                      0,0303                            86,2977                    
574.073                        1.298.309                    136.003                     3.487                               9.844.409                
IMMATERIAL
232 18,0059                        16,0090                        13,4598                      1,0426                            86,2977                    
Goodwill is immaterial (1) 53 0,4973                           0,2958                           0,5422                        0,0303                            0,9112                      
IMMATERIAL (1) in '0000 EUR 550.506                        880.471                        164.113                     1.242                              4.331.000                
QUARTILED MATERIALITY
0-25% quartile 71 0,7390                           0,5032                           0,7099                        0,0303                            1,8279                      
25-50 quartile 72 4,8125                           2,2065                           4,2202                        1,8334                            10,0711                    
50-75% quartile 71 15,4545                        3,6258                           14,7431                      10,0829                          22,6817                    
75-100% quartile 71 38,1338                        12,6734                        35,8008                      22,8092                          86,2977                    
QUARTILED MATERIALITY in '000 EUR
0-25% quartile in '000 EUR 1.083.938                    2.570.474                    214.394                     1.242                              15.764.028             
25-50 quartile in '000 EUR 2.418.795                    5.042.245                    589.820                     7.066                              27.548.000             
50-75% quartile in '000 EUR 3.633.793                    5.092.968                    1.788.000                  135.867                         30.987.357             
75-100% quartile in '000 EUR 6.809.729                    9.182.796                    3.181.000                  300.892                         58.189.320             
(Continued)
RELATIVE in '000 EUR 
Goodwill is material (0)
Country ID 
(Name of country 
is anonymous and 
numbers are 
random)
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(table 4 continued)
Control variables 
Country
Market 
capitalisation of 
listed domestic 
companies (% of 
GDP)
Stocks traded, total 
value (% of GDP)
Listed companies to 
population in 
million MASCULINITY
UNCERTAINTY 
AVOIDANCE
Belgium 60,17                             20,28                             13,21                             54                                 94                                    
Denmark 69,77                             36,41                             31,12                             16                                 23                                    
Finland 61,82                             51,62                             21,98                             26                                 59                                    
France 67,43                             40,07                             8,56                               43                                 86                                    
Germany 41,99                             35,31                             8,27                               66                                 65                                    
Ireland 48,51                             4,17                               9,16                               68                                 35                                    
78,51                             50,36                             8,06                               14                                 53                                    
Norway 47,63                             23,47                             36,66                             8                                   50                                    
Portugal 30,28                             12,22                             4,66                               31                                 99                                    
Spain 74,26                             64,51                             67,73                             42                                 86                                    
Sweden 103,06                           75,23                             34,88                             5                                   29                                    
114,79                           93,91                             29,50                             66                                 35                                    
 
n Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum
Non-dichotomous
SIZE 285 241,6132                      105,8107                      243,2500                    11,0000                          426,5000                  
- Total revenue in '000 EUR 19.335.429                  36.335.475                  7.361.286                  79.073                           317.446.069           
- Total assets in '000 EUR 106.801.620               294.185.325               13.964.739               294.120                         2.166.239.249       
- Market capitalization in '000 EUR 19.784.247                  26.068.094                  9.700.289                  132.384                         174.120.739           
- Employees in average FTE 56.895                          88.337                          24.274                        40                                    623.000                   
AUDIT_COM 285 0,7430                           0,1727                           0,6990                        0,3010                            1,3802                      
AUDIT_COM in # of meetings 6,0175                          2,7661                          5,0000                        2,0000                           24,0000                   
CLOSELY-HELD in % 285 19,5802                        21,7850                        9,9400                        0,0000                            87,8000                    
CLOSELY-HELD (squared) 856,3063                     1.410,6393                  98,8036                     0,0000                            7.708,8400             
Dichotomous  (0) (1)
AUDITORS 285
INDUSTRY 285
US LISTING (1 if cross-listed) 285 196 89
PROFIT 285 27 258
S_MARKET
see table C
see table C
Culture
Netherlands
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Table 6 – Compliance with mandatory disclosures 
 
Independent variables β t β t β t β t
Intercept 69,9437       13,85           *** 70,7963       14,15        *** 72,9333     14,34        *** 76,9493       14,27        ***
Explanatory variables
ABSOLUTE + 7,4961         5,13              ***
RELATIVE + 0,1880         3,05          ***
IMMATERIAL - -9,9189     -3,68        ***
ENFORCEMENT + 0,2009         2,71              *** 0,1916         2,59          *** 0,1680       2,25          ** 0,1859         2,49          **
Materiality indicators§
0-25% quartile of materiality - -11,5665     -4,06        ***
25-50% quartile of materiality ? -3,7180        -1,63        
50-75% quartile of materiality ? -3,4906        -1,52        
Control Variables
CLOSELY-HELD +/- -0,0321       -0,25            -0,0445        -0,35        -0,0022     -0,02        -0,0020        -0,01        
CLOSELY-HELD +/- 0,0005         0,27              0,0008         0,44          0,0001       0,07          0,0002         0,09          
SIZE + -0,0251       -2,25            ** 0,0165         1,82          * 0,0158       1,80          * 0,0168         1,87          *
AUDIT_COM + 7,2580         1,39              5,7333         1,11          7,4538       1,40          6,7173         1,31          
USLISTING + 0,5228         0,31              0,8080         0,46          1,0933       0,63          0,8668         0,51          
PROFIT - -2,7669       -0,77            -3,3788        -0,94        -3,1076     -0,89        -3,0810        -0,87        
MASCULINITY + -0,0861       -2,30            ** -0,0776        -2,02        ** -0,0827     -2,19        ** -0,0778        -2,03        **
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE - -0,1992       -4,75            *** -0,1943        -4,53        *** -0,1848     -4,34        *** -0,1878        -4,43        ***
S_MARKET + -1,1057       -4,20            *** -1,1422        -4,13        *** -1,1583     -4,36        *** -1,1304        -4,25        ***
Auditor indicators¤
E&Y ? 3,4526         1,11              3,9756         1,23          3,3801       1,07          3,3671         1,07          
KPMG ? 5,3752         1,91              * 5,6829         2,02          ** 5,3841       1,98          ** 5,4149         1,91          *
PwC ? 4,1859         1,52              3,7868         1,34          3,5753       1,31          3,9481         1,42          
Industry indicator&
OIL&GAS ? 2,8286         0,74              1,4567         0,36          0,7695       0,19          0,3907         0,10          
INDUSTRIAL ? 1,5144         0,55              0,7710         0,24          0,9731       0,33          -1,1561        -0,36        
BASIC MATERIALS ? -0,0066       -0,00            0,7591         0,19          -2,2347     -0,56        -2,4092        -0,58        
CONSUMER GOODS ? 2,6617         0,93              1,9408         0,61          1,2967       0,44          -0,6244        -0,20        
HEALTHCARE ? -1,6337       -0,38            -1,7821        -0,37        0,0873       0,02          -3,2526        -0,68        
CONSUMER SERVICES ? 0,9804         0,32              -0,9292        -0,27        -1,1465     -0,36        -2,3424        -0,70        
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ? 5,3245         1,33              5,8825         1,50          5,3662       1,31          3,4354         0,83          
UTILITIES ? 1,2991         0,37              1,8618         0,51          1,2338       0,36          0,0626         0,02          
TECHNOLOGY ? -5,8066       -0,74            -5,0229        -0,64        -5,9186     -0,76        -7,8129        -0,95        
0,1886         3,87              *** 0,1369         2,96          *** 0,1625       3,40          *** 0,1561         3,10          ***
Maximum VIF@ 2,29              1,46          1,26          2,32          
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. §The benchmark used for materiality is the quartile 75-100%. 
¤The benchmark for auditors is Deloitte. &The benchmark used for industries is Financials. @Maximum VIF shows the highest VIF-value for any of the explanatory 
variables, i.e. proxies for enforcement and materiality.
Expected 
direction
Model 1 
Absolute materiality
(N=285)
Model 2
Relative materiality
(N=285)
Model 3
Immaterial
(N=285)
Model 4
(Materiality - quartile)
(N=285)
Panel A: Total Enforcement
All models are mean-centred
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Independent variables β t β t β t β t
Intercept 69,0209       13,89           *** 69,9326       14,28        *** 72,1518     14,54        *** 76,2816       14,36        ***
Explanatory variables
ABSOLUTE + 7,6160         5,21              ***
RELATIVE + 0,1911         3,09          ***
IMMATERIAL - -9,9819     -3,71        ***
ENFORCEMENT + 0,7373         3,57              *** 0,7022         3,38          *** 0,6559       3,08          *** 0,6876         3,35          ***
Materiality indicators§
0-25% quartile of materiality - -11,6822     -4,10        ***
25-50% quartile of materiality ? -4,0814        -1,80        *
50-75% quartile of materiality ? -3,1991        -1,40        
Control Variables
CLOSELY-HELD +/- -0,0882       -0,71            -0,0982        -0,78        -0,0516     -0,41        -0,0596        -0,47        
CLOSELY-HELD +/- 0,0011         0,59              0,0013         0,75          0,0006       0,36          0,0008         0,43          
SIZE + -0,0215       -1,97            ** 0,0205         2,29          ** 0,0196       2,26          ** 0,0206         2,33          **
AUDIT_COM + 8,5970         1,67              * 6,9853         1,38          8,6192       1,64          7,9041         1,56          
USLISTING + 0,2479         0,15              0,5494         0,32          0,8744       0,51          0,6217         0,37          
PROFIT - -2,5854       -0,73            -3,2140        -0,91        -3,0079     -0,87        -2,9153        -0,83        
MASCULINITY + -0,0521       -1,30            -0,0451        -1,10        -0,0523     -1,28        -0,0453        -1,10        
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE - -0,1735       -4,21            *** -0,1697        -4,01        *** -0,1635     -3,92        *** -0,0165        -3,95        ***
S_MARKET + -1,4117       -4,84            *** -1,4341        -4,65        *** -1,4358     -4,85        *** -1,4155        -4,79        ***
Auditor indicators¤
E&Y ? 4,0935         1,34              4,5940         1,44          3,9716       1,27          3,9452         1,27          
KPMG ? 5,2755         1,94              * 5,5919         2,06          ** 5,3306       2,03          ** 5,2925         1,93          *
PwC ? 4,5441         1,69              * 4,1218         1,50          3,9040       1,47          4,2226         1,55          
Industry indicator&
OIL&GAS ? 3,0962         0,82              1,6893         0,43          1,0467       0,26          0,5705         0,14          
INDUSTRIAL ? 2,2974         0,83              1,5010         0,47          1,6731       0,57          -0,5950        -0,19        
BASIC MATERIALS ? 0,1178         0,03              0,8873         0,23          -2,1105     -0,56        -2,3362        -0,58        
CONSUMER GOODS ? 3,7537         1,29              2,9673         0,93          2,2388       0,75          0,2923         0,09          
HEALTHCARE ? -0,1713       -0,04            -0,3969        -0,09        1,3413       0,32          -2,0480        -0,44        
CONSUMER SERVICES ? 1,7771         0,60              -0,2032        -0,06        -0,4312     -0,14        -1,7369        -0,53        
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ? 6,0162         1,50              6,5444         1,69          * 6,0451       1,47          3,8903         0,93          
UTILITIES ? 2,4507         0,70              2,9656         0,81          2,2580       0,66          0,8616         0,24          
TECHNOLOGY ? -5,0112       -0,65            -4,2580        -0,55        -5,1682     -0,67        -7,3488        -0,91        
0,2053         4,19              *** 0,1519         3,21          *** 0,1775       3,66          *** 0,1708         3,34          ***
Maximum VIF@ 2,29              1,46          1,41          2,32          
Model 1 
Absolute materiality
(N=285)
Model 2
Relative materiality
(N=285)
Model 3
Immaterial
(N=285)
Expected 
direction
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. §The benchmark used for materiality is the quartile 75-100%. 
¤The benchmark for auditors is Deloitte. &The benchmark used for industries is Financials. @Maximum VIF shows the highest VIF-value for any of the explanatory 
variables, i.e. proxies for enforcement and materiality.
Panel B: Deterrence Enforcement
All models are mean-centred
Model 4
(Materiality - quartile)
(N=285)
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Independent variables β t β t β t β t
Intercept 69,3853       13,51           *** 70,2334       13,75        *** 72,5638     14,06        *** 76,4313       13,90        ***
Explanatory variables
ABSOLUTE + 7,4354         5,05              ***
RELATIVE + 0,1842         3,03          ***
IMMATERIAL - -10,1259   -3,72        ***
ENFORCEMENT + 0,2522         1,06              0,1867         0,78          0,1531       0,65          0,1520         0,64          
Materiality indicators§
0-25% quartile of materiality - -11,5193     -4,02        ***
25-50% quartile of materiality ? -3,7176        -1,63         
50-75% quartile of materiality ? -3,5882        -1,56        
Control Variables
CLOSELY-HELD +/- -0,0361       -0,28            -0,0485        -0,37        -0,0053     -0,04        -0,0057        -0,04        
CLOSELY-HELD +/- 0,0005         0,27              0,0008         0,43          0,0001       0,07          0,0002         0,08          
SIZE + -0,0259       -2,26            ** 0,0157         1,70          * 0,0152       1,69          * 0,0162         1,77          *
AUDIT_COM + 7,0475         1,32              5,6515         1,07          7,4326       1,37          6,6880         1,28          
USLISTING + 0,3811         0,22              0,6584         0,37          0,9349       0,53          0,6926         0,40          
PROFIT - -2,1404       -0,60            -2,7241        -0,76        -2,4952     -0,71        -2,4070        -0,68        
MASCULINITY + -0,0995       -2,87            *** -0,0878        -0,25        ** -0,0914     -2,63        *** -0,0865        -2,43        **
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE - -0,1490       -3,10            *** -0,1507        -3,03        *** -0,1472     -3,03        *** -0,1478        -3,03        ***
S_MARKET + -1,0054       -3,71            *** -1,0510        -3,70        *** -1,0785     -3,97        *** -1,0440        -3,82        ***
Auditor indicators¤
E&Y ? 3,4808         1,08              3,9188         1,17          3,3082       1,02          3,2812         1,01          
KPMG ? 5,0704         1,75              * 5,3454         1,84          * 5,0581       1,80          * 5,0651         1,73          *
PwC ? 4,1052         1,44              3,6567         1,25          3,4520       1,22          3,8048         1,32          
Industry indicator&
OIL&GAS ? 2,2531         0,57              0,8213         0,20          0,1555       0,04          -0,2721        -0,07        
INDUSTRIAL ? 1,7952         0,65              1,1069         0,34          1,1253       0,38          -0,8462        -0,26        
BASIC MATERIALS ? -0,0581       -0,01            0,6985         0,17          -2,4120     -0,60        -2,4586        -0,58        
CONSUMER GOODS ? 3,1466         1,09              2,4731         0,77          1,6605       0,56          -0,0934        -0,03        
HEALTHCARE ? -0,3072       -0,07            -0,3361        -0,07        1,2049       0,28          -1,8525        -0,39        
CONSUMER SERVICES ? 0,8477         0,27              -1,0223        -0,29        -1,3480     -0,42        -2,4580        -0,73        
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ? 5,1458         1,28              5,7026         1,42          5,0281       1,22          3,2221         0,77          
UTILITIES ? 1,5957         0,57              2,1620         0,58          1,4261       0,40          0,4035         0,11          
TECHNOLOGY ? -5,7259       -0,72            -4,9463        -0,62        -6,0213     -0,76        -7,7481        -0,93        
0,1730         3,58              *** 0,1215         2,71          *** 0,1505       3,19          *** 0,1411         2,87          ***
Maximum VIF@ 2,29              1,57          1,57          2,32          
Model 1 
Absolute materiality
(N=285)
Model 2
Relative materiality
(N=285)
Model 3
Immaterial
(N=285)
Expected 
direction
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. §The benchmark used for materiality is the quartile 75-100%. 
¤The benchmark for auditors is Deloitte. &The benchmark used for industries is Financials. @Maximum VIF shows the highest VIF-value for any of the explanatory 
variables, i.e. proxies for enforcement and materiality.
Panel C: Persuasion Enforcement
All models are mean-centred
Model 4
(Materiality - quartile)
(N=285)
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Table 7 – Moderating effects of enforcement on materiality 
 
Independent variables β t β t β t β t
Intercept 69,9447       13,84           *** 70,4595       13,70        *** 72,9349       14,39        *** 76,9411      14,12        ***
Explanatory variables
ABSOLUTE + 7,4566         5,07              ***
RELATIVE + 0,1846         2,98          ***
IMMATERIAL - -9,9196        -3,66        ***
ENFORCEMENT + 0,2020         2,78              *** 0,1982         2,53          ** 0,1676         2,41          ** 0,1563        1,76          *
Materiality indicators§
0-25% quartile of materiality - -11,6056    -4,01        ***
25-50% quartile of materiality ? -3,7362       -1,63        
50-75% quartile of materiality ? -3,5104       -1,53        
Control Variables
CLOSELY_HELD +/- -0,0353       -0,27            -0,0313        -0,24        -0,0023        -0,02        0,0005        0,00          
CLOSELY_HELD +/- 0,0005         0,29              0,0006         0,32          0,0001         0,07          0,0001        0,06          
SIZE + -0,0251       -2,26            ** 0,0170         1,88          * 0,0159         1,78          * 0,0170        1,86          *
AUDIT_COM + 7,2517         1,38              5,9500         1,15          7,4513         1,40          6,7505        1,29          
USLISTING + 0,4695         0,28              0,8796         0,50          1,0929         0,63          0,8835        0,51          
PROFIT - -2,7803       -0,78            -3,1635        -0,88        -3,1054        -0,89        -3,0445       -0,85        
MASCULINITY + -0,0871       -2,28            ** -0,0776        -2,03        ** -0,0828        -2,25        ** -0,0782       -2,07        **
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE - -0,1983       -4,73            *** -0,1991        -4,57        *** -0,1849        -4,37        *** -0,1901       -4,34        ***
S_MARKET + -1,0935       -4,23            *** -1,1599        -4,26        *** -1,1588        -4,47        *** -1,1399       -4,33        ***
Auditor indicators¤
E&Y ? 3,3952         1,09              4,2032         1,29          3,3828         1,06          3,4640        1,09          
KPMG ? 5,3691         1,90              * 5,6906         2,02          ** 5,3824         1,99          ** 5,3830        1,92          *
PwC ? 4,1659         1,50              3,8391         1,35          3,5773         1,28          3,9702        1,42          
Industry indicator&
OIL&GAS ? 2,8047         0,73              1,6186         0,40          0,7682         0,19          0,4429        0,11          
INDUSTRIAL ? 1,5814         0,58              0,8083         0,25          0,9677         0,34          -1,2228       -0,39        
BASIC MATERIALS ? 0,0578         0,01              0,9258         0,23          -2,2401        -0,57        -2,3969       -0,59        
CONSUMER GOODS ? 2,7366         0,96              1,9128         0,60          1,2905         0,45          -0,7388       -0,24        
HEALTHCARE ? -1,5273       -0,36            -1,3657        -0,27        0,0848         0,02          -3,1535       -0,65        
CONSUMER SERVICES ? 1,0021         0,33              -0,9013        -0,26        -1,1510        -0,37        -2,3800       -0,72        
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ? 5,4423         1,37              5,6105         1,48          5,3587         1,33          3,3720        0,83          
UTILITIES ? 1,2858         0,37              1,9816         0,54          1,2303         0,36          0,0479        0,01          
TECHNOLOGY ? -5,8001       -0,74            -4,7769        -0,61        -5,9226        -0,76        -7,7194       -0,94        
Moderation effects
ENFORCEMENT*GOODWILL ? 0,0345         0,32              
ENFORCEMENT*MATERIALITY ? -0,0033        -0,78        
ENFORCEMENT*IMMATERIAL ? 0,0029         0,01          
Materiality indicators§
ENFORCEMENT*0-25% quartile 
of materiality ? 0,0614        0,25          
ENFORCEMENT*25-50% quartile 
of materiality ? 0,0346        0,17          
ENFORCEMENT*50-75% quartile 
of materiality ? 0,0381        0,25          
0,1858         3,70              *** 0,1350         2,85          *** 0,1593         3,24          *** 0,1465        2,74          ***
Maximum VIF@ 2,31              1,47          1,43          3,64          
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. §The benchmark used for materiality is the quartile 75-100%. 
¤The benchmark for auditors is Deloitte. &The benchmark used for industries is Financials. @Maximum VIF shows the highest VIF-value for any of the explanatory 
variables, i.e. proxies for enforcement and materiality.
Expected 
direction
Model 5
Enforcement on absolute 
materiality
(N=285)
Model 6
Enforcement on relative 
materiality
(N=285)
Model 7
Enforcement on 
immateriality
(N=285)
Model 8
Enforcement on quartiled 
materiality
(N=285)
Panel A: Total Enforcement
All models are mean-centred
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Independent variables β t β t β t β t
Intercept 69,5609       13,67           *** 70,5575       14,10        *** 72,6291       14,42        *** 76,3370      14,67        ***
Explanatory variables
ABSOLUTE + 7,6883         5,33              ***
RELATIVE + 0,1921         3,09          ***
IMMATERIAL - -9,9252        -3,72        ***
ENFORCEMENT + 0,3136         3,34              *** 0,2895         3,02          *** 0,3154         3,26          *** 0,2011        1,65          *
Materiality indicators§
0-25% quartile of materiality - -11,4977    -4,06        ***
25-50% quartile of materiality ? -4,0888       -1,81        *
50-75% quartile of materiality ? -3,2501       -1,41        
Control Variables
CLOSELY_HELD +/- -0,0612       -0,49            -0,0735        -0,57        -0,0141        -0,11        -0,0207       -0,16        
CLOSELY_HELD +/- 0,0008         0,44              0,0011         0,63          0,0003         0,17          0,0004        0,24          
SIZE + -0,0251       -2,26            ** 0,0167         1,86          * 0,0152         1,73          * 0,0178        1,98          **
AUDIT_COM + 7,2692         1,39              6,4225         1,25          7,7539         1,46          7,0731        1,37          
USLISTING + 0,3084         0,18              0,5735         0,33          0,9449         0,55          0,6859        0,40          
PROFIT - -2,5435       -0,70            -3,2876        -0,92        -2,8154        -0,81        -2,8118       -0,80        
MASCULINITY + -0,0624       -1,56            -0,0543        -1,31        -0,0591        -1,45        -0,0472       -1,11        
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE - -0,1681       -4,01            *** -0,1704        -4,00        *** -0,1631        -3,91        *** -0,1691       -4,08        ***
S_MARKET + -1,2139       -4,36            *** -1,2687        -4,37        *** -1,2370        -4,47        *** -1,3116       -4,53        ***
Auditor indicators¤
E&Y ? 3,9694         1,28              4,3148         1,34          3,4055         1,09          3,6717        1,19          
KPMG ? 5,1524         1,86              * 5,3881         1,93          * 5,0223         1,89          * 5,2241        1,91          *
PwC ? 4,1059         1,51              3,7432         1,32          3,3559         1,25          4,0699        1,51          
Industry indicator&
OIL&GAS ? 3,2423         0,85              1,6560         0,41          0,9514         0,23          0,4203        0,10          
INDUSTRIAL ? 1,8835         0,68              1,0718         0,33          1,2957         0,45          -0,6774       -0,21        
BASIC MATERIALS ? -0,1566       -0,04            0,6009         0,15          -2,3653        -0,62        -2,3173       -0,59        
CONSUMER GOODS ? 3,3419         1,16              2,4792         0,78          1,6820         0,57          -0,2320       -0,07        
HEALTHCARE ? -0,6144       -0,15            -0,9591        -0,20        0,8180         0,19          -2,1457       -0,46        
CONSUMER SERVICES ? 1,4071         0,46              -0,5743        -0,17        -0,5841        -0,19        -1,6154       -0,50        
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ? 5,5484         1,37              6,0318         1,55          5,5475         1,34          3,6443        0,88          
UTILITIES ? 1,7318         0,49              2,1803         0,59          1,5661         0,46          0,8457        0,24          
TECHNOLOGY ? -5,3566       -0,68            -4,5565        -0,58        -5,3712        -0,69        -7,3680       -0,90        
Moderation effects
ENFORCEMENT*GOODWILL ? 0,1992         0,89              
ENFORCEMENT*MATERIALITY ? 0,0013         0,13          
ENFORCEMENT*IMMATERIAL ? -0,6002        -1,26        
Materiality indicators§
ENFORCEMENT*0-25% quartile 
of materiality ? 0,0325        0,08          
ENFORCEMENT*25-50% quartile 
of materiality ? 0,4855        0,99          
ENFORCEMENT*50-75% quartile 
of materiality ? 0,3216        0,80          
0,1968         3,90              *** 0,1405         2,93          *** 0,1718         3,45          *** 0,1571        2,89          ***
Maximum VIF@ 2,30              1,49          1,35          2,64          
Expected 
direction
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. §The benchmark used for materiality is the quartile 75-100%. 
¤The benchmark for auditors is Deloitte. &The benchmark used for industries is Financials. @Maximum VIF shows the highest VIF-value for any of the explanatory 
variables, i.e. proxies for enforcement and materiality.
Panel B: Deterrence Enforcement
All models are mean-centred
Model 5
Enforcement on absolute 
materiality
(N=285)
Model 6
Enforcement on relative 
materiality
(N=285)
Model 7
Enforcement on 
immateriality
(N=285)
Model 8
Enforcement on quartiled 
materiality
(N=285)
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Independent variables β t β t β t β t
Intercept 69,7184       13,67           *** 69,9898       13,43        *** 72,9259       14,03        *** 76,5467      13,73        ***
Explanatory variables
ABSOLUTE + 7,4522         5,06              ***
RELATIVE + 0,1847         2,99          ***
IMMATERIAL - -10,3070     -3,86        ***
ENFORCEMENT + 0,1145         1,27              0,1044         1,19          0,0922         1,13          0,0732        0,75          
Materiality indicators§
0-25% quartile of materiality - -11,5452    -4,02        ***
25-50% quartile of materiality ? -3,7615       -1,62        
50-75% quartile of materiality ? -3,6972       -1,60        
Control Variables
CLOSELY_HELD +/- -0,0268       -0,20            -0,0143        -0,10        0,0028         0,02          0,0025        0,02          
CLOSELY_HELD +/- 0,0004         0,20              0,0003         0,17          0,0000         0,01          0,0000        0,02          
SIZE + -0,0253       -2,25            ** 0,0168         1,84          * 0,0155         1,76          * 0,0163        1,78          *
AUDIT_COM + 6,9426         1,31              5,0496         0,97          7,5014         1,39          6,3594        1,22          
USLISTING + 0,3864         0,23              0,7369         0,42          0,9457         0,54          0,6807        0,40          
PROFIT - -2,2514       -0,62            -2,4729        -0,68        -2,7132        -0,77        -2,4774       -0,70        
MASCULINITY + -0,1054       -2,99            *** -0,0959        -2,71        *** -0,0954        -2,73        *** -0,0949       -2,66        ***
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE - -0,1626       -3,81            *** -0,1640        -3,74        *** -0,1557        -3,57        *** -0,1509       -3,20        ***
S_MARKET + -1,0437       -4,04            *** -1,0908        -3,99        *** -1,0889        -4,13        *** -1,0664       -3,95        ***
Auditor indicators¤
E&Y ? 3,2570         1,04              4,0161         1,22          3,2282         1,01          3,2962        1,02          
KPMG ? 5,0419         1,74              * 5,4121         1,88          * 5,1387         1,85          * 5,0849        1,76          *
PwC ? 3,9535         1,37              3,7011         1,28          3,3179         1,18          3,7969        1,31          
Industry indicator&
OIL&GAS ? 2,2787         0,58              1,2324         0,30          -0,1153        -0,03        -0,0038       -0,00        
INDUSTRIAL ? 1,7076         0,61              1,3752         0,41          0,9552         0,32          -0,8555       -0,26        
BASIC MATERIALS ? -0,2237       -0,06            0,7952         0,20          -2,5541        -0,63        -2,4758       -0,58        
CONSUMER GOODS ? 2,9668         1,05              2,1432         0,68          1,6022         0,54          -0,2409       -0,08        
HEALTHCARE ? -0,7114       -0,17            -0,1481        -0,03        0,6698         0,15          -2,1145       -0,44        
CONSUMER SERVICES ? 0,7783         0,25              -1,2915        -0,37        -1,3999        -0,43        -2,4456       -0,71        
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ? 5,0129         1,26              4,8592         1,29          4,9449         1,21          3,1929        0,76          
UTILITIES ? 1,3259         0,37              2,1839         0,58          1,0957         0,31          0,3677        0,10          
TECHNOLOGY ? -5,8008       -0,73            -4,7681        -0,62        -6,0509        -0,76        -7,7178       -0,93        
Moderation effects
ENFORCEMENT*GOODWILL ? -0,0545       -0,17            
ENFORCEMENT*MATERIALITY ? -0,0161        -1,15        
ENFORCEMENT*IMMATERIAL ? -0,2605        -0,43        
Materiality indicators§
ENFORCEMENT*0-25% quartile 
of materiality ? 0,1841        0,30          
ENFORCEMENT*25-50% quartile 
of materiality ? 0,0902        0,23          
ENFORCEMENT*50-75% quartile 
of materiality ? 0,0167        0,05          
0,1713         3,45              *** 0,1241         2,68          *** 0,1491         3,07          *** 0,1335        2,56          ***
Maximum VIF@ 2,30              1,46          1,50          2,34          
Expected 
direction
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. §The benchmark used for materiality is the quartile 75-100%. 
¤The benchmark for auditors is Deloitte. &The benchmark used for industries is Financials. @Maximum VIF shows the highest VIF-value for any of the explanatory 
variables, i.e. proxies for enforcement and materiality.
Panel C: Persuasion Enforcement
All models are mean-centred
Model 5
Enforcement on absolute 
materiality
(N=285)
Model 6
Enforcement on relative 
materiality
(N=285)
Model 7
Enforcement on 
immateriality
(N=285)
Model 8
Enforcement on quartiled 
materiality
(N=285)
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Abstract 
This study examines how the enforcement of financial reporting, the enforcement of auditors and the 
limitations to the auditors’ liability impact the auditors’ auditing efforts of the statutory financial report. 
Previous research suggests that strict enforcement makes auditors increase their audit efforts and that a 
limitation to the auditors’ liability makes auditors reduce their audit efforts. However, unlike prior research, 
this study distinguishes between different kinds of enforcement and applies an enforcement measure 
designed to capture this particular kind of enforcement as opposed to applying a general measurement of 
enforcement. Understanding how different kinds of enforcement affect the audit efforts may help 
regulators and enforcers to be better able to achieve the desired enforcement outcomes. Based on a sample 
of six countries, this study finds that a strict financial reporting enforcement and limitations to the auditors’ 
liability have a significant and negative influence on the audit efforts. Further, the strict enforcement of 
auditors has a positive and significant influence on the audit efforts. The study contributes to the literature 
by exploring how different kinds of enforcement impact the auditors’ auditing behaviour.  
 
Key Words: Audit fee; Audit efforts; Enforcement; Enforcement of financial reporting; Enforcement of 
auditor; Liability cap; Enforcement strategy  
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Introduction 
Studies investigating the effects enforcement have on the quality of the financial reports and the 
compliance with mandatory disclosures are numerous (Street and Gray 2002, Glaum and Street 2003, Hail 
and Luez 2006, Daske et al. 2008, 2013, Christensen et al. 2013, Glaum et al. 2013, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014, 
Preiato et al. 2015), while studies investigating the effect enforcement has on the audit efforts is limited 
(Brocard et al. forthcoming). However, several studies investigate how limitations to the auditors’ liabilities 
influence the audit efforts (Taylor and Simon 1999, Fargher et al. 2001, London Economics 2006, Srinidi et 
al. 2009, Choi et al. 2008, 2009, Kim et al. 2012). The objective of this paper is to investigate how 
enforcement and limitations to the auditors’ liability influences the audit efforts when applying specific 
measurement for the enforcement of financial reporting and auditors, while simultaneously considering 
limitations to the auditors’ liability. This will provide a more detailed picture of how enforcement and 
limitations to the auditors’ liability influences the audit efforts. This is interesting, as it may help regulators 
and enforcers to modify the regulations and the enforcement applied to achieve the desired auditor 
behaviour. 
The audit risk model is utilised to identify how different kinds of enforcement, i.e., enforcement of auditors 
and financial reporting, as well as limitations to the auditors’ liability, may influence the audit efforts. Based 
on this model, it is expected that a strict financial reporting enforcement may cause preparers to be more 
diligent in preparing the financial statements, which may make the auditors reduce their audit efforts. It is 
also expected that a strict enforcement of the auditors may cause auditors to perform additional audit 
efforts because the auditor faces an increased risk of financial and reputation losses. Finally, it is expected 
that limitations to the auditors’ liability may reduce the audit efforts, as the benefits of performing 
additional audit efforts are quickly outweighed by the marginal costs of performing the additional audit 
efforts.  
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The study is based on six European countries with differences in the strictness of the enforcement of both 
auditors and financial reporting and where half of the countries have limited the auditors’ liability. Audit 
efforts are proxied by the size of the audit fee. The analysis shows that a strict financial reporting 
enforcement has a significant and negative effect on the audit efforts, which indicates that preparers 
working in a strict financial reporting enforcement environment deliver a financial report of a higher quality 
than preparers working in a weak enforcement environment. The higher quality of the financial report 
reduces the audit risk and thereby also the amount of audit efforts the auditor has to perform. The analysis 
also reveals that a strict enforcement of auditors has a positive and significant effect on the audit efforts of 
the auditor, i.e., the auditor performs additional audit efforts because of the increased risk of suffering 
financial and/or reputation losses due to the strict enforcement. Finally, the study finds that the audit 
efforts are significantly lower in countries with a limited auditors’ liability.  
This study makes several important contributions to the existing literature. First, it analyses the effect of 
enforcement by applying indices that are specifically developed to measure the enforcement of financial 
reporting and of auditors. The index measuring the financial reporting enforcement is created by Johansen 
et al. (2018) and measures the actual public enforcement. The index measuring the enforcement of 
auditors is created by Brown et al. (2014) and measures the strictness of the auditors’ working 
environment. Applying these indices simultaneously helps clarify how different kinds of enforcement 
impact the audit efforts. Consequently, the study provides a more nuanced picture of the effects of 
enforcement, as prior literature has applied enforcement proxies that measure the general strictness of 
enforcement and has not distinguished between different kinds of enforcement. A better understanding of 
how a different kind of enforcement impacts the auditors’ behaviour is of interest to regulators and 
enforcers, as it may help in designing regulation and enforcement that may alter the auditors’ behaviour in 
a more desirable direction.  
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Second, the study adds to the knowledge of determinants for the size of audit fees by documenting that 
country-level factors may be significant determinants for the size of the audit fee. The effects of country-
level factors are largely unexplored within this stream of research (Hay et al. 2006, Hay 2013, DeFond and 
Zhang 2014). Third, the study adds to the existing literature by developing a new and timely measurement 
of the auditors’ liability. The existing measurements of the auditors’ liability have become obsolete due to 
changes in the underlying regulation within the European countries (EU Commission 2007, ACCA 2017). 
Further, the study responds to the call of Hay et al. (2006) for more research on how the regulatory 
environment affects audit fees, and thereby the audit efforts. This is done by analysing how limitations to 
the auditors’ liability act together with different kind of enforcement. 
The remainder of the paper has been organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the background along with 
the development of the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology and research design, 
including the sample and its collection. Descriptive statistics and correlations are discussed in Section 4 
while Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Robustness tests are conducted in Section 6. The article 
closes with a summary and a conclusion. 
Background and hypothesis development 
The literature investigating the supply and demand for audit services and its’ pricing is divided into two 
research streams. The first research stream focuses on the demand for auditing services, i.e., the 
characteristics that the auditees would like the auditors to have. The second research stream focuses on 
determinants influencing the supply of auditing services, i.e., the factors that influence the auditor when 
pricing the auditing services. 
Prior studies investigating the demand side find that audit services are demanded because they reduce the 
cost of capital, improve the credit ratings of the audited firms and provide a signalling value to the firms’ 
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stakeholder (Kim et al. 2011, Lennox and Pittman 2011, DeFond and Zhang 2014). Importantly, the 
signalling value only exists if the audit is voluntary. An audit also helps stakeholders monitor the 
performance of managers, which reduces the agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Watts and 
Zimmerman 1983, Francis et al. 2011). Other determinants known to influence the demand for auditors are 
their qualifications, either generally or specifically (Big 4 auditors and industry specialists), corporate 
governances and the existence of an internal auditor (Francis et al. 1999, Turley and Zaman 2007, Cahan et 
al. 2008, Hay et al. 2008). 
The literature covering the supply side is extensive and focuses on identifying characteristics influencing the 
risk exposure of the auditors (engagement risk) to financial losses from litigation and/or regulatory 
penalties and reputational losses. A reputational loss may impair the auditors’ ability to retain current 
clients and attract future clients, which may reduce the future earning potential of the auditor (DeFond and 
Zhang 2014). The risk of suffering either a financial and/or a reputational loss can be reduced by charging a 
risk premium or by increasing the applied audit efforts, both of which results in higher audit fees (Simunic 
and Stein 1996, Choi et al. 2008, 2009, Kim et al. 2012, DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
The identified determinants from the two research streams are classified into three categories: client 
characteristics, auditor characteristics and engagement characteristics (Hay et al. 2006, Hay 2013, Defond 
and Zhang 2014). Client characteristics include size, complexity, profitability, leverage and industry. Auditor 
characteristics include the auditor firm size (Big 4 or not) and changes of auditors. Engagement 
characteristics include the timing of the audit (busy season), audit problems and non-auditing services. 
From these characteristics, it can be concluded that enforcement is rarely considered as a possible 
determinant for the audit fee. 
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One of the few cross-border studies, which incorporate the effects of enforcement, is the exploratory study 
of Taylor and Simon (1999). They find that firms located in countries with strict regulations, high disclosure 
requirements and a higher litigation risk have higher audit fees. On a similar note, Fargher et al. (2001) find 
that an increased risk of litigation and stricter regulation is associated with higher audit fees. Srinidhi et al. 
(2009) observe that strong institutions increase the average audit fee but also reduce the incremental 
demand for specialist auditors, which indicates a more transparent accounting environment. Kim et al. 
(2012) find that audit fee premiums derived from the adoption of IFRS are lower in countries with strong 
legal regimes relatively to countries with weak legal regimes. Kou and Lee (2018) finds that firms that 
capitalise development costs experience higher audit fees, which are mitigated if the firm is located in a 
country with a strict enforcement environment. 
Choi et al. (2008) investigate how the auditors’ liability impacts the audit pricing and find that a strict 
liability regime increases the audit fees and that the premium charged by Big 4 auditing firms is lower in a 
weak liability regime than in a strong liability regime. Choi et al. (2009) examine how a cross-listing impacts 
the audit fee and find that firms cross-listed in countries with a strong legal regime are paying higher audit 
fees than non-cross-listed firms. Further, they find that a cross-listing premium increases with the 
difference in the strength of the legal regimes of the home country and the cross-listed country, i.e., the 
larger the difference is in the strength of the legal regimes, the larger the audit fee. London Economics 
(2006) investigates how limitations (caps) to the auditors’ liability impact the firms’ cost of capital. They do 
this by comparing the cost of capital for firms located in countries with limits to the auditors’ liability with 
the cost of capital for firms located in countries without limits to the auditors’ liability, while controlling for 
the effects of the enforcement environment. They find that the strength of the enforcement environment 
and limitations to the auditors’ liability do not significantly impact the cost of capital (London, 2006).  
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The results from the studies listed above are slightly mixed, but the overall conclusion is that a strict 
enforcement has a positive and significant effect on the size of the audit fee. However, all the studies utilise 
enforcement indices that are created to measure other things, such as investor protection and the general 
regulatory strength of the country and are therefore not ideal measurements for the enforcement of 
financial reporting and auditors (Johansen et al. 2018). Furthermore, the enforcement and liability proxies 
used by these studies are all created before the year 200034 (Cooke and Wallace 1990, Wingate 1997, La 
Porta et al. 1998, La Porta et al. 2006), which means that they no longer can be considered relevant, as the 
regulatory environment has undergone significant changes since their creation (EU Commission 2008, 
Brown et al. 2014).  
The results of the literature investigating the impact that enforcement has on accounting quality and 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, Street and Gray 2002, 
Glaum and Street 2003, Hail and Leuz 2006, Daske et al. 2008, 2013, Christensen et al. 2013, Glaum et al. 
2013, Tsalavoutas et al. 2014, Preiato et al. 2015), together with the literature investigating the cross-
border determinants for audit fees, suggests that auditing fees increase when enforcement becomes 
stricter. These results have led to the general perception that a strict enforcement leads to increased 
auditing efforts. However, this conclusion is puzzling, as enforcement of financial reporting rules is found to 
increase the accounting quality and compliance with mandatory disclosures. This would, ceteris paribus, 
suggest that the accounting information being audited is of a higher quality, which, again, would suggest 
that the auditor needs to perform fewer auditing procedures to obtain the needed assurance. Likewise, the 
existing literature on auditors’ liability finds that limitations to the liability decrease the audit fee (Taylor 
and Simon 1999, Fargher et al. 2001, Choi et al. 2008, 2009, Kim et al. 2012). However, none of these 
                                                          
34
 Taylor and Simon (1999), along with Fargher et al. (2001), use the enforcement measure developed by Cook and 
Wallace (1990). Srinidhi et al. (2009) use the components Rule of law and the component Efficiency of Judicial system 
developed by La Porta et al. (1998). Kim et al., (2012) base their enforcement proxy on five components from the La 
Porta et al. (2006), while Choi et al. (2008, 2009) base their litigation proxy on Wingate (1997).  
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studies differentiated between different kinds of enforcement, which is problematic, as financial reporting 
enforcement, enforcement of auditors and limitations to the auditors’ liability are likely to influence the 
financial report differently. This may be explained by applying the audit risk model as shown below: 
          35               36              37                38 (1) 
 
The model states that the audit risk is equal to the inherent risk, the control risk and the detection risk. The 
inherent risk and the control risk are assumed to be the auditee’s risks and exist independently of the audit 
(ISA 200, par. A37). Theoretically, it follows that a change in one of the risks influences the remaining three 
risks.  
Financial reporting enforcement focuses on ensuring that preparers issue financial reports without material 
misstatements and in accordance with the chosen financial reporting framework (Johansen et al., 2018). 
Financial reporting enforcement therefore targets the inherent risk and the control risk, as these are the 
preparers’ risks. Considering the definition of the inherent risk (ISA 200, par. 13n, i, and ISA 200, par. A38), 
it seems reasonable to assume that the inherent risk, in all practical regards, is unsusceptible to deliberate 
changes by the firm. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that the employees of the firm possess 
the necessary competence and are able to execute their duties with due diligence. Increases in the 
                                                          
35
 Audit risk denotes the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements 
are materially misstated (IAS 200, par 13c).  
36
 Inherent risk denotes the susceptibility of an assertion about a class of transaction, account balance or disclosure to 
a misstatement that could be material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, before 
consideration of any related controls (IAS 200, par. 13n, i). 
37
 Control risk denotes the risk that a misstatement that could occur in an assertion about a class of transaction, 
account balance or disclosure and that could be material, either individually or when aggregated with other 
misstatements, will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis by the firms’ internal control (IAS 
200, par. 13n, ii). 
38
 Detection risk denotes the risk the procedures performed by the auditor to reduce audit risk to an acceptable low 
level will not detect a misstatement that exists and that could be material, either individually or when aggregated with 
other misstatements (IAS 200, par 13e). 
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strictness of the financial reporting enforcement will, considering these assumptions, make the firm 
perform additional procedures to detect errors. This may be done by reducing the control risk, i.e., the firm 
implements additional internal controls to be able to withstand the increased scrutiny from the regulatory 
authorities. The auditors are not directly affected by changes in the enforcement of financial reporting but 
will indirectly, other things being equal, experience a decline in the audit risk, which is caused by the 
reduction of the control risk. Consequently, auditors are able to reduce the detection risk (and thereby 
their audit efforts) without increasing the audit risk39. However, the reduction in the audit efforts may be 
moderated if the auditor expects that a ruling by the enforcers against the audited firm may spill over into 
a reputational loss or a financial penalty for the auditor. This may occur if the enforcers of auditors are 
required to open an investigation of the performed audit if clients of the auditor have been sanctioned by 
the enforcers of financial reporting. This moderation is not expected to fully off-set the negative effect 
enforcement of financial reporting has on the audit efforts, which means that the following hypothesis can 
be stated: 
Hypotheses 1: The audit efforts decrease as the financial reporting enforcement becomes stricter, other 
things being equal. 
The enforcement of auditors focuses on ensuring that audits performed are in compliance with relevant 
legislation and the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) (Brown et al. 2014). Consequently, 
                                                          
39
 This can be illustrated by the following example:  
Assume that the audit engagement must have an assurance level of 95% and has the following risks: Inherent risk 
(IR)=99%; Control risk(CR)=99%; and Detection risk(DR)=97%. Applying these figures will make the model look as 
follows: 0.99(IR)*0.99(CR)*0.97(DT)= 0.95, or a total audit risk of 95%. Assume that the country introduces a stricter 
enforcement on financial reporting and thereby forces the firm to implement additional internal controls that will 
make the control risk increase from 0.99 to 0.999. These changes will make the model look as follows: 
0.99(IR)*0.999(CR)*0.97(DR)=0.96, or a total audit risk of 96%. Assuming that the auditor will continue to accept an 
audit risk of 95% will make it possible to reduce the detection risk to 96%, which will make the model l look as follows: 
0.99(IR)*0.999(CR)*0.96(DR)=0.95%, or an unchanged audit risk of 95%. Consequently, a stricter enforcement 
environment makes it possible for the auditor to reduce his auditing procedures without increasing the total audit 
risk, which may be reflected in lower audit fees. 
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changes in the strictness of the enforcement of auditors incentivise them to adjust the accepted audit risk 
by either increasing or decreasing the performed audit efforts. For example, increases in the strictness of 
the enforcement of auditors will, ceteris paribus, make auditors reduce the detection risk by performing 
additional audit procedures40 and thus reduce the risk of suffering a reputational and/or financial loss. The 
audited firms’ risks are unaffected by changes in the enforcement of auditors, as the sole focuses of this 
kind of enforcement is on the auditors. Subsequently, the auditors must, ceteris paribus, increase their 
audit fee to cover the marginal costs of performing the additional audit efforts. This leads to the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The audit efforts increase as the enforcement of auditors becomes stricter, other things 
being equal. 
The strictness of the financial reporting enforcement and the enforcement of auditors are not the only 
items auditors must consider when determining the acceptable audit risk. They must also consider the legal 
liability regime. Auditors risk being litigated even without the occurrence of an audit failure and when they 
have performed the audit in accordance with the relevant legislation and GAAS (DeFond and Zhang 2014). 
Assuming that the auditor is a homo economicus, he will attempt to minimise his efforts relative to the 
expected benefits. Consequently, the auditor may therefore find it attractive to perform an audit equal to 
the minimum legislative and GAAS requirements. Auditors choosing this course of action expose 
themselves to an increased risk of being litigated because GAAS is a subjective concept involving 
professional judgements, contextual decisions, etc. This means that the auditors’ evaluation of GAAS may 
differ from that of the court, which may therefore rule against the auditor, who then becomes liable for 
damages. A limit on the auditors’ liability will, ceteris paribus, make the auditor reduce/remove audit 
                                                          
40
 Continuing the example from above and assuming that the detecting risk is reduced from 97% to 99%, the audit risk 
model will look as follows: 0.99(IR)*0.99(CR)*0.99(DR)=0.97, or a total audit risk of 97% compared to the previously 
95% risk. 
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procedures beyond a certain threshold, as the marginal costs of performing the additional procedures 
exceeds the expected benefits. Put differently, auditors exposed to very low liability limits will more quickly 
experience that the marginal costs of additional audit efforts exceed the expected benefits than will 
auditors exposed to high liability limit, or no limit. The effect of a limit on the auditors’ liability will, ceteris 
paribus, lead to lower audit fees.  
Several European countries have established a limit on how much auditors can be required to pay in 
compensation (London Economics 2006, EU Commission 2007). Prior literature find that legal litigation is an 
important factor for the size of the audit fee, as stricter legal litigation regimes are associated with higher 
audit fees (Taylor and Simon 1999, Fargher et al. 2001, Choi et al. 2008, DeFond and Zhang 2014). This 
indicates that auditors charge a risk premium for the risk of litigation. A survey conducted by London 
Economics (2006) show that the vast majority of auditors from the Big 4 and middle tier firms believe that a 
limitation in the auditors’ liability will not affect the value of the audit. However, 37% of preparers of the 
financial report and 45% of the institutional investors believe that financial reports audited under a regime 
of limited liability provide a less true and less fair view (London Economics 2006). This view is particularly 
strong for firms located in countries with a limited liability regime, as 51% of the firms in these countries 
believe that the financial report provides a less true and less fair view (London Economics 2006). Together, 
these results indicate that preparers and users of the financial report consider limits to the auditors’ 
liability to have a negative impact on the audit efforts. The following hypothesis can therefore be stated: 
Hypothesis 3:  The audit efforts decrease if the auditors’ liability is limited by a cap, other things being 
equal.  
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Methodology and research design 
Sample and data 
The initial sample consists of 600 firms from six European countries. The countries included in the sample 
are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and The United Kingdom (UK), and they have been 
selected on the basis of a five-step process. In the first step, France, Germany and UK were selected due to 
the size of their capital markets. This selection criterion ensures that the most valuable and largest firms in 
Europe are included in the sample and thus ensures that the sample covers the countries where the 
majority of investors are present. Second, an additional three countries are added (Belgium, Denmark and 
Finland) to ensure a wider variation in the financial reporting enforcement, enforcement of auditors and 
limitations in the auditors’ liability. Third, the 100 firms with the highest market value in each country were 
selected, thus limiting the selected firms to those that are listed on a stock exchange. The selected firms 
are limited to 100 from each country, which is meant to ensure that the firms are active and frequently 
traded on the exchange, considering the sizes of the different exchanges, and to ensure that each country 
is represented with a relatively similar number of observations. The value of the firms was measured 
according to the market value on December 31, 2014 and was retrieved from ThomsonOne. Fourth, 
following prior literature, firms from the financial industry (SIC codes 8000-8999) have been removed from 
the sample (133) because they are subject to extensive industry regulation. Fifth, firms with the following 
characteristics are removed from the sample: not listed on an exchange within its country of origin (8), the 
financial statement is not available in English (26), have not disclosed the audit fees (11), or because of 
other missing data (31). The reduction of the initial sample and the allocation of the final sample across 
country and industry is shown in table 1, panel A and B, respectively.  
[Insert Table 1 – overview of sample around here] 
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Dependent variable – Audit fee 
The dependent variable is the total audit fee in thousands EUR converted to the natural log (AUDIT_FEE). 
The audit fees have been collected by hand from the firms’ 2014 consolidated financial statements by the 
researcher (along with information about non-auditing services, tax services and other services) and 
registered in the reporting currency of the firm. Audit fees in currencies other than EUR (DNK, GBP and 
USD) have been converted to EUR using the average exchange rate for 2014. The average exchange rate is 
calculated based on the daily exchange rates disclosed by the Danish National Bank. The collected data has 
been verified in two ways. First, 114 observations of the sample, approximately 33% of the final sample, 
have been re-performed to ensure the validity of the sample. Second, the total remuneration to the firms’ 
auditors has been cross-checked to total audit fees, including non-auditing services obtained from 
Datastream. All discrepancies in excess of 5% have been investigated and resolved. The description and 
measurement of the dependent variable is summarised in table 2, panel A. 
Independent variables 
This section describes how the explanatory variables and the control variables are measured and why they 
have been included. The description and measurement of the explanatory variables are shown in table 2, 
panel B while the description and measurement of the control variables are shown in table 2, panel C.  
Financial reporting enforcement 
Financial reporting enforcement is measured by the enforcement index developed by Johansen et al. 
(2018). The index measures the actual public enforcement of financial reporting and is based on the 
responses of a questionnaire from the European enforcement bodies and the regulatory specialists of a Big 
4 auditing firm in 17 European countries. Consequently, the measurement of the enforcement of financial 
reporting is considered to be more accurate than any of the other available enforcement indices, as they 
tend to be based on either general rules of law or the formal rules of financial reporting (Johansen et al., 
2018). Johansen et al. (2018) develops three enforcement indices; this article applies the total enforcement 
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index from Johansen et al. (2018) (ENFOR_TOT). The remaining two indices are applied as robustness tests 
and measure financial reporting enforcement applied under different enforcement strategies. The 
enforcement score of the individual countries is anonymous, as this was a condition for the European 
enforcement bodies to participate in the survey (Johansen et al., 2018). It is expected that the financial 
reporting enforcement will have a negative association with the audit fee.   
Enforcement of Auditors 
The measurement of the enforcement of auditors is one of two indices developed by Brown et al. (2014) 
that were created to capture differences in the institutional setting of the enforcement of accounting 
standards. One of the indices measures the enforcement of auditors, while the other index measures the 
enforcement of financial reporting. Both indices are based on publicly available data sources. The 
enforcement index for auditors is based on eight elements, in which six of the eight elements are founded 
on a survey conducted by the International Federation of Accountants (IFRC – data from 2011) and verified 
by data from the World Bank (data from 2011). These six elements measure items such as that the auditor 
must be licenced , if a country apply more extensive licence requirements, the on-going professional 
development, the existence of an audit oversight body, the ability of the oversight body to apply sanctions, 
the existence of a quality assurance programme, and the requirements for an audit rotation (firm or 
partner). The last two elements measure the level of the audit fees (taken from Worldscope and measures 
the level of audit fees in 2008) and the level of litigation risk (based on the Wingate index) (Brown et al., 
2014). 
The applied measure for the enforcement of auditors (ENFOR_AUD) is an adjusted version of the auditor 
enforcement index developed by Brown et al. (2014), as the last two elements, those measuring the level 
of audit fees and the level of litigation risk, have been removed from the applied enforcement index. The 
reason for removing these elements is because the level of audit fees in 2008 is considered irrelevant for 
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2014 and the Wingate litigation index is considered obsolete, as it dates back to 1997. Furthermore, this 
study applies a separate measurement of the auditors’ litigation risk. It is expected that BROWN_AUD 
exhibits a positive association with the audit fee.  
Auditors’ liability  
The dichotomous variable LIABILITY_CAP measures whether the auditors’ liability has been limited. 
LIABILITY_CAP is coded as one if a country has implemented a limit on the auditors’ liability, whether it is a 
legal liability cap or a contractual liability cap, and otherwise it is coded as zero. LIABILITY_CAP is based on 
the information provided in the appendix. It is expected that the existence of a cap will exhibit a negative 
association with the audit fee.  
[Insert Table 2 – Overview of dependent and independent variables – around here] 
Control variables 
The study includes 16 control variables that prior studies have identified as likely to influence the size of the 
audit fee. The variable LNASSETS (log of total assets) is included as a proxy for client size, while INVREC 
(sum of inventory and accounts receivable over total assets), BUS_SEG (number of business segments) and 
GEO_SEG (number of geographical segments) are included as proxies for client complexity (Simunic 1980, 
Choi et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2012). The variables, BUS_SEG and GEO_SEG, have been chosen as proxies for 
complexity rather than the more commonly used number of subsidiaries (Hay 2013), as the number of 
subsidiaries may be driven by tax and legal issues rather than by operational considerations. Following prior 
studies (Francis 1984, Hay et al. 2006, Choi et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2012), the variables, LEVERAGE (ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets) and ROA (return on assets), have been included as client-specific risks. 
Following Choi et al. (2008), SEASONED has been included as an additional proxy for the client-specific risk 
caused by the likely increased risk premium relating to clients who have obtained external financing by 
issuing shares or bonds in the capital markets. Choi et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2012) find that firms with a 
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cross-listing are charged higher audit fees. The variables US_LISTING and SECONDARY are included to 
capture this effect. US_LISTING captures the effect of being cross-listed in US, while SECONDARY captures 
the effect of being cross-listed on exchanges other than US exchanges.  
Following prior literature, control variables are included for selective industries (Taylor and Simon 1999, 
Fargher et al. 2001, Hay et al. 2006, Srinidhi et al. 2009, Hay 2013). These industries are Oil & Gas, Basic 
Materials, and Utilities and Telecommunications. These industries are controlled for individually, as they all 
are subject to additional regulation and reporting requirements.  
Model 
Following prior literature, the hypotheses are tested by using an OLS-regression (Hay et al. 2006, Choi et al. 
2008, 2009, Kim et al. 2012, Hay 2013). The models have been centred at the mean values to ease the 
interpretation of the results. The model is illustrated below: 
                                                       
                                         
                                              
                                         
                                              
                         
(2) 
All reported standard errors and t-values are Huber-White-adjusted to eliminate potential 
heteroscedasticity problems. The variance inflator factors (VIF) are inspected and reported along with the 
empirical results. 
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Descriptive statistics and correlation 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 3 and panel A, B and C, respectively. The 
size of the average audit fees varies greatly from EUR 778k in Denmark to EUR 8,074k in France. These 
differences are caused by firms being significantly larger in France than in Denmark and because firms in 
France are required by law to have a joint audit consisting of two or more independent auditors. However, 
if audit fees are scaled by total assets, it becomes apparent that the audit fees are significantly lower in 
France, Germany and in the UK than in Belgium, Denmark and Finland, which can be attributed to the 
significant economies of scale auditors experience when they audit large firms.  
As indicated in panel B, the enforcement of auditors varies across the six countries, where the UK and 
France have the strictest enforcement, while Finland and Belgium have the weakest enforcement of 
auditors. Belgium, Germany and the UK all have limitations to the auditors’ liability, while the auditors’ 
liability in Denmark, Finland and France is unlimited. Likewise, the financial reporting enforcement ranges 
from a low of 55 in country F to a high of 89. In summary, the enforcement variables and limitations to the 
auditors’ liability exhibit variations across the six countries. This indicates a reasonable cross-country 
setting, in which the impact of the enforcement of both financial reporting and auditors and the limitations 
to the auditors’ liability can be tested.  
[Insert Table 3– Descriptive statistics– around here] 
 
As shown in table 3, panel C, the average total assets amount to EUR 15.2 billion, with a high of EUR 345.3 
billion to a low of EUR 5.0 million. The largest firms are located in France, with an average size of EUR 27.3 
billion, while the smallest firms are located in Finland, with an average size of EUR 2,269 million. A total of 
14 firms have assets in excess of EUR 100 billion, while 129 firms have assets of less than EUR 1.0 billion. 
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The firms have an average of 3.2 business segments, 4.3 geographical segments and an average return on 
assets of 5.3%. The average liabilities equal 58.2% of total assets, while inventory and receivables on 
average equal to 27.9% of the total assets. Almost all of the firms are audited by a Big 4 auditing firm, as 
only 16 of the 391 firms are audited by a non-Big 4 auditing firm. A total of 110 of the firms have a cross-
listing in US, while 89 firms have a secondary listing, excluding firms with a US cross-listing. A total of 92 
firms have obtained external financing by issuing either shares or bonds in 2014. The majority of the firms 
(330) have a year-end between December 31 and February 28, which is also the period defined as the busy 
season. Only 19 firms have changed auditors between the years 2013 and 2014. 
Table 4 presents the Spearman correlation coefficients. AUDIT_FEE exhibits a negative and significant 
correlation with ENFOR_TOT and a positive and significant correlation with BROWN_AUD and 
LIABILITY_CAP. These correlations provide a preliminary support for the hypotheses. BROWN_AUD is 
negatively and significantly correlated with ENFOR_TOT, which further lends support to our hypotheses. 
LIABILITY_CAP is negatively and significantly correlated with BROWN_AUD and ENFOR_TOT. None of the 
variables exhibit signs of multicollinearity. The control variables generally exhibit a significant correlation 
with AUDIT_FEE, where LNASSETS exhibit a particular high correlation of 0.9060.  
[Insert Table 4 – Pearson correlation for dependent and independent variables – around here] 
 
Empirical results 
Table 5 reports the empirical results, in which it is evident that the model is highly significant, with an F-
value of 135.28 (p=<.0001) and an explanatory power of 0.8674, which is in line with prior literature. From 
table 5, it is initially evident that the coefficients of the explanatory variables act as expected, which is also 
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true for most all the control variables. Thus, the model appears to behave as expected, and the VIF’s are 
also at an acceptable levels41.  
 
[Insert Table 5 – Analysis of regression results – around here] 
 
Focusing on the effects of enforcement, it is apparent from table 5 that enforcement of financial reporting 
is negative and highly significant (t=-4.59; p=<.0001). This result is consistent with the notion that a strict 
enforcement environment on financial reporting makes the auditor apply fewer audit efforts and thus 
supports the theory that preparers are incentivised to produce a financial report of a higher quality if the 
financial reporting enforcement becomes stricter. Auditors are therefore able to achieve the desired audit 
risk by performing fewer audit procedures, which may lead to lower audit fees. The high level of 
significance of the result indicates that auditors are not particular concerned about suffering penalties or 
reputational losses from the spill over effects of the financial reporting enforcement, which was expected 
to moderate the negative effect of the financial reporting enforcement. The effect is not only significant 
statistically but also economically, as a change from the average level of enforcement (66.4) to the highest 
(89) will reduce the audit fee by approximately 32.0%, which equals a reduction in average audit fee of EUR 
1,173k, or a change in the average audit fee from EUR 3,665k to approximately EUR 2,492k. Similar, a 
change from the average level of financial reporting enforcement to the weakest (55) will increase the 
audit fees by approximately 17.7%, or increase the average audit fee by EUR 649k. 
                                                          
41
 Variables are considered to be at an acceptable level if their VIF’s are below 10 (Wooldridge (2013), page 94). 
Furthermore, none of the VIF’s exceeds the more conservative threshold of 5, as suggested by Montgomery et al. 
(2015), page 296. 
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The enforcement of auditors is positive and significant at a 1%-level in all three models, which suggests that 
auditors perform additional auditing procedures if the enforcement of auditors becomes stricter. The result 
is significant both statistically and economically, as a change from the average level of enforcement of 
auditors (17.06) to the strictest (20) will increase the audit fees by approximately 31.6%, or an increase in 
the average audit fee of EUR 1,145k. A reduction in the enforcement of auditors to the lowest level (14) will 
reduce the average audit fee by approximately EUR 1,199k.  
Limitations in the auditors’ liabilities appear to reduce the audit efforts, as the result is negative and 
significant (t=-3.03; p=p.0026). From this result, it follows that if a country introduces a limit to the 
auditors’ liability, it can be expected that the average audit fee will fall by approximately 22.1% or EUR 
809k. 
In addition to the results from the explanatory variables, it is worth noting that geographical diversity 
impacts the audit fee more than product diversity does, as GEO_SEG (t=4.27; p=<.0001) is more significant 
than BUS_SEG (t=3.02; p=0.0027). A dual listing in the US appears to have a positive and significant impact 
(t=3.01; p=0.0027) on the audit fee, while a dual listing in countries other than the US has a much weaker 
impact on the audit fee (t=1.82; p=0.0699). This finding is similar to that of Choi et al. (2009), who observe 
that auditors charge higher audit fees for firms with a cross-listing in a country with a stricter enforcement 
environment (proxied by Wingate’s (1997) litigation index). Finally, total assets have a very strong and 
significant (t=22.42; p=<.0001) impact on the audit fees, which is in line with the findings of prior literature 
(Simunic 1980, Taylor and Simon 1999, Fargher et al. 2001, Hay et al. 2006, Choi et al. 2008, 2009, Kim et al. 
2012, Hay 2013). 
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Robustness tests 
This section contains a series of robustness tests conducted to check whether the results of the main 
analysis are robust to alternative variable definitions, model specifications and econometric models. Table 
6 reports the results of the robustness tests, where the different robustness tests are labelled R1 to R8. The 
results of the robustness tests will be compared with the results of the base, as shown in table 5.  
[Insert Table 6 – Robustness tests – around here] 
 
Alternative measurements of enforcement and auditors’ liability 
The enforcement of a financial reporting proxy, used in the main investigation, is anonymous, which makes 
it difficult to reproduce and compare the findings of the study with those from prior literature. The first 
robustness test attempts to amend this problem by applying the Brown et al. (2014) index measuring 
accounting enforcement activity. It is acknowledged that this proxy is relatively new, which means that it 
has not been used extensively in the existing literature. However, it is the only other contemporary 
enforcement proxy created that attempts to measure the financial reporting enforcement. As shown in 
table 6, Model R1 has a fit (F=135.39; p= <.0001), similar to the base model. The coefficients of 
enforcement of financial reporting and the enforcement of auditors are in the expected direction and both 
are highly significant (t=-4.66; p=<.0001) (t=7.66; p=<.0001), respectively. Similar to the base model, the 
results are significant at a 1%-level. Furthermore, LIABILITY_CAP has become positive and significant 
(t=2.18; p=0.0302), which is curious, as this result indicates that auditors apply additional audit efforts if the 
auditors’ liability has an upper limit. The control variables behave in all instances in accordance with the 
expectations.  
Another enforcement proxy tested is the Wingate (1997) litigation proxy, which primarily relates to the 
auditors’ litigation. This proxy measures the strength of a country’s legal regime regarding litigation. The 
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proxy is taken directly from Wingate (1997). The overall fit of model R2 (F=128.11; p=<.0001) is at a similar 
level to that of the base model, and it shows that enforcement is highly significant (t=2.90; p=0.0039), 
which means that auditors, according to this model, apply significantly fewer audit efforts if the 
enforcement environment is strict. The result is in line with the combined effect of ENFOR_TOT, 
BROWN_AUD and LIABIITY_CAP in the base model (Chi-square 76.54; p=<.0001). The effects of financial 
reporting enforcement is also tested for changes in how the enforcement is applied, i.e., the enforcement 
strategy. The base model applies the most commonly used enforcement strategy, which is a mix of two 
opposing archetypes (Baldwin et al. 2012). The first archetype is the deterrence strategy, which aims at 
securing compliance by punishing non-compliers, while the second archetype is the persuasion strategy, 
which secures compliance through dialogue, encouragement and education (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 
Baldwin et al. 2010, 2012). Utilising the enforcement proxies developed by Johansen et al. (2018) it is 
possible to identify the effect enforcement of financial reporting has if it is applied in accordance with a 
deterrence (model R3) or a persuasion (model R4) enforcement strategy. Based on a deterrence 
enforcement strategy (model R3), the financial reporting enforcement exhibit a negative and significant (t=-
2.74; p=0.0065) influence on the audit efforts. The persuasion enforcement strategy (model R4) exhibit 
similar results (t=-3.94; p=<.0001) as the base model. The enforcement of auditors under deterrence or a 
persuasion enforcement strategy are positive and significant (t=4.87; p=<.0001) (t=6.54; p<.0001), 
respectively. However, the effects of limitations to the auditors’ liability disappear, which indicates that this 
variable is susceptible to changes in the enforcement environment. The results from model R1 to R4 verify 
that enforcement has a significant influence on the audit efforts and that different types of enforcement 
have a different effect on the audit efforts. 
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Alternative measurement of size 
Prior studies have mainly used the log of total assets as a proxy for the size of the firm, but several studies 
have used the log of sales as a proxy for size. Measuring size by the amount of total assets is biased against 
firms that generate their profits from knowledge based firms delivering services, software, consulting, etc. 
as the firms’ knowledge base rarely is recognised and measured in the financial report. Therefore, it is 
prudent to make a robustness test versus such a potential bias. The results are shown in table 6, model R5, 
and it has a fit (F=124.75; p=<.0001) similar to the base model and the explanatory variables are highly 
significant in the expected direction. The log of sales are highly positive and significant (t=18.60; p=<.0001) 
and at a similar level as the log of total assets (t=22.42; p=<.0001) in the base model. Conclusively, the 
results indicate that the base model can withstand changes in the measurement of size.  
Alternative model specification and econometric model 
Firms located in France are by law required to have two independent auditors who jointly perform the 
audit of the statutory financial report. Consequently, it is tested if this may drive the results, by applying 
the base model and excluding France (model R6). Model R6 (F=93.30: p=<.0001) is highly significant but 
slightly below that of the base model. ENFOR_TOT and BROWN_AUD remain significant (t=-3.22; p=0.0014) 
(t=4.24; p=<.0001), respectively, while LIABILITY_CAP is insignificant (t=1.60; p=0.1110). Furthermore, it is 
tested if any of the other countries may drive the results, which is done by excluding one country at a time 
and re-running model R6. These results generally follow a pattern similar to that of the base model, 
including the LIABILITY_CAP. Again, this suggests that the LIABILITY_CAP is susceptible to changes in the 
enforcement environment. These results indicate that the results are not driven by an individual country.  
Similar to Choi et al. 2008, 2009, a quantile regression is performed to analyse the impact of extreme 
observations, without removing them from the sample. This is done by applying a quantile regression, 
which predicts the relationship at points of the response variable distribution other than at the mean (Cade 
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and Noon 2003). The regression is calculated at 0.05 per cent intervals and covers the range from 0.05 to 
0.95 per cent. The result of the quantile regression (at median) is shown in table 6, model R7. All other 
results from the quantile regression are un-tabulated. The coefficients for the explanatory variables are 
similar to those of the base model. A few minor changes have occurred to the control variables, as 
BUS_SEG and US_LISTING have turned slightly less significant. The results of the un-tabulated quantile 
regressions are generally similar to those shown in model R7.  
The size of non-audit services (NAS) has in prior literature been identified as influencing the size of the 
audit fee, as a cross subsidisation or knowledge synergies may exist between non-auditing services and 
auditing (Simunic 1984, Hey et al. 2006, Hay 2013). Model R8 is estimated to control for this effect by 
including the variable NAS_OVER_AUDIT_FEE, which is the total non-auditing services scaled by total audit 
fees. Model R8 has a fit (F=132.09; p=<.0001) similar to the base model, and the explanatory variables 
exhibit a level of significance and behaviour as in the base model. NAS_OVER_AUDIT_FEE is negative and 
significant (t=-2.13; p=0.0340). This indicates that the more NAS the auditors performs, the lower is the 
audit fee. As the explanatory variables remain constant, relative to the base model, it is concluded that the 
amount of NAS does not change the effect enforcement has on the audit efforts. However, the result does 
indicate that there is some level of synergies between NAS and the audit of the statutory financial report 
and thus supports the finding of prior literature (Simunic 1984, Hey et al. 2006, Hay 2013). Due to these 
results, the interpretations from the main investigation are considered robust to changes in the model 
specification and econometric model.  
Summary and conclusion 
This paper expands the scope of the existing literature on the audit efforts when performing a statutory 
audit of listed firms. This is done by investigating how the strictness of enforcement, of both financial 
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reporting and auditors, along with limitations in the auditors’ liability, influences the audit efforts. Based on 
an analysis of prior literature and the audit risk model, it is expected that strict financial reporting 
enforcement most likely has a negative impact on the audit efforts. Likewise, limitations in the auditors’ 
liability are also expected to have a negative impact on the efforts applied by the auditor during the audit 
of the statutory financial report. A strict enforcement of auditors is expected to have a positive impact on 
the audit efforts and thus make them perform additional audit efforts.  
The empirical results indicate that a strict financial reporting enforcement decreases the audit efforts. This 
is assumed to occur because preparers of the financial statements produce financial reports of a higher 
quality and because the strict enforcement of financial reporting does not influence the auditors’ perceived 
risk towards litigation and reputational losses. These results are valid, disregarding the applied 
enforcement strategy. Further, the study finds that auditors increase their audit efforts if they operate in a 
country with a strict enforcement of auditors. Finally, the study finds that auditors working in countries 
without limitations on the auditors’ liability apply more audit efforts when auditing the statutory financial 
report than in countries with limitations to the auditors’ liability. Changes to the applied enforcement 
strategy for financial reporting enforcement do not appear to significantly influence the auditors’ applied 
auditing efforts.  
The study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the study finds that the enforcement 
environment of a country is a significant determinant when auditors decide on the level of audit efforts to 
perform. Compared with prior literature, this study provides a broader picture of the consequences of a 
strict enforcement, as it compares the effects in a cross-country setting, whereas prior literature often 
focuses on a single country setting. Second, the study distinguishes between different types of 
enforcement and thus shows that enforcement targeted at the different parties involved in the preparation 
of the statutory financial report affect the audit efforts differently. This is a novel finding, as it provides a 
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more nuanced picture of how financial reporting enforcement affects the audit efforts. Prior literature 
applies enforcement proxies based on the general legal enforcement environment, such as the Wingate 
(1997) litigation index. The results are robust to changes in the measurement of variables, model 
specification and choice of econometric model.  
The study has a few limitations, one being the variable used to measure limitations in the auditors’ liability. 
The applied measure only captures the financial impact of litigation, and the result does therefore not 
reflect how reputational damages impact the audit efforts. This also means that the variable does not 
capture the likelihood of being litigated and/or convicted when litigated, which perhaps has a more direct 
impact on the auditors’ behaviour than a mere limitation to the auditors’ liability. Essentially, the applied 
model suffers, in this regard, with an omitted variable specification. Future research should therefore 
include estimates of the reputational risk, as this may provide new insight into how auditors decide on the 
amount of audit efforts needed during an audit. Furthermore, future research should also attempt to 
measure the likelihood of being litigated and convicted, as this probably will be a more accurate 
measurement of how litigation impacts the auditors’ behaviour, as the measure will reflect the actual 
possible liability rather than the formal possible liability. It is important to consider the actual possible 
liability, as it will include a measurement of prior court rules and practices, which may reduce the auditors’ 
liabilities to a level below any established limits. Consequently, future research should include these 
informal limitations to the auditors’ liability to provide a more accurate measurement of the actual 
limitations. 
A second limitation in the study lies in the applied proxy for enforcement of auditors (Brown et al. 2014). 
This proxy is based on measurements of the ‘rule of the book’ rather than on the applied rules. The rules of 
the book are not always applied to the actual enforcement, which is why a measurement measuring the 
actual enforcement is preferable. Future research should therefore be initiated to create a better 
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enforcement proxy of enforcement of auditors that measures not only the rules of the book but also the 
manner in which these rules are being applied by the regulatory authorities. Such a proxy will provide a 
better basis for examining how enforcement impacts the pricing of auditing services.  
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Table 1 – Overview of sample selection and distribution 
  
 
Table 2 – Overview of variables – description and source 
Variable Description Source 
Panel A – Dependent variable 
AUDIT_FEE Natural log of audit fee converted to thousands of 
Euros 
Hand-collected from the 
2014 financial 
statement 
Panel B – Explanatory variables 
ENFOR_FIN The strictness of a country’s enforcement of 
financial reporting, measured by the ranked 
enforcement score of the Johansen et al (2018) 
enforcement index. This is true for each of the 
enforcement strategies, i.e., deterrence strategy, 
persuasion strategy and total enforcement (mix of 
deterrence and persuasion). 
Johansen et al. (2018) 
BROWN_AUD The strictness of a country’s enforcement of an 
auditor, measured by the Brown et al auditor 
Brown et al. (2014) 
Panel A: Sample selection by country
Initial Sample (100 largest firms measured by capitalised value, end of 2014) from ThomsonOne 600                 
Subtract:
Firms working in the financial sector (ICB 8000-8999) -133               
Firms listed but not listed in home country or in other sample country -8                    
The financial report is not available in English -26                  
Firm observations with a missing audit fee -11                  
Firms excluded due to missing data other than an audit fee -31                  
Final sample 391                 
Panel B: Cross-distribution of sample by industry and country
Oil & gas 
(ICB - 0001)
Basic 
Materials 
(ICB - 1000)
Industrials 
(ICB - 2000)
Consumer 
Goods  
(ICB - 3000)
Health Care 
(ICB - 4000)
Consumer 
Services 
(ICB - 5000)
Tele-
communi-
cations 
(ICB - 6000)
Utilities 
(ICB - 7000)
Technology
 (ICB - 9000) Total
0                      5                      15                   7                      10                   5                      1                      1                      6                       50                   
3                      1                      19                   12                   14                   7                      1                      1                      3                       61                   
1                      4                      24                   9                      3                      7                      1                      1                      12                     62                   
1                      4                      18                   16                   6                      14                   2                      6                      7                       74                   
0                      11                   19                   16                   8                      9                      4                      6                      3                       76                   
3                      8                      16                   11                   5                      16                   3                      5                      1                       68                   
8                      33                   111                 71                   46                   58                   12                   20                   32                     391                 
Country
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
United Kingdom
Total
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Variable Description Source 
enforcement index, excluding the Wingate (item 
#9 in their index) and audit fee component (item 
#8 in their index) of the index.  
LIABILITY_CAP Indicator variable measuring if there is a cap on 
the auditors’ liability. 1 if liability is capped and 0 
otherwise.  
See appendix 
Panel C – Control variables 
LNASSETS Natural log of year-end assets in thousands of 
Euros. 
Worldscope 
BUS_SEG Natural log of 1 plus the number of business 
segments. 
Worldscope 
GEO_SEG Natural log of 1 plus the number of geographical 
segments. 
Worldscope 
INVREC Natural log of the sum of inventories and 
receivables divided by total assets. 
Calculated based on 
data from Worldscope  
LEVERAGE Ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  Calculated based on 
data from Worldscope 
ROA Return on Assets in 2014 Worldscope 
US_LISTING 1 if the firm is listed in US and 0 otherwise Worldscope 
SECONDARY 1 if the firm has a secondary listing and 0 
otherwise.  
Worldscope 
SEASONED 1 if the firm has obtained financing by issuing 
bonds or shares in 2014.  
ThomsonOne 
OIL&GAS 1 if the firm is working in the Oil & Gas industry 
(ICB code 0001-0999). 
Worldscope 
BASIC_MATERIAL 1 if the firm is working in the Basic Material 
industry (ICB code 1000-1999). 
Worldscope 
UTILITIES 1 if the firm is working in Utilities (ICB 7000-7999). Worldscope 
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Variable Description Source 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1 if the firm is working in Utilities (ICB 6000-6999). Worldscope 
NON_BIG4 0 if the firm is being audited by a Big 4 auditing 
firm and 1 otherwise. 
Hand-collected from the 
2014 financial 
statement 
CHANGE 1 if the firm has changed auditors between 2013 
and 2014 and 0 otherwise.  
Hand-collected from the 
2014 and 2013 financial 
statement 
YEAR_END 1 if the firm has its year-end in the “busy season”, 
which is defined as the period from the 31st of 
December to the 28th of February. 
Worldscope 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of variables 
   
Panel A: Dependent variable - Audit fee
n Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum
Dependent variable
AUDIT_FEE (log of audit fee) 391                 7,0116 1,6910                   6,9783              3,1896          10,6805                     
 -By country
Belgium 50    5,9086                1,2645                   5,9228              3,5553          9,3129                        
Denmark 61    5,5818                1,3853                   5,4867              3,1896          9,4584                        
Finland 62    5,9266                1,3477                   5,8415              3,2581          9,6024                        
France 74    8,5049                1,0684                   8,7029              6,4425          10,4429                     
Germany 76    7,3818                1,3557                   6,9533              5,1699          10,6805                     
United Kingdom 68    8,0558                1,1041                   8,0317              5,5487          10,3141                     
AUDIT_FEE (in '000 EUR) 391 3.665                   5.955                     1.073                 24                  43.500                        
 -By country 
Belgium 50    880                      1.752                     373                    35                  11.080                        
Denmark 61    778                      1.790                     241                    24                  12.815                        
Finland 62    937                      1.971                     345                    26                  14.800                        
France 74    8.074                   7.722                     6.021                 628                34.300                        
Germany 76    4.241                   7.088                     1.047                 176                43.500                        
United Kingdom 68    5.350                   5.619                     3.086                 257                30.154                        
AUDIT_FEE divided by total assets 391 0,0007                0,0009                   0,0004              0,0000          0,0108                        
 -By country 
Belgium 50    0,0010                0,0016                   0,0007              0,0001          0,0108                        
Denmark 61    0,0010                0,0009                   0,0007              0,0001          0,0054                        
Finland 62    0,0010                0,0010                   0,0007              0,0001          0,0050                        
France 74    0,0005                0,0003                   0,0005              0,0000          0,0011                        
Germany 76    0,0003                0,0002                   0,0002              0,0000          0,0012                        
United Kingdom 68    0,0004                0,0003                   0,0004              0,0000          0,0015                        
Total assets (in '000 EUR) 391 15.236.911        35.787.424          3.286.050        5.000            345.331.000             
 -By country 
Belgium 50    3.715.823          16.453.127          526.930            10.110          117.013.880             
Denmark 61    2.352.252          7.662.492             340.110            5.000            56.461.470               
Finland 62    2.269.250          4.180.939             850.700            8.500            21.277.000               
France 74    27.310.917        43.264.866          10.092.500      1.104.200    265.363.000             
Germany 76    25.201.933        51.768.748          5.621.250        424.740        345.331.000             
United Kingdom 68    22.813.316        37.568.230          8.223.690        1.323.500    233.285.780             
(Continued)
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(table 3 continued)
Panel B: Explanatory variables
Explanatory variables 
BROWN_AUD 
(adjusted)
LIABILITY CAP 
(dichotomous)
Belgium 16 1
Denmark 18 0
Finland 14 0
France 20 0
Germany 14 1
United Kingdom 20 1
Country ID - (anonymous and 
                           randomised) ENFOR_TOT
Country A 68  
Country B 67
Country C 89  
Country D 68
Country E 66
Country F 55
Panel C: Control variables
Control variables n Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum
Non-dichotomous
LNASSETS 391 14,7729              2,1835                   15,0052            8,5172          19,6600                     
ASSETS in '000 EUR 15.236.911        35.787.424          3.286.050        5.000            345.331.000             
BUS_SEG 391 1,3428                0,4303                   1,3863              0,6931          2,3026                        
# of business segments 3,1893                1,7585                   3,0000              1,0000          9,0000                        
GEO_SEG 391 1,5446                0,4987                   1,6094              0,6931          2,3979                        
# of geographical segments 4,2609                2,4376                   4,0000              1,0000          10,0000                     
INVREC 391 0,2791                0,1587                   0,2732              0,0000          0,9041                        
LEVERAGE 391 0,5820                0,2188                   0,5866              0,0071          2,5104                        
ROA 391 5,2993                11,4482                5,1500              -100,1000    60,5500                     
(0) (1)
Dichotomous
NON_BIG4 375 16
US_LISTING 281 110
SECONDARY 302 89
SEASONED 299 92
YEAR_END 330 61
CHANGE 372 19
OIL&GAS 385 6
BASIC MATERIAL 358 33
UTILITIES 374 17
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 380 11  
 2
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Table 5 – Analysis of regression results 
  
 
Independent variables β t
Intercept 7,0784       121,26     ***
Explanatory variables
ENFOR_TOT - -0,0171     -4,59        ***
BROWN_AUD + 0,0925       6,12          ***
LIABILITY_CAP - -0,2493     -3,03        ***
Control Variables
Client characteristics
LNASSETS + 0,5756       22,42        ***
BUS_SEG + 0,2543       3,02          ***
GEO_SEG + 0,3594       4,27          ***
INVREC + 0,5840       2,26          **
LEVERAGE + 0,3519       2,03          **
ROA - -0,0021     -0,71        
US_LISTING + 0,2354       3,01          ***
SECONDARY + 0,1375       1,82          *
SEASONED + 0,0147       0,21          
OIL&GAS ? -0,0464     -1,27        
BASIC MATERIAL ? -0,3855     -2,53        **
UTILITIES ? -0,0390     -0,17        
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ? -0,1178     -0,79        
Auditor characteristics
NON_BIG4 - 0,1061       0,45          
CHANGE - -0,0199     -0,15        - , 04     - , 2        
Engagement characteristic
YEAR_END - -0,0104     -0,12        
0,8674       135,28     ***
Highest VIF on explanatory variables 2,02          
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Expected 
direction
Base model
Total Enforcement
(n=391)
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